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Abstract 
In recent years, many Western European urban public transport systems have 
undergone major reorganisation, including London (1985), Madrid (1985), 
Manchester (1986), Zurich (1990), Antwerp (1991), Copenhagen (1991), Athens 
(1992,1993), Gothenburg (1993) and Hamburg (1996). Other cities are also about 
to implement reorganisations in their public transport systems. 
Despite this, and with the exception of the British case, relatively little attention 
has been paid in the literature to the determinants and effects of these changes. 
Nevertheless, economics has benefited from individual contributions from people 
involved in these reorganisations. The aim of this thesis is to address two main 
weaknesses in the existing literature on the organisation of urban public transport. 
Firstly, there is a distinct shortage of studies integrating different experiences in 
terms of forms of organisation. and their important features. Hence, emphasis in 
this thesis is placed on examining structural changes in urban public transport, 
using a broad typology of organisations, and to explore related changes in the 
conduct and performance of public transport systems. 
A second weakness of the literature is the lack of detailed evaluations of the link 
between forms of organisation and the performance of transport operators. The 
evaluation of this link is carried out making use of case studies of Metro de Madrid 
and London Underground. 
The key objective of this thesis is to explore the existence of a link between 
organisation of the urban public transport markets and the performance of 
transport operators. Ile empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that 
reorganisations induce changes in performance levels. Additionally, in the cases of 
Metro de Madrid and London Underground, efficiency and effectiveness values 
emerge as positively correlated which is contrary to evidence presented in previous 
work. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Public transport has played a key role in the increasing urbanisation and social 
progress of Western Europe during the last two centuries. The horse omnibus was 
the first mode of transport guaranteeing a fixed-route service in exchange for a 
fare, pre-announced and independent of the number of passengers. Following this 
the horse tram was introduced but it was only after mechanisation with electric 
power that the service became an immense success. The horse tram brought gains 
in efficiency but the electric tram brought, not only that, but also, affordable 
transportation for the worker on a low income: urban areas expanded, the urban 
population increased and the number of passengers rose sharply. Afterwards 
public transportation evolved with other modes of transport such as the trolley bus, 
the autobus, the metro but none of them transformed the city to such an extent. 
During this initial period the potential for expansion of the market for public 
transport was very high and the constraints were on the supply side: any new mode 
of transport capable of driving costs down was likely to be successful. The 
conditions of operation of the different modes of transport improved, the costs of 
operation were driven down, average'speeds increased and city centres were 
accessible at ever longer distances. 
The mobility of people has continued on an increasing trend, but the number of 
trips using public transport has been decreasing in many cities during the last 50 
years or so and this has brought the utilisation of public transport to very low 
levels. This has been happening because 'public transport' has many of the 
characteristics of 'inferior goods' - increasing wealth means decreasing 
consumption. Wealth makes people more mobile but people have been satisfying 
their need for increasing mobility by using the private car. The growing 
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productivity of the workers, which has been experienced for many decades in 
Europe, induces increasing wages and increasing travel budgets which in turn 
brings increasing car ownership and increasing distances travelled. Increasing 
wages makes public transport more expensive because productivity gains in public 
transportation cannot keep pace with them (Jansen, 1993) and labour costs 
represent around 80% of the operational costs of bus operators (Fazioli et A, 
1993; Levaggi, 1994). 
The increase in car ownership figures experienced by virtually all European 
countries seems be unceasing and the private car is becoming the predominant 
mode for work trips which are the more common journeys. "Flows well served by 
public transport decrease whereas congestion on roads in the urban fringe is 
exploding" [Jansen, 1993,1261. The choice of the transport mode is determined 
by the trip chain of activities each person has to undertake and some activities, in 
which people are captive of the private car such as shopping and taking the 
children to school, are being combined ever more with work trips. 
Both the low levels of public transport utilisation and the trend for increasing 
use of cars are matters of concern because this increasing utilisation is stretching 
some vital urban resources, such as space and clean air, above what is bearable. 
Drivers are increasingly aware of the damages induced by the utilisation of their 
vehicles but seem not to change their individual choices. 
Urban areas suffer from the congestion created by vehicles circulating and 
parking on the public road because space is a scarce resource in city centres. The 
car uses road space very inefficiently and congestion problems affect the operation 
of those public transport modes that have to share the transport network with the 
car. Road networks and forms of urbanisation reflect the fact that European urban 
areas expanded with the intense utilisation of public transport. Cities and their 
street layouts were designed for the most part before the requirements of the new 
vehicle were visualised (Owen, 1966,39) and do not cope well with the spread and 
increase of car utilisation. Public transport is capable of carrying far more 
passengers for the amount of congestion generated. Even low levels of public 
transport utilisation are relevant because public transport uses the space very 
efficiently and most trips are undertaken during peak periods, giving the extra 
capacity when space is the most needed resource. 
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Environmental damage imposed by transport activities can assume the form of 
noise, air pollution and visual impact. This damage is, certainly, of greater concern 
than the congestion problems because it can last longer and is experienced not only 
by travellers but also by non-travellers. The size of the problem of air pollution at 
local, regional and global level is demanding radical changes in people's 
movements. ]Public transport is capable of carrying far more passengers for the 
amount of environmental damage generated. "Environmental considerations 
require that public transport attracts a large share of customers that have the 
private car as an available alternative" [Stem and Tretvik, 1993,148]. 
These problems arise because there are "costs associated with transport that are 
not directly borne by those generating them" [Button, 1993,931. Not only is the 
environment considered a free good but also several aspects related to private car 
utilisation are under priced (e. g. parking). The pricing mechanism determines 
choices and, in this case, determines the balance between private car and public 
transport utilisation. Private vehicles will always be the most economical form of 
travelling in many situations, especially related to activities in areas of low 
population, but drivers should pay all the costs of their activities. Price affects 
consumer choices and the private car is perceived as being a very cheap form of 
transportation. Only a general increase in the price of individual forms of mobility 
would cause people to move back to more efficient means of transport and to 
waWng and cycling. 
A few urban areas in the wealthiest part of central Europe have recently 
reversed the decreasing trends in the share of the market taken by public transport. 
The public authorities have been investing heavily in public transport rail networks 
and supporting the huge deficits of the public transport operators. These measures 
combined with strong policies restricting private car utilisation have produced 
some desired results. However, in some cases the reported increases in the market 
share of public transportation result from longer commuting distances or from 
increases in the number of people that previously walked or cycled and not from 
diverting people away from using the car. But in other parts of Europe the picture 
is the opposite. The reduction in car and petrol taxation in some countries used to 
very high levels of taxation has occurred at the same time as economic growth is 
making petrol and cars ever more affordable. Car ownership has been increasing at 
rates never experienced before and car utilisation is following a similar trend. 
Decreasing trends in the share of public transport seem unstoppable and investment 
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in public transport facilities is not enough and cannot change some long term 
decisions. 
Pucher (1995), comparing the European and North American situations, points 
out that the only effective policies in attaining a reduction in car utilisation and 
enhancing public transport utilisation are high levels of car and petrol taxation, 
restriction of private car utilisation in cities and land-use controls avoiding low 
density developments in the suburbs. 
Public authorities are facing a shortage of capital, which has its own effects on 
public transport operations in terms of investment and the accountability of public 
transport operators. Transport operators receive capital and operational subsidies 
and some researchers have reported that the form of attribution enhances 
inefficiency. Many operators have recently reported cost reductions but many of 
these gains in efficiency are offset by big losses in public transport utilisation. 
In recent years, many Western European urban public transport systems have 
undergone major reorganisation, including London (1985), Madrid (1985), 
Manchester (1986), Zurich (1990), Antwerp (1991), Copenhagen (1991), Athens 
(1992,1993) and Gothenburg (1993). An increasing market orientation, following 
Thatcher-era reforms in Britain, resulted in structural forms which would have 
been politically unacceptable a decade earlier. These changes reflect an interest in 
reducing public expenditure and subsidies, as well as ideological factors (see 
Andersen, 1992). 
1.2 Objective 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the link between the organisation of fixed-route 
urban public transport systems and the performance of transport operators with 
particular emphasis on some Western European transport undertakings operating 
in large metropolitan areas. 
1.3 Research methodology 
Perry et A (1988) review 20 works on the relation between public transport 
organisational. form and perforimance, and find very diverse and even conflicting 
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results among those studies. They realise that "previous research has not made a 
persuasive case for the whole-scale privatisation of either ownership or 
management of urban mass transit organisation" and conclude that "implicit in" 
their "criticisms and suggestions for future research is the view that the use of past 
research about the relationships between organisational form and performance for 
the development of public policy would be both difficult and risky. " (Perry et al., 
1988,139). Those conflicting results derive, among other things, from the fact 
that organisation size and urbanisation affect the form-performance association 
(Perry et aL, 1988,138) and this was not taken into consideration in those studies. 
The inconsistency between the results of those studies has significantly affected 
the research methodology followed here. First of all, the focus of this study is on 
European metropolitan areas and both the size of their transport organisation and 
urbanisation characteristics are still very heterogeneous as shown in chapter 3. 
Secondly, the conceptual explanation was privileged. It was even considered 
whether to undertake this study without mathematical evaluation, using only 
methodologies developed in industrial economics and looking at the coherence of 
the organisational solutions. This may not be entirely reflected in this work 
because it was possible to develop a mathematical evaluation procedure reflecting 
the concepts of performance that were to be measured. The explanation of the 
procedure had to be quite extensive in order to justify its theoretical value and 
practical usefulness. Thirdly, the applications are case studies in order to avoid, as 
much as possible, the problems of different methods of reporting the data. 
Fourthly, metro operators were chosen in order to avoid certain external factors 
such as congestion experienced by the modes of transport that have to share the 
network with the private car. 
1.4 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis that the reorganisation of the urban public transport systems affects 
the performance of operators is tested. The test of the hypothesis is carried out 
using two case studies: the underground operations in London and Madrid. 
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1.5 Structure 
The first chapter contains a brief justification of the reasons that led to the choice 
of this particular study, which are related to the recent developments in the 
organisation of public transport in Western European cities. It also includes the 
objectives of the work, the methodology adopted, the hypothesis tested and its 
structure. 
The second chapter gives a temporal perspective of the evolution of public 
transport in the context of the aims of this work. Therefore, this historical 
description concentrates on the public transport modes and on the involvement of 
public authrities in the transport market. The reason for this is that the substitution 
processes of the modes of transport are related to gains in performance and the 
organisation of public transport systems is, to a great extent, determined by the 
behaviour of public authorities. 
The third chapter offers a brief description of public transport operators in 
Western European urban areas. The characteristics surveyed are mainly of a 
physical and financial nature but also performance and organisational issues are 
presented. The purpose of the survey is to give a general picture of the urban 
public transport operators and highlight their diversities. 
The fourth chapter presents the organisational arrangements currently in place 
in some Western European cities. Models of organising urban public transport 
services are identified and the economic implications of each model are discussed. 
The discussion on the economic implications of each model of organisation is 
carried out using the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
The fifth chapter offers a very brief discussion of the reasons for reorganising 
the urban public transport system, strategies adopted in switching from one 
organisational model to another and evidence of those changes in the metropolitan 
areas analysed. This chapter offers several possibilities for future related work and 
its introduction has to be seen in this context because the themes tackled go 
beyond the aims of this study. 
The sixth chapter is dedicated to the problem of performance evaluation. The 
chapter offers a different method to evaluate the performance of the undertakings - 
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Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix (EEM) - which has numerous theoretical and 
practical advantages over the traditional methods. Because of the novelty of the 
methodology of evaluation, comparisons with other applications are carried out 
and this chapter assumes a particular importance in the overall work. 
The seventh chapter offers applications of the methodology proposed 
previously, exploring the link between the performance of the operators and 
organisation of the urban public transport market. This is done with the case 
studies of the London Underground and Metro de Madrid. The results are also 
useful in illustrating the strength of the EEM method. 
The last chapter presents the main conclusions of the previous chapters 
highlighting the original aspects researched in this work and offering policy 
implications and some specific ways of continuing research in this area. 
1.7 
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An historical view of urban public transport in 
Europe 
2.1 Introduction 
Public transport in urban areas, and by 'public transport' is meant a service 
transporting passengers along a predetermined itinerary in exchange of a fare, has 
been guaranteed by different modes of transport. Each of them affected the 
dimension and organisation of public transport markets in different forms but 
public authorities became gradually more involved in the provision of the service. 
In the following pages we explore the relation between the evolution of modes 
of transport, public transport utilisation and involvement of public authorities in the 
transport markets in the European cities. The discussion is carried out in turn of 
the modes of public transport widely in place, at some point in time, during the 
short history of urban public transportation. Those modes are the horse omnibus, 
the tram (horse and electric), the trolleybus, the motor bus and the metro. The 
train is left outside this analysis because, in many urban areas, it is difficult to 
distinguish when the services were of suburban or interurban nature. 
The aim of the chapter is to present a temporal characterisation of urban public 
transport focusing on the main issues studied here: performance and organisation. 
The first part of the chapter relates to performance issues and focus on the 
succession of transport modes and their substitution processes. Those substitution 
processes are related to the ability to drive costs down and enhancing an increase 
in the utilisation. The second part relates to organisational issues and focus on the 
involvement of public authorities. 
An historical view of urban public transport in Europe 
2.2 Modes of transport: innovation and diffusion 
Technological change and incremental technology, at various levels, played an 
important role in the success of urban public transport. For the purpose of this 
analysis "change is defined in terms of the means of performing a given technical 
task, fulfilling a certain need, or achieving a specific objective" and "incremental 
technology is the continual improvement of existing products and processes by 
small steps" (Girifalco, 1991,2 and 5). The function 'public transport' in urban 
areas includes major systems such as the road and rail network, major devices such 
as trams and buses, components such as engines and sub components such as 
wheels and tyres. Each of these parts has a function of its own to support the 
overall function 'public transport'. 
The time sequence of the technological change will be divided in the following 
broad areas: invention, innovation, diffusion and decline. "Invention is the process 
of arriving at an idea for a device, product, or process and demonstrating its 
feasibility. Innovation is the process by which the invention is first brought into 
use. Diffusion is the process of spread of the innovation into other situations" 
(Girifalco, 1991,3). Decline is the process of substitution of the old technology 
for a new one performing the same task. The analysis will focus on the transport 
devices and dates will be attached to the occurrences, whenever possible. 
Blaise Pascal was well ahead of his time when he and some friends introduced 
the public transport service in Paris, in March 1662. They requested permission to 
explore an omnibus "that would follow the same routes everyday;... for five sols... 
and would start everyday at a fixed time, even if few people or any were present 
without any extra charge for the ones using the service". Given the initial success, 
by July the same year they were operating five lines, one of them circular. The 
licence was conceded on the condition that "soldiers, pages, lackeys and other 
workers" were not allowed to use the service "for the more comfort of people of 
merit". The hostility of the general public to such a pretentious service, the 
deficient conditions of circulation in the narrow streets of Paris and the increase in 
the fares to six sols led to the closure of the company, probably in 1677 (Robert, 
1974,19). 
The transformation of mass transportation into a successful business is generally 
attributed to a horse omnibus service launched in Nantes by Stanislas Baudry, in 
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1826.1 The service was meant to transport people from the centre of the city to 
some baths he had built in its outskirts but it became very popular with passengers 
boarding for different destinations along the route. The baths were never a success 
and were eventually closed but Baudry extended the transport services to the 
streets of Nantes (Robert, 1974,21). 
The diffusion of the horse omnibus service started almost immediately. In 
1828, Baudry got pen-nission to explore ten lines, using 100 vehicles, through the 
streets of Paris (Robert, 1974,21). In the following year, George Shillibeer, a 
coach builder with interests in Paris, introduced the horse omnibus in London 
(Barker and Robbins, 1963,20) and Jakub Chocenský obtained the right to operate 
the omnibus in Prague (Carter, 1973,209). In the 1830s and 1840s many cities 
saw local entrepreneurs launching the same kind of service: Le Havre in 1832, 
Geneva in 1833, Birmingham in 1834, Brussels in 1835, Lyons in 1837, Dresden in 
1838, Milan in 1841 and Berlin in 1846.2 
The horse tram was the second mode of transport widely used in public 
transport in urban areas. The horse tram became viable with the solution of the 
problem of the height of the rail achieved in 1852 with an experiment carried out in 
New York under the supervision of the French engineer Alflionse Loubat. This 
was a significant innovation because the first trams had used rails placed above 
street level and such rails interfered with the other traffic which created public 
hostility (McKay, 1976,14). The horse tram used the horse power, the operators' 
main expense, much more efficiently than the omnibus and it was safer, more 
comfortable, faster, smoother and less noisy (Barker and Robbins, 1963,178-179). 
In spite of these advantages the horse tram needed the construction of the track 
and so the omnibus remained with a niche in the market in the places where this 
was not justifiable or where opposition to track laying arose. Table 2.1 shows 
information related to dates of diffusion of the horse tram in some of the most 
populated European cities in 1875. It took ten years from the introduction of the 
I Hibbs (1989a, 25) describes a public transport service launched by John Greenwood in 
Manchester in 1824, Carter (1973,224) mentions that the horse omnibus was established in 
Vienna in 1824 and Jenson (1978,18) attributes the merit of starting the service to Jacques 
Laffite in Paris in 1819 but this fact is generally attributed to Baudry because the service spread to 
other cities from the knowledge of the success of his experience. 
2 Le Havre (Robert, 1974,431); Geneva (Boegli et A, 1976,19); Birmingham (Jenson, 1971, 
113); Brussels (Socidtd des Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles, 1976,21); Lyons (Robert, 
1974,303); Dresden and Berlin (McKay, 1976,11); Milan (Cornolb and Severi, 1987,10). 
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horse tram in New York to have a regular horse tram service in a major European 
city and it took nearly another two decades to have the tram in all of them. 
Table 2.1 
Innovation and diffusion of the horse tram in Europe 
Innovation Diffusion in Europe Closure 
New York Paris (1854/1873) Dresden (1872) Stuttgart (1896) 
(1832/1852) London (1861/1870) Barcelona (1872) Leipzig (1897) 
Geneva (1862) Leipzig (1872) Liverpool (1898) 
Copenhagen(1863) Turin (1872) Dresden (1900) 
St Petersburg (1863) Moscow (1872) Munich (1900) 
Berlin (1865) Birmingham (1872/3) Manchester (1903) 
Vienna (1865) Sheffield (1873) Vienna (1903) 
Hamburg (1866) Antwerp (1873) Oporto (1904) 
Budapest (1866) Lisbon (1873) Fran kfu rt (1904) 
Stuttgart (1868) Amsterdam (1875) Prague (1905) 
Brussels (1869) Bristol (1875) Cologne (1907) 
Constantinople (1869) Prague (1875) Berlin (1907/10) 
Liverpool (1869) Marseilles (1876) London(1914) 
Madrid (1870) Munich (1876) Copenhagen(1915) 
Leeds(1871) Manchester (1877) Amsterdam (1916) 
Edinburgh (187 1) Cologne (1877) Hamburg (1922) 
Oporto (1872) Genoa(1878) 
Cardiff (1872) Milan (1878) 
Glasgow (1872) Rotterdam (1879) 
Dublin (1872) Bordeaux (1880) 
Fran kfu rt (18 72) Lyons(1880) 
Data: Amsterdam (Deacon, 1980,10 and 23); Antwerp (Keutgens, 1975b, 2); Barcelona (Del 
Castillo and Riu, 1959,21); Berlin, Cologne, Dresden, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, Munich and 
Stuttgart (Hendlmeier, 1981,11: 11-16); Birmingham (Jenson, 1971,125); Bordeaux, Lyons and 
Marseilles (Robert, 1974, Table 1); Bristol (Cooper, 1974,75); Brussels (Socidtd des Transports 
Intercommunaux de Bruxelles, 1976,61); Budapest (Carter, 1973,224); Cardiff (Morgan, 1986, 
178); Constantinople (Hendlmeier, 1981,1: 31); Copenhagen (Taplin, 1967,3 and 15); Dublin 
(Flanagan, 1969,82); Edinburgh (Booth, 1971,35); Geneva (Boegli et aL, 1976,21); Genoa 
(Azienda Municipalizzata Trasporti, 1980,37); Glasgow (Simpson, 1972,150); Lisbon 
(Companhia Carris de Ferro de Lisboa, 1993,7); Leeds (Dickinson, 1960,215); Liverpool (Bett 
and Gillham, 1962,23); London (Barker and Robbins, 1963,178; Barker and Robbins, 1974, 
170); Manchester (Joyce, 1965,24); Madrid (Hendlmeier, 1981,1: 31); Milan (Cornolb and 
Severi, 1987,15); Moscow (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Blickpunkt Stral3enbahn e. V., 1996,99); New 
York (McKay, 1976,14); Oporto (Pereira, 1995,34 and 46); Paris (Merlin, 1982,17; Basti6, 
1964,129); Prague (Carter, 1973,211 and 215); Rotterdam (Schoonaard, 1971,7); St. Petersburg 
(Bater, 1973,88); Sheffield (Hall, 1977,30); Turin (Hendlmeier, 1981,1: 31); Vienna (Joyce, 
1965,56). 
Note: Cities in italics are not among the 36 most populated cities in Europe in 1875, as seen in 
Chandler (1974). 
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The productivity of the service had increased with the horse tram and lower 
fares were possible but the costs of operation were still high, the fares were above 
what the worker in a low income could afford and several attempts to mechanise 
the tram took place (McKay, 1976,12-13). Steam power was introduced in some 
cities but generally over short periods of time and was of little significance (e. g. 
Steam tram in Antwerp 1888-1891, Copenhagen 1884-1892, Munich 1883-1900, 
one line in Oporto 1878-1914 and funiculars in Lisbon 1889-1927). 3 The same 
happened with the cable tram with the exception of Edinburgh where the cable 
network was from 1900, quite extensive. The system started to be built in 1888, 
was greatly extended in 1900, but the operation was very complex and in 1922 and 
1923, was converted to electric traction (Hunter, 1954; Booth, 197 1). 
The electric tram was the technological innovation that provided a cheap foun. 
of transportation and a swift increase in public transport utilisation. McKay (1976, 
241) says: 
"... I would argue that the change from animated-powered transport of the age of 
walking cities and horse-drawn vehicles, including tramways, to inanimate, 
mechanized, mass-produced, and mass oriented urban public transportation has 
ocurred only once. For Europe, that once was with electric streetcars. Thereafter 
urban public transportation has evolved with buses, high-speed trains, express 
subways, etc., or even declined where the harmful consequences of basing urban 
civilization upon the private automobile have been grossly underestimated, as in the 
United States. But it has not been revolutionized. " 
The electric tram was made possible because of several technical developments. 
Siemens built for the Berlin Industrial Exhibition of 1879 the "first practical electric 
train in the world with current taken from a stationary generator" but the power 
supply was still from a third rail but in the Paris exhibition in 1881 Siemens 
experimented with the first overhead conductors with copper wire. In the 
beginning of the 1880s, in spite of some technical difficulties, some electric 
tramway systems with underground supply were built in holiday resorts (McKay, 
1976,37-39). These systems had operational costs similar to those of the horse 
tram (The Engineer, 1890, (April 25), 342) which were profiting from the 
favourable state of the hay and grain market experienced after the mid-1870s 
3 Antwerp (Keutgens, 1975b, 3); Copenhagen (Taplin, 1967,4); Lisbon (Companhia Carris de 
Ferro de Lisboa, 1993,12); Munich (Hendimeier, 198 1,11: 13); Oporto (Pereira, 1995,48). 
2.5 
An historical view of urban pubfic transport in Europe 
The productivity of the service had increased with the horse tram and lower 
fares were possible but the costs of operation were still high, the fares were above 
what the worker in a low income could afford and several attempts to mechanise 
the tram took place (McKay, 1976,12-13). Steam power was introduced in some 
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one line in Oporto 1878-1914 and funiculars in Lisbon 1889-1927). 3 The same 
happened with the cable tram with the exception of Edinburgh where the cable 
network was from 1900, quite extensive. The system started to be built in 1888, 
was greatly extended in 1900, but the operation was very complex and in 1922 and 
1923, was converted to electric traction (Hunter, 1954; Booth, 1971). 
The electric tram was the technological innovation that provided a cheap fonn 
of transportation and a swift increase in public transport utilisation. McKay (1976, 
241) says: 
"... I would argue that the change from animated-powered transport of the age of 
walking cities and horse-drawn vehicles, including tramways, to inanimate, 
mechanized, mass-produced, and mass oriented urban public transportation has 
ocurred only once. For Europe, that once was with electric streetcars. Thereafter 
urban public transportation has evolved with buses, high-speed trains, express 
subways, etc., or even declined where the harmful consequences of basing urban 
civilization upon the private automobile have been grossly underestimated, as in the 
United States. But it has not been revolutionized. " 
The electric tram was made possible because of several technical developments. 
Siemens built for the Berlin Industrial Exhibition of 1879 the "first, practical electric 
train in the world with current taken from a stationary generator" but the power 
supply was still from a third rail but in the Paris exhibition in 1881 Siemens 
experimented with the first overhead conductors with copper wire. In the 
beginning of the 1880s, in spite of some technical difficulties, some electric 
tramway systems with underground supply were built in holiday resorts (McKay, 
1976,37-39). These systems had operational costs similar to those of the horse 
tram (The Engineer, 1890, (April 25), 342) which were profiting from the 
favourable state of the hay and grain market experienced after the mid-1870s 
3 Antwerp (Keutgens, 1975b, 3); Copenhagen (Taplin, 1967,4); Lisbon (Companhia Carris de 
Ferro de Lisboa, 1993,12); Munich (Hendimeier, 1981,11: 13); Oporto (Pereira, 1995,48). 
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(Barker and Gerhold, 1995,47) and even more in the middle 80s (Engineering, 
1887, (Nov. 18), 530). 
Table 2.2 
Innovation and diffusion of the electric tram in Europe 
Innovation Diffusion Closure 
Richmond Bremen (1890) Glasgow (1898) Paris (1938) 
(1888) Berlin (1890) Liverpool (1898) Manchester (1947) 
Leeds(1891) Copenhagen(1899) London(1952) 
Paris (1892) Frankfurt (1899) Birmingham (1953) 
Lyons(1893) Moscow (1899) Belfast (1954) 
Dresden (1893) Sheffield (1899) Liverpool (1957) 
Genoa(1893) Barcelona (1899) Lyons(1957) 
Milan (1893) Amsterdam (1900) Leeds(1959) 
Breslau (1893) Birmingham (1901) Glasgow (1962) 
Hamburg (1894) Cologne (1901) Hamburg (1978) 
Brussels (1894) London(1901) 
Bristol (1895) Lisbon (1901) 
Munich (1895) Manchester (190 1) 
Oporto (1895) Antwerp (1902) 
Dublin (1896) Belfast (1905) 
Leipzig (1896) Rotterdam (1905) 
Prague (1896) St Petersburg (1907) 
Vienna (1897) Edinburgh (1910/1922) 
Madrid (1898) 
Data: Amsterdam (Deacon, 1980,18); Antwerp (Keutgens, 1975b, 3); Barcelona (Zurita, 1964, 
4); Belfast (Flanagan, 1969,72); Berlin, Bremen, Cologne, Dresden, Frankfurt, Hamburg, 
Leipzig and Munich (Hendimeier, 1981,11: 11-16); Birmingham ( Klapper, 1974,150; Kay and 
Cormack, 1977,156); Breslau (Hendlmeier, 1981,11: 16); Bristol (Cooper, 1974,90); Brussels 
(Socidtd des Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles, 1976,178); Copenhagen (Taplin, 1967, 
10); Dublin (Flanagan, 1969,82); Edinburgh (Booth, 1971,37/38); Genoa (Azienda 
Municipalizzata Trasporti, 1980,96); Glasgow (Simpson, 1972,151; Joyce, 1965,31); Lee& 
(Dickinson, 1960,218; Kay and Cormack, 1977,156); Lisbon (Companhia. Carris de Ferro de 
Lisboa, 1993,10); Liverpool (Bett and Gillham, 1962,22 and 23); London (Barker and Robbins, 
1974,15; Kay and Cormack, 1977,156); Lyons and Paris (Robert, 1974, Table I); Manchester 
(Joyce, 1965,24 and 25); Madrid (Empresa Municipal de Transportes, 1992); Milan (Cornolb 
and Severi, 1987,19); Moscow (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Blickpunkt StraBenbahn e. V., 1996,99); 
Oporto (Pereira, 1995,46); Prague (Carter, 1973,215); Richmond (McKay, 1976,49); Rotterdam 
(Schoonaard, 1971,7); St. Petersburgh (Bater, 1973,92); Sheffield (Hall, 1977,71); Vienna 
(Joyce, 1965,56). 
Notes: Electric tram with electricity by overhead wire. Cities in italics are not among the 41 most 
populated cities in Europe in 1900, as seen in Chandler (1974). 
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In 1888, in Richmond, Virginia, USA, the American Julian Sprague built the 
first network with equipment able to provide a regular service, without major 
disruptions, with the electric supply by overhead wires (McKay, 1976,49). 
Sprague's system, as well as Thomson-Houston's one, enabled a reduction in 
working expenses of about 45% (The Engineer, 1890, (April 25), 342). This 
information spread quickly and Richmond "became the mecca of railway operators 
and investors" (McKay, 1976,50). Other cities had the system built in a few years 
as shown in Table 2.2. Incremental technology and the gains in the phase of 
learning by doing were also important (Dawson, 1895b, 144 - see Table A. 1.5 in 
Appendix A. 1). Fares went down, public transport was then affordable for those 
on a low income and utilisation increased sharply (McKay, 1976,202). 4 
The electric tram was a perfect substitute for the horse tram which entered a 
period of rapid decline and most systems were soon closed as shown in Table 2.1. 
Within two years of Sprague's success in Richmond the electric tram with overhead 
wire was operating in Europe and, with few exceptions, within 10 years the major 
urban centres had an electric tramway system. 
Table 2.3 
Comparisons of rise and decline of electric tramway operations 
Country/Group GB F BX D CII AH CS PL SD IB 
% open 
by 1.1.1895 56688 13 743322 
by 1.1.1900 19 39 11 20 36 40 38 41 46 14 11 15 
by 1.1.1905 79 67 37 59 57 50 53 59 65 42 41 28 
at 1.1.1950 16 36 83 89 77 73 92 93 90 92 84 73 
at 1.1.1960 47 57 73 64 63 92 74 87 64 58 27 
N. of operators 196 163 49 236 83 22 13 27 32 39 (34) (99) 
Year 50% Open 02 00 06 02 02 03 00 01 00 07 06 09 
Year 50% Closed 35 45 61 69 67 76 NA NA NA 71 63 54 
GB - British Isles: F- France (1930): BX - Netherlands + Belgium + Luxembourg: D- Germany 
(E+W) (1950): CH - Switzerland: A- Austria: H- Hungary: CS - Czechoslovakia: PL - Poland (1950): SD - Sweden + Norway + Finland + Denmark: IB - Spain + Portugal: I- Italy: NA - Not Applicable: Data relates to national boundaries as at year given: () incomplete data. 
Source: Souter (1996,188). 
Electric trams still operate in some Western European cities but the 
development of the trolleybus and the motor bus resulted in the abandonment of 
4 Appendix A. 1 includes tables and figures illustrating these arguments. 
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many electric tramway lines. The choice of public transport modes with the horse 
tram and electric tram was clear, so great were the advantages of these new modes 
of transport over the existing ones everywhere. The substitution of the electric 
tram was a more complex decision. The process of substitution was influenced by 
the economic environments experienced in different countries. Table 2.3 shows 
that the opening of the electric tramway systems occurred approximately at the 
same time everywhere in Europe but the closure of the undertakings occurred 
much sooner in Great Britain and France than anywhere else. 
The main cost differences between the electric tram, the trolleybus and the 
motor bus over a period of four decades or so were the ones related to initial 
investments. The operational costs of the electric tram and trolleybus were 
comparable from the 1910s (Gribble, 1915,52-53) and the operational costs of the 
electric tram, trolleybus and motor bus were possibly comparable in the 1920s, 
30s, 40s and 50s. The abandonment of the tramway was related to the huge 
investments needed for track replacement but the moment of the abandonment of 
specific services was influenced by several different factors, internal and external to 
the industry. 5 The electric tram kept its competitiveness longer in large cities 
without underground systems because the capacity of the tram ensured a better 
position to deal with heavy traffic than other modes. In small cities the tram's 
struggle to survive began earlier. 
The first operational troHeybus line was opened in 1901 in Bielethal, in 
Germany, but being unprofitable, closed in 1904. Several other lines opened in the 
following years across Europe but most of them had to close before the 1920s 
(Kuipers, 1977,58-59). Taking France as an example, all the initial trolleybus 
systems had very few vehicles (Montaubau was the most extensive with 5 vehicles) 
and closed within a few years of their opening dates (e. g. Lyons 1901-07, 
Marseilles 1902-08, Saint Malo 1906-07, Fontaineblau 1901-13, Mulhouse 1908- 
18 and Montaubau 1903-04). 6 During the 1910s in Britain the trolleybus started to 
present some advantages over the electric tram and with the increasing utilisation 
of the tyre in the 1920s the trolleybus appeared to be the natural successor to the 
tramway. Design improvement resulted in greater reliability, comfort and higher 
5 Souter (1996,187) summarises the factors pointed by Ian Iardsley and Buckley and establishes 
an extensive list of external factors. 
6 Robert (1974, Table H). 
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speed (Pilcher, 1937,135). The operational costs were about the same as the bus 
which was much noisier and polluted more. 
By the 1930s the trolleybus had "advanced from a position in which it was 
regarded in the main only as suitable as a means of developing short lengths of 
route preliminary to tramway operation, to that in which it" was then "considered 
capable of replacing complete tramway systems" (Pilcher, 1937,135 and 137). 
Some regular trolleybus systems were constructed in Britain in the 1910s but most 
of them were built during the 1920s and 1930s. In France and Germany most 
systems were built during the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s. 
The introduction of the trolleybus was linked, in many cases, to secondary 
reasons. Difficulties in obtaining petrol after World War II and the long life span 
of some electric equipment that could be used from the tramway network favoured 
the introduction of the trolleybus. 
gure . 
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(Data: Kay and Cormack, 1977,150). 7 
7 Brearley (1996) reports similar information. There are minor differences in dates of opening 
and number of systems. Brearley (1996) includes information on the dimension of trolleybus 
operators. 
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In Britain the involvement of municipalities in the production of electricity also 
affected the decision to adopt the trolleybus. That might be the main reason why 
Britain had regular trolleybus services before other countries. The decline started 
in the 1950s and most systems closed during the 1960s. By then the advantages of 
the motor bus were clear. The price of petrol had been decreasing for a long 
perio d and operational costs had gone down. The trolleybus did not have the 
flexibility of the bus and road repairs, accidents and power failure could bring the 
whole system to a halt. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the diffusion and decline of the 
trolleybus in British and French towns. 
Figure 2.2 
Number of trolleybus systems operating in each year and accumulated value in 
French urban areas 
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The motor bus was the mode that widely took over as the main mode of public 
transport in urban areas. The first motor bus service opened in 1895 between the 
cities of Netphen and Deuz in Germany, with buses built by Benz (Kuipers, 1977, 
4). Approximately around 1905 the motor bus was presenting advantages in 
relation to the horse omnibus which, in spite of high operational costs, was still in 
use because of its flexibility. The motor bus was a good substitute for the horse 
omnibus and in virtually ten years the horse omnibus disappeared from the cities 
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where it had survived (e. g. Paris in 1913 and London in 1914), 8 giving way to the 
electric tram. However, the process of diffusion was slow because it took time to 
develop many engineering parts such as the body, engine and tyre. Many cities, in 
spite of early attempts to introduce the motor bus (e. g. Edinburgh in 1898, 
Barcelona in 1906, Amsterdam in 1908, Lisbon in 1912), only had regular services 
much later (e. g. Edinburgh from 1919, Amsterdam and Barcelona from 1922 and 
Lisbon from 1944). 9 The motor bus became gradually more competitive in areas of 
low density (Engineering, 1913,779-780). "Some years before motor buses were 
supposed to have become competitive with the trams as far as working costs were 
concerned, trams were already becoming uneconomic because of their intrinsic 
high capital replacement costs" (Buckley, 1989,104). In the 1950s with the fleet 
fully dieselised, new metal bodies which meant lower maintenance costs and the 
raising of the bus/employee productivity the advantages of the motor bus were 
greater (Buckley, 1989,109). 
Underground systems were built in some of the larger European urban areas 
because the degree of congestion already experienced in the road network led to 
the need for dedicated public transport corridors. The number of buildings in city 
centres made the construction of open air railway lines impossible, such would be 
the amount of destruction and monetary compensation needed to impose such a 
solution. The underground offered the best form of providing a service of high 
frequency and high capacity, matching the needs of the ever larger cities. In 1863 
London, the largest city of the time with around 3 million inhabitants, was the first 
to construct a metro, powered with steam. Glasgow and Budapest followed in 
1896, with a cable and a electric system respectively, and Paris in 1900 with an 
electric system. London started electrification in 1890 and Glasgow changed from 
the cable system to electric power in 1935. 
The construction of an underground line demanded huge amounts of capital. In 
the first systems the construction was done by the cut-and-cover principle (e. g. 
London and Paris) with lines following the road network but with the improvement 
of engineering techniques in the construction of tunnels, construction became less 
disruptive of urban life. Construction costs differed considerably between cities 
8 Paris (Engineering, 1922, (June 16), 740); London (Flibbs, 1989a, 69). 
9 Amsterdam (Deacon, 1980); Barcelona (Zurita, 1964,8); Edinburgh (Mbbs, 1989a, 42; Booth, 
1971,37); Lisbon (Companhia Carris de Ferro de Lisboa, 1993,12). 
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(Reilly, 1992,104). Table 2.4 gives the opening dates of the underground systems 
in Europe. 
Table 2.4 
Innovation and diffusion of underground systems in Europe 
Innovation Diffusion in Europe 
London (1863) Glasgow (1896) St Petersburg (1955) Vienna (1976) 
Budapest (1896) Lisbon (1959) Lyons(1978) 
Paris (1900) Kiev (1960) Marseilles (1978) 
Berlin (1902) Milan (1964) Newcastle (1980) 
Hamburg (1912) Oslo(1966) Helsinki (1982) 
Madrid (1919) Frankfurt (1968) Lille (1983) 
Barcelona (1924) Rotterdam (1968) Kharkow (1984) 
Bucharest (1929) Munich (1971) Novosibirsk (1985) 
Moscow (1935) Nuremberg (1972) Toulouse (1993) 
Stockholm (1950) Prague (1974) 
Rome (1955) Brussels (1976) 
Data: Union International des Transports Publiques (1964) and Jane's Urban Transport Systems. 
2.3 Public transport utilisation 
The success of public transport has been related to technology and costs. There 
was a potential market to explore and any new mode of transport able to drive the 
costs down and provide a reliable, comfortable and safe service was likely to be 
successful. The level of utilisation increased sharply with the introduction of the 
electric tram and kept increasing until intensive use of the private car changed this 
trend. Figures 2.3,2.4 and 2.5 show the number of passengers in Antwerp, in 
Marseilles and in the tramway system in Leipzig. The evolution in the number of 
passengers followed similar patterns and the impact of the introduction of the 
electric tram is easily spotted: Antwerp from 1902, Marseilles from 1892 and 
Leipzig from 1896. 
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Figure 2.3 
PubHc transport utiEsation in Antwerp 
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Figure 2.4 
Public transport utilisation in Marseilles 
250 
, 200 
150 
loo 
50 
,01 
C-1 8 00 vA rý !? 00 0 ;3N r- c> 
1--4 Z _A -4 24 1. -1 -4 24 
Year 
(Data: Laupiýs and Martin, 1975,590). 
2.13 
C14 00 A0 ýo N 00 It 2s cq 884 
-4 m Cf) wl) t-- 
a, % m c7N Clý c7A (71 m ON m 
wý wý w-4 ý4 V-4 4 Y-4 -4 ý4 V-4 ý4 
Year 
An historical view Of urban pubUc transport in Europe 
Figure 2.5 
Tram utilisation in Leipzig 
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(Data: Adam et aL, 1966,240-242). 
Table 2.5 
Peak year of passengers carried in European cities 
Year city 
1942 Marseffles 
1946 Antwerp 
Copenhagen 
1948 London 
1950 Manchester 
1956 Genoa 
1957 Edinburgh 
Frankfurt 
Data: Antwerp (Keutgens, 1975a, 411); Copenhagen (Taplin, 
1967,24); Edinburgh and Manchester (Sharp, 1967,27); 
Frankfurt (Yago, 1984,114); Genoa (Azienda Municipalizzata 
Trasporti, 1980,696); London (Barker, 1980,86); Marseilles 
(Laupi6s and Martin, 1975,590). 
The increasingly intensive use of the private car led to reductions in public 
transport utilisation. These reductions started in the 1940s in the wealthier 
European cities and regions but later became more widespread. Table 2.5 contains 
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data showing years of peak numbers of passengers for a selection of European 
cities. 
More recently this downward trend has been reversed in a limited number of 
European cities that have restrained car utilisation and invested heavily in their 
public transport system (e. g. Zurich, Munich). 
2.4 Market characteristics 
Public authorities have gradually increased their involvement in the provision of 
public transport services in urban areas. In the beginning, with the horse omnibus, 
markets were very competitive and the involvement of local public authorities was 
confined to the granting of licences and law enforcement. Nowadays the 
involvement of public authorities extends, in many cases, to the point of actual 
operation of the transport service itself. Between these two extreme situations a 
variety of combinations have existed and continue to exist. 
Three phases in the longer term evolution of urban public transport market can 
generally be identified: 
1) an entrepreneurial stage when the mode of transport first emerged. This 
phase was characterised by great dynamism and frequent market instability needing 
considerable entrepreneurial ability to survive; 10 
2) a period of agreements, mergers and consolidation in an attempt to increase 
profits and economic rents or achieve market stability to improve the prospects of 
staying in the market. The consolidation was achieved either through fare and 
service agreements between the operators or promoted by public authorities with 
the granting of monopoly licences; 
3) a period of public involvement in which public authorities assumed the 
responsibility of operating urban public transport services. This public involvement 
had its greatest expression in Britain with the increasing involvement of municipal 
corporations in urban services. The justification of the municipal enterprise was 
put forward in the following terms: "At first private individuals with capital behind 
10 In economic terms this type of situation is said to be characterised by the lack of acore'. 
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them relieved the authorities of certain duties. Then they joined hands and the 
company became a public servant. But as towns increased in wealth, and more 
able men went, into office and public opinion strengthened, with an eye to greater 
perfection in public service, Parliament began to grant to the municipal 
corporations the privilege of doing their own work. The opportunity for self- 
employment, the sense of co-operation, and the personal interest of the public has 
increased this. This may be the raison d9tre of municipal socialism in England. " 
[Gibbons, 1901,248]. 
Not all modes of public transport experienced these three phases and certainly 
this did not happen in the same form or at the same time in every urban area. 
However, as in the case of diffusion of modes of transport, the similarifies in 
experiences between cities are impressive. Table 2.6 offers the phases of evolution 
generally experienced by each mode of transport. 
Table 2.6 
Phases of evolution of market characteristics of transport modes 
Mode Phases 
Entrepreneurial Consolidation Public involvement 
Horse Omnibus yes yes no 
Tram yes (Horse tram) yes yes (Electric tram) 
Trolleybus no no yes 
Motor bus yes/no yes/no yes 
Metro yes/no yes/no yes 
Horse Omnibus 
The horse omnibus went through the first two phases: an entrepreneurial stage 
and a phase of agreements, mergers and consolidation. 
The entrepreneurial stage was difficult and most of the initial entrepreneurs had 
to close their businesses within a few years of their opening. For example, Baudry 
(Nantes and Paris) became bankrupt and committed suicide in 1830 (Robert, 1974, 
21); Schillibeer (London) saw all his property seized in 1836, fled to Boulogne to 
escape his creditors and, on his return to Britain spent several months in prison 
(Barker and Robbins, 1963,29); the two initial companies formed in Birmingham 
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were last mentioned in 1838 and 1843 (Jenson, 1978,34); while the service started 
in Prague was prone to failure from the beginning (Carter, 1973,209). 
The usual advantages of arriving first in the market (first mover advantage) did 
not exist. In the large cities the closures occurred because competition was fierce, 
the markets were very unstable and many of the initial entrepreneurs could not 
survive in such an environment. In other cities there was not enough demand and 
the conditions of operation in the narrow streets of city centres was difficult. 
The process of agreements between operators to combat instabilities started 
almost from the beginning (e. g. London since 1831 (Barker and Robbins, 1963, 
23)). More important consolidations were achieved either by the concession of 
monopoly licences (e. g. Paris and Lyons in 1855) or by attempts to create private 
monopolies (e. g. London in 1856). 
In Paris, after the introduction of the horse omnibus in April 1828, the number 
of operators spread: there were three operators by the end of 1828 and ten by the 
end of 1829 (Robert, 1974,21). Competition, however, was fierce, several 
regroupings and mergers occurred and new companies were formed. The 
intervention of the Chief Constable Pidtri (Merlin, 1982,17), and the Prefect 
Haussman, led to the merger in 1855 of the existing 10 companies to form the 
Compagnie Gdndrale des Omnibus, which received monopoly operating rights for 
30 years. The same happened in Lyons with the merger of the six existing 
companies in 1855 and the creation of Compagnie Lyonnaise d'Omnibus which 
obtained the monopoly of omnibus operation (Robert, 1974,23-24). In these two 
French cases, public authorities took an active role in the process of consolidation. 
In 1855 the Compagnie Gdndrale des Omnibus de Londres (later renamed 
London General Omnibus Company - LGOC) was formed in Paris. During 1856 
the company managed to buy operators owning 600 out the 800 vehicles of the 
existing stock and established agreements with most the remaining ones. The 
Parisian experience highlighted the advantages of monopolies in the operation of 
public transport and a similar market structure was tried in London. The company 
"achieved economies of scale in the purchase and processing of horse feed and in 
stabling" (Barker and Gerhold, 1995,47). 
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Tram 
The tram experienced each of the three phases of evolution identified 
previously. From the beginning, using horse power, two institutions emerged: the 
public authority which regulated the tramways but did not operate them and the 
private operators which had the concessions to build and operate the tramways in 
public streets for private profit (McKay, 1976,18-19). 
The entrepreneurial phase was smooth. The need for track construction in 
public road and acquisition of vehicles led to the granting of long term concessions. 
The ownership of these long term concessions had some economic value. The 
various urban markets were stable but relations between the authorities and the 
operators were generally rather poor with Glasgow representing, probably, the 
extreme case. A major difficulty was that operators and municipalities did not 
share the same objectives. The operators wanted to maximise profits and the 
municipalities wanted to develop the transport network and expand the physical 
limits of the cities. Concessions were normally granted line by line or over small 
areas and, more rarely, for the entire area of a city. Antwerp, Berlin, London, 
Madrid, Lisbon and Paris enjoyed a relatively large number of operators but in 
other cities, such as Amsterdam, Oporto and Prague, the number was limited to 
just one or two. 
A more deep consolidation of markets was attained at the time of electrification 
because, with the exception of larger cities, it was not feasible to have several 
operators electrifying the streets. The industrial organisation of the market became 
monopolistic or, at least, there was a greater degree of concentration. The 
consolidation was achieved in one of three ways: monopolies or oligopolies 
created by the private organisations, merging their companies or buying the 
competitors (e. g. Oporto in 1893, Lisbon between 1892 and 1896, Copenhagen in 
1897), granting of monopoly licences to a private operator (e. g. Milan in 1897, 
Antwerp in 1902) or municipalisation (e. g. Amsterdam in 1900, Frankfurt in 
1898). 
Table 2.7 shows the dates of electrification together with the creation of private 
and public monopolies in selected European cities. 
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Table 2.7 
Dates of electrification and creation of monopolies of tram networks 
Electric tram Private monopolies Public involvement 
Amsterdam 1900 1900 
Antwerp 1902 1901 s. 1945 
Barcelona 1899 1952/53 
Belfast 1905 - 1904 
Berlin 1890 - 1918 
Birmingham 1901 - s. 1904 c. 1911 
Cardiff 1902 - s. 1902 c. 1903 
Copenhagen 1899 1898 s. 1911 C. 1919 
Edinburgh 1910/1922 - 1919 
Frankfurt 1899 - 1898 
Glasgow 1898 - 1894 
Leeds 1891 - 1894 
Lisbon 1901 1892-1896 1973 
Liverpool 1898 - 1897 
London 1901 - 1933 
Madrid 1898 1920 1933 
Milan 1893 1897 1917 
Oporto 1895 1893 1946 
Paris 1892 - 1921 
Prague 1896 - s. 1898 
St Petersburg 1907 - s1898 
Sheffield 1899 - 1896 
Vienna 1897 - 1903 
Data: Electric tram taken from table 2.2. Amsterdam (Deacon, 1980,17-18); Antwerp (Keutgens, 
1975b, 3-6/7); Barcelona (Del Castillo and Riu, 1959,194); Belfast (Flanagan, 1969,72); Berlin 
(Walker, 1965,46); Birmingham (Jenson, 1971,146); Cardiff (Morgan, 1986,182); Copenhagen 
(Taplin, 1967,5 and 14-15); Edinburgh (Booth, 1971,37); Frankfurt (Yago, 1984,91); Glasgow 
Mapper, 1974,211); Leeds (Soper, 1985,107); Lisbon (King and Price, 1983,10); Liverpool 
(Bett and Gillham, 1962,23); London (Barker and Robbins, 1974,282); Madrid (Empresa 
Municipal de Transportes, 1992); Milan (Cornolb and Severi, 1987,26); Oporto (Pereira, 1995, 
44 and 142); Paris (Robert, 1974,129); Prague (Carter, 1973,92); St Petersburg (Bater, 1973,63 
); Sheffield (Hall, 1977,63); Vienna (Havers, 1966,195). 
Note: s. started, c. completed. 
The first municiPalisation of a wide scale network took place in Glasgow, in 
1894. The service was already consolidated into one operation at the time of 
municipalisation but there were considerable conflicts between the operator and the 
corporation. Disputes over conditions of contract renewal led to the decision by 
the authorities not to extend the contract (McKay, 1976,173-174). Given the 
subsequent success of this municipalisation, in spite of the initial difficulties, many 
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cities followed the experience. As can be seen from Table 2.7, many transfers to 
public ownership took place in the late 1890s and beginning of 1900s. 
Two main reasons, not necessarily independent, seem to have contributed to the 
involvement of public authorities in the operation of the tramway systems: the high 
profitability of tramway operations and conflicts stemming from the different 
objectives of operators and authorities. Some cities after transferring the operators 
to public ownership pursued similar economic criteria to the private operators. 
This led in Britain to enquires by Parliamentary Commissions. Gibbons (1901, 
254) reports that in one of those enquires "Mr Garckd, by means of a chart, 
showed that most municipal undertakings were being run with a view to profit, 
and, therefore he was opposed to the majority of them". Glasgow (Simpson, 1972, 
152) and Cardiff (Morgan, 1986,188-189) are among those cities that kept the 
same criteria of investment of the private operators. For other cities, the 
transference to public ownership of the tram network was a determinant factor in 
the implementation of policies of quick network construction and city expansion 
(e. g. Frankfurt). A third reason to transfer operators to public ownership was 
related to the fact that knowledge of the success of first public involvement in the 
operation spread fast - there was a strong positive, demonstration effect. 
The introduction of the electric tram affected the structure of transport markets 
to such an extent that from then onwards urban public transport markets were 
generally seen as almost natural public monopolies. 
7), olleybuses 
'ne trolleybus became competitive when the operation of electric trams was 
already in public ownership. The trolleybus could use, with some amplifications, 
the same infrastructure of power supply and wires already built for electric trams 
(Pilcher, 1937,137). 
There were some early attempts by private entrepreneuers to introduce 
trolleybuses in France and Germany but eventually all of them had to close. In fact 
in France Lombard-Gdrin, wishing to promote his invention, was responsible for a 
number of these early attempts (Courant et Bejui, 1985,7). Very few vehicles 
were used (Robert, 1974, Table II). 
2.20 
An bistorical view of urban pubHc transport in Europe 
Motor bus 
The characteristics of transport markets supplying motor bus services varied 
between cities mainly because the process of diffusion was very slow. The electric 
tram brought the municipalisation of the service. This affected the market 
characteristics of trolleybus operations because of the similarities in their operating 
conditions. The motor bus resembles the omnibus in that its operation is very 
flexible, the sunk costs are not great and one man enterprises are possible. 
However, with few exceptions, the fierce competition experienced in horse drawn 
omnibus markets was not to be repeated. Motor bus markets were consolidated 
and public authorities were more involved in public transport issues. 
The entrepreneurial phase took place in an era in which the motor bus still 
experienced many technical problems and frequent breakdowns would disrupt the 
service. Even after London and Paris had regular bus services, attempts to 
introduce the motor bus were unsuccessful in many other cities. 
In cases where competition did evolve, agreements and mergers prevailed and in 
other cases an operator enjoyed a monopoly of operations. Tramway companies 
were well established in the public transport market and in many cases they were 
responsible for the introduction of the motor bus. In other cases they bought out 
the enterprises competing with their service (e. g. Antwerp). "In cases where 
foresight has been shown, the tramways undertaking has operated buses, 
abandoned the tram routes and extended its services. Where vision has not been 
shown and the tramway system has been adhered to, the undertaking has gone out 
of business" [Pilcher, 1937,111]. 
metro 
The first underground system opened in 1863 in London but Table 2.4 shows 
that most of the existing ones in Europe opened more than a hundred years later. 
At the time of the construction of the underground in London, municipalisation 
was not an issue but, in 1896, when the underground opened in Glasgow, 
municipalities were starting to become involved in public transport provision. 
The first underground systems experienced the three phases of evolution of 
market characteristics. The first and second phases were strongly linked because 
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construction implied a strong degree of concentration. Private entrepreneurs 
assumed the responsibility of constructing and exploring the underground service 
in London, Glasgow and Madrid. Public authorities became involved because 
private operators were struggling to deliver the service (e. g. one line in Paris in 
1920, Glasgow in 1922, Madrid in 1978ng). 
Most underground systems were built in the last 40 years or so and only 
experienced the last phase of evolution of market characteristics. The system in 
Paris opened in 1900 and was built by public authorities for private exploration. 
Only one line was constructed and explored by private entrepreneurs but was 
municipalised in 1920. 
Transport Commissions 
Involvement of public authorities in the provision of several modes of urban 
transport led to the creation of transport commissions in many European 
metropolitan areas. Transport commissions were created in order to bring all 
public owned operators under the same management (e. g. Paris in 1948 and 
Madrid in 1985). This would make possible the co-ordination of services and the 
introduction of fare systems common to all public owned operators. London 
followed a different process. The transport commission was created in 1933 at the 
same time as municipalisation. Table 2.8 gives the dates of creation of some 
transport commissions. 
Table 2.8 
Year of creation of transport authorities 
city Year city Year 
Berlin 1929 Milan 1932 
London 1933 Paris 1948 
Madrid 1985 
Data: Berlin (Walker, 1965,49); London (Barker and Robbins, 1974,282); Madrid (Consorcio 
Municipal de Transportes, 1986,5); Milan (Comolo and Severi, 1987); Paris (Hardy, 1988,9). 
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2.5 Conclusions 
The diffusion of public transport modes in the European cities shows many 
similarities. "The new forms of transport were available everywhere within a very 
short period of time of their being shown to be commercially viable anywhere. 
Their economic and social effects, once introduced, are likely to have been similar. 
The timing of their introduction and extent of their success would seem to have 
depended upon each town's size rather than upon its location" [Barker, 1980,89]. 
The process of evolution of market characteristics in European cities relating to 
each form of transport also presents many similarities. The consolidation of 
markets has generally been favoured. Private entrepreneurs tried to create 
monopolies through mergers or to obtain them through the ownership of a 
monopoly licence. Public authorities supported the creation of these monopolies 
and gradually became involved in the provision of public transport services. 
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Chapter 3 
Urban public transport in selected Western 
European cities 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter was concerned with the temporal dimension of urban public 
transport. The evolution of public transport in European cities was described in 
tenns of substitution of transport modes, public transport utilisation and 
involvement of public authorities in the organisation and operation of public 
transport services. This chapter is concerned with the current situation and offers a 
brief survey of some characteristics of selected operators and networks in Western 
European cities in 1992. The survey includes type of operations, government's 
financial effort, indicators of performance and the degree of utilisation of services. 
The aim of this chapter is to describe some aspects of the transport operation in 
European metropolitan areas. The presentation is essentially of informative nature 
but, given the aims of this work, aspects related to performance of the operations 
and organisation of the transport system are included. There are few common 
procedures across the operators in terms of form of measuring characteristics, 
reporting the data and so, in spite of the efforts to present compatible information, 
the data reported often stems from slightly different types of measurement. 
3.2 Means of transport 
Transport operators face different conditions in tenns of size of the relevant urban 
area, characteristics of location, topography, economic environment, cultural and 
political aspects. These conditions inevitably influence the operation of public 
transport services. 
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Table 3.1 shows information on the number of different types of vehicles in 
various fleets together with the number of passengers, the number of staff and the 
distance covered by the fleets for a selection of public transport operators in 
European cities. 
The means of transport involved in the provision of public transport differ 
considerably from city to city, not only in terms of output produced but also in 
terms of the exact modes of transport used. The bus is in every city, very few 
cities still have trolleybus operations, the electric tram is in operation in a number 
of cities and there are cities which have light rail and underground operations. 
The range in the size of operators can be as much as 20, depending on the type 
of measurement used. For example, a comparison between the underground 
operators in London, Madrid and Lisbon shows that if the unit of measurement is 
the number of carriages, London Underground is 4.0 times larger than Metro de 
Madrid and 28.6 times larger than Metropolitano de Lisboa, if the unit of 
measurement is the number of staff the respective values are 3.3 and 10.2 and if the 
unit of measurement is the number of passengers the values are 1.8 and 5.2, 
respectively. 
There are cities, such as Amsterdam, with one operator for all modes of 
transport and there are others such as Madrid, Lisbon or Dublin with different 
operators for each mode. 
3.3 Subsidies 
The important role played by public transport in the daily life of people living in 
metropolitan areas led to strong involvement of public authorities in financing 
urban transport operations. Table 3.2 shows the financial structure of the 
operational costs of public transport systems in a number of metropolitan areas in 
1992. 
With the exception of London Underground, the operating costs are in part 
covered by the political authorities or, ultimately, by the national tax payers. The 
amount of subsidy can vary more than 20% between the two larger cities in one 
country (e. g. in Portugal and Switzerland) and over 40% between the two larger 
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cities in different countries (e. g. Amsterdam or Rome compared to London, Lisbon 
or Madrid). 
Table 3.2 
The financing of operafional costs in urban public transport systems in 1992 
City Operator Fares Other Subsidy Source of grants 
% Com. % 
Amsterdam GVBA 22.5 77.5 Government 
Antwerp De Lijn 38.5 2.7 58.8 Regional Government 
Athens* ILPAP 39.1 45.9 15 Government 
Athens* ISAP 28 26 46 Government 
Athens* OAS 27 25 48 Government 
Barcelona TMB-Bus 42.2 1.1 56.7 Local and Central Govern. 
Barcelona TMB-Metro 54.5 2.5 43 Local and State 
Berlin BVG 33 6 61 Fed 1 City 99 
Brussels SUB 33 5 62 Regional Government 
Cologne VRS 53 47 
Copenhagen- HT 52 2 46 Counties 
Dublin Bus Atha Cliath 95.6 4.4 Government 
Geneva TPG 38 6 56 Canton + 2% Government 
Gothenburg SG 40 60 City Council 
Hamburg HHA 50 10 40 State and City 
HelsinVi HKL/HST 42.3 4.7 53 Municipal Taxes 
Lisbon Carris 60.3 39.7 Government 
Lisbon ML 64 36 Government 
London LBL 71 29 Government 
London-- LU 103 
Lyons TCL 48 52 Local and Versement 
Madrid EMT 63 2 35 Government and Local 
Madrid MM 55 3.3 31.7 Government and Local 
Milan ATM 27.4 1.9 47.3 Government deficit 23.4 
Munich M`VV 52 48 State 10 Fed 40 City 50 
Oporto* STCP 75 10 15 Government 
Oslo Os 57 12 31 City 87 Nat 4 other coun 9 
Paris RATP 32 15 53 Versement, local and govern. 
Rome ATAC 10.3 2.1 85.2 Regional and local Tax 
Stockholm- SL 30 6 64 County Council 
Vienna- WS 52 0.3 47.7 City Authorities 
Zurich ZVV 53 15 32 Local Authorities 
Note: * 1990 data; 1991 data; 1 993 data; -A pril 1992 to end of March 1993. 
Source: Jane's Urban Transport Systems. 
3.4 Responsibility for the local public transport 
Central government, federal and local authorities share the responsibility of 
provision and control of urban public transport in Western Europe. Table 3.3 
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provides infonnation on the strata of political authority having responsibility for the 
organisation of local public transport. 
Table 3.3 
Responsibility for local public transport 
Central govemment Local authorities Date 
- 
Germany x 
Switzerland x 
UK x (1968n2) 
France x (1982) 
Belgium x (1989) 
Norway x (1981) 
Sweden x (1978) 
Denmark x (1977/78) 
Data: Andersen (1992) 
Some countries, such as Portugal and United Kingdom, have different 
structures of public transport organisation in the larger metropolitan areas as 
compared with their other cities. Portugal has specific legislation for Oporto and 
Lisbon where the central government is responsible for the public transport 
provision. London is also an exception in its organisation of public transport in the 
United Kingdom, where the Department of Transport has the responsibility. In 
Denmark urban public transport has been a responsibility of the local authorities 
since 1978 although in Copenhagen responsibility for the organisation of the city's 
urban public transport system has been with the local authority since 1977. 
3.5 Indicators of performance 
The means providing urban public transport services differ from city to city. 
Indicators of utilisation of underground operations in Brussels, Lisbon, London, 
Madrid and Oslo are set out in Table 3.4. 
The indicators of performance reveal a number of differences. The operator in 
Lisbon presents the highest values for indicators involving number of passengers 
(PassengersfVehicle Km, Passengers/Staff, PassengersNehicle, Passengers/Route 
Km) which could imply that either the operator is very effective or that the 
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operator is under-staffed and under-capitalised. But this operator is the one that 
has less kilometres per vehicle per year (60,272 kilometres per year compared to 
63,927 in Oslo, 68,231 in Brussels and 83,465 in Madrid), has less output per staff 
(4,390 vehicle kilometres compared to 8,618 in Brussels, 11,745 in Oslo and 
13,973 in Madrid) and has more staff per vehicle in the fleet (13.73 compared to 
7.92 in Brussels, 5.97 in Madrid, 5.44 in Oslo and 4.88 in London) which could 
imply that the operator is over-staffed or over-capitalised. Even in the case of 
homogeneous operation, and metro operations are not affected by road congestion 
and traffic measures, the ratios of performance are very different. The indicator 
Passenger Km/Staff is the only one that takes approximately the same value for all 
the operators (258,099 in Lisbon, 269,295 in Oslo and 302,829 in London). 
Table 3.4 
Indicators of performance of selected underground operators 
Indicator Brussels lAsbon London Madrid Oslo 
Vehicle KnVStaff 8,618 4,390 13,973 11,745 
Vehicle Kni/Vehicle 68,231 60,272 - 83,465 63,927 
Staff/Vehicle 7.92 13.73 4.88 5.97 5.44 
Passengers/Vehicle Km 7.58 17.01 5.07 3.82 
Passengers/Staff 65,302 74,660 38,288 70,858 44,883 
Passenger Km/Staff - 258,099 302,829 - 269,295 
Passengers/Vehicle 517,043 1,024,926 186,906 423,258 244,292 
Passengers/Route Km 2,529,190 7,375,132 1,847,716 3,670,434 535,000 
Passenger Kni/Route Km - 25,495,820 14,614,213 - 3,210,000 
Network length (Krn) 32.3 18.9 394 112.5 100 
Year 1990 1992 1992 1992 1991 
Table 3.5 
Indicators of performance of selected bus operators 
Indicator Dublin 
__ 
London (LBL) Madrid 
Vehicle Km/Staff 16,115 15,737 13,102 
Vehicle KmNehicle 44,646 49,924 46,105 
Staff/Vehicle 2.77 3.17 3.52 
passengers/Vehicle Km 3.76 2.53 5.38 
Passengers/Staff 60,594 39,777 70,487 
Passengers/Vehicle 167,878 126,190 248,034 
Year 1992 4/1992-3/1993 1992 
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Table 3.5 shows indicators related to bus operations in Dublin, London and 
Madrid. The indicators not involving information on number of passengers are 
quite similar (Vehicle Km/Staff, Vehicle KmNehicle an 'd 
Staff/Vehicle). The 
indicators with information on the number of passengers show very wide 
differences. The Madrid operator presents the highest values of utilisation of 
resources and service with 70,487 passengers per worker compared to 60,594 in 
Dublin and 39,777 in London (LBL), with 248,034 passengers per vehicle in the 
fleet compared to 167,878 in Dublin and 126,190 in London and with 5.38 
passengers per vehicle kilometre compared to 3.76 in Dublin and 2.53 in London. 
The differences in the indicators of performance of the bus operators between 
large cities are in line with those reported by Matas (1990). 
3.6 Public transport utilisation 
The utiHsation levels of urban public transport in selected cities is shown in Table 
3.6. The level of utilisation of public transport differs quite substantially as 
between cities. 
Table 3.6 
Urban public transport utilisation in selected European cities in 1992 
city Population (1990) Travellers Trips/Inhabitants 
Amsterdam 695,000 253,000,000 364 
Athens* 3,600,000 670,000,000 186 
Barcelona 1,700,000 473,400,000 278 
Berlin 3,400,000 1,002,000,000 295 
Brussels 1,100,000 205,635,000 187 
Cologne 1,400,000 339,000,000 242 
Geneva 387,000 102,800,000 266 
Hamburg 2,300,000 458,000,000 199 
Lyons 1,159,000 205,309,000 177 
Madrid 3,100,000 854,000,000 275 
Milan 3,000,000 647,601,000 216 
Oslo 800,000 136,000,000 170 
* Data relates to 1990 
Source: Jane! s Urban Transport Systems. 
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There are cities such as Amsterdam and Berlin with around 300 trips/inhabitant 
and over and other cities such as Athens and Brussels that do not even attain 200 
trips/inhabitant. 
The levels of utilisation are not related to the number of inhabitants. For 
example, the levels of utilisation in Oslo, Brussels, Hamburg and Athens were quite 
similar in 1992 (range from 170 trips per inhabitant in Oslo to 199 trips per 
inhabitant in Hamburg) but the number of inhabitants was quite different (800,000 
in Oslo, 1,100,000 in Brussels, 2,300,000 in Hamburg and 3,600,000 in Athens). 
Oslo and Amsterdam have similar numbers of inhabitants but very different levels 
of public transport utilisation (170 and 360 trips per inhabitant, respectively). 
3.7 Conclusions 
These initial chapters show that the processes of development of public transport in 
urban areas in terms of modes of transport which have provided services and the 
transport organisations which have been used present many similarities but the 
actual operation and utilisation are very different. 
In the next chapters we will explore organisational. differences in the way that 
urban public transport is supplied and assess the impacts of this on the performance 
of the various operators. 
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The organisation of urban public transport systems, 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, many Western European urban public transport systems have 
undergone major institutional reorganisation. These include the systems of London 
(1985), Madrid (1985), Manchester (1986), Zurich (1990), Antwerp (1991), 
Copenhagen (1991), Athens (1992 and 1993) and Gothenburg (1993). An 
increasing market orientation, largely stimulated by the Thatcher-era reforms in 
Britain, resulted in structural forms which would have been politically unacceptable 
a decade earlier. These changes reflect an interest in reducing public expenditure 
and subsidies taken by public transport systems and enhance economic efficiency, 
as well as ideological factors (Andersen, 1992). 
WhRe the organisational. forms taken by public transport systems differ between 
cities in Western Europe, there are a number of common features. The aim of this 
chapter is to examine structural changes in urban public transport, using a broad 
typology of organisations, and to explore related changes in public transport 
conduct and performance. It offers a review of recent works on classification of 
organisational arrangements of urban public transport, provides a typology of the 
organisational structures found in European metropolitan areas and an economic 
exploration of market characteristics and performance implications. The chapter 
includes a classification of the major European systems within this typology and 
respective dates of reorganisation. 
I The article 'The organisation of urban public transport systems in Western European 
metropolitan areas', forthcoming in Transportation Research A (1996), is based on material 
covered in this chapter. 
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4.2 Review of literature 
The literature reviewed here refers to the classification of forms of organising the 
urban public transport system. The papers referred to in the review describe the 
characteristics of the system, especially the role of operators and planning agencies 
and the importance and nature of market regulations. Additionally, Cox and Love 
(1991) have evaluated models of organisation according to costs and ridership and 
Berechman (1993) proposes organisational systems depending on the type of 
market. None of this previous work, however, used mathematical procedures to 
support its conclusions. 
Cox (1986) examines three forms of organising public transport systems in 
metropolitan areas taking into consideration seven issues: 
- fundamental role of the public agency; 
- ownership of the service franchise; 
- responsibility for service planning and marketing; 
- operation of the service; 
- economic applicability today; 
- service orientation; 
- driving factor in service delivery choices. 
The three categories of organisation defined are shown in Table 4.1: private 
monopoly was the previous model, public monopoly is the present model and the 
competitive model is the emerging model. This emerging structure "combines the 
expertise of the public sector, planning and policy, with the expertise of the 
competitive sector, operations which are cost efficient and market oriented" (Cox, 
1986). 
Models examining the organisation of public transport systems in metropolitan 
areas also emerged from a workshop at the 'Conference on New Organizational 
Responses to the Changing Transit Environment', held in Norfolk, USA, in 
December 1987 (Transportation Research Board, 1988). Later, Wilson (1991), at 
a conference held in Australia in 1989, clarifies those models and his description is 
followed here. This approach classifies relationships between agents in the 
planning and operation tasks in the market and five models are proposed: 
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Table 4.1 
Transit service delivery models, characteristics and contrasts 
Previous Present Emerging 
private monopoly public monopoly competitive 
(franchised (regional (regional policy 
Models/issues private operator) operating organisation) 
authority) 
1. Role of the public Regulator 
agency 
Exclusive Sponsor, 
provider guarantor 
2. Ownership of the Public utility 
service franchise 
3. Responsibility for Public utility 
service planning 
4. Operation of service Monopolistic: 
Service public utility 
5. Econon-dc Unfeasible 
Applicability today unprofitable 
6. Service orientation Product focus: 
limited to 
conventional 
service modes 
Public agency Public agency 
Public agency Public agency 
Monopolistic: Competitive: 
public agency public or 
private provider 
Super-inflationary Cost reduction 
cost increases and containment 
Product focus: Market focus: 
limited to innovative modes 
conventional and service modes 
7. Driving factor in Profits Existing service Customer 
service delivery mechanisms service needs 
choices 
Source: Cox (1986). 
1. Classical Regional Transit Authority - the important characteristics are that 
the service is operated by employees of the authority, policy making and operations 
are under the same management, urban public transport is limited to the 
conventional transit modes and the agency concentrates almost exclusively on 
urban public transport provision. 
2. Extended Regional Transit Authority - this model is, in essence, the same as 
the previous one but there is a broader approach to some of the characteristics. 
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Policy making and the operations are still integrated within the same management 
but the approach is more flexible. 
3. Split Policy and Operations Responsibilities with Single Service Provider - 
in this model there is a clear separation between the policy setting authority/agency 
and the operator or operators of the urban public transport system. The key 
characteristic of this model is that there is no competition, so where more than one 
enterprise provides the service, they do it in areas with different characteristics or 
using different transport modes making performance comparisons meaningless. 
4. Split Policy and Operations Responsibilities with Multiple Service Provider - 
this model is in essence similar to the previous one but, in this case, there is 
competition between the operators in the provision of the public service. The 
policy setting authority allocates services among the available operators with the 
one offering the best conditions getting the work. 
5. Deregulation: the UK Model - in this model there is no public provider. 
Private operators can enter the market and competitive bidding is used for any 
social services that are not provided on a purely commercial basis. 
Table 4.2 
Public transport services structures and functions 
Service Structures 
Public Private Competitive Competitive Tbreatened 
Monopoly Monopoly Tendering Operation Competition 
with 
Function Tendering 
Overall System Government Government Government Private Government 
Planning 
Service Design Government Private Government Private Private 
operation of Government Private Private Private Private 
Services 
Nature of None None For the In and for the Tbreat 
Comoetition Market Market 
Source: Cox and Love (1991). 
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Cox and Love (1991) classify five service structures taking into consideration 
government involvement in three functions (overall system planning, service design 
and operation of services) as well as the nature of competition. The service 
structures are shown in Table 4.2 and are: Public Monopoly, Private Monopoly, 
Competitive Tendering, Competitive Operation with Tendering and Threatened 
Competition. 
Public Monopoly corresponds to the situation in which a governmental agency 
plans, designs and operates the entire urban public transport system. Private 
Monopoly corresponds to the situation in which a governmental agency plans the 
system but the design and operation is undertaken by a private company. 
Competitive Tendering corresponds to the situation in which a governmental 
agency designs the system but the operator is that private company which offers 
the best, often cheapest, conditions of operation. Competitive Competition with 
Tendering corresponds to the situation in which the government or city authority, 
through one agency, tenders services of social importance not provided by the 
private operators. Threatened Competition corresponds to the situation in which 
the service is offered to a private operator under conditions imposed by the 
governmental agency and if no agreement is reached the service is tendered out. 
Figure 4.1 
Service structure characteristics 
Market designed services 
(Likelv to attract more riders) 
Competitive 
Operation with 
Tendering Private Monopoly 
----------------- (protected) 
Market Threatened Administratively 
determined Competition determined 
costs costs 
(Likely to be (Likely to be 
lower) Competitive Public Monopoly higher) 
Tendering (protected) 
Administrative-decided service-levels 
(Likely to attract fewer riders) 
(Source: Cox and Loye (1991). ) 
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These models can be evaluated in general terms according to costs and ridership 
and the results are formalised in Figure 4.1. 
As an alternative, Andersen (1992) classifies the regulatory regimes looking at 
the role of the public sector and at entry conditions to the market. Taking into 
consideration the role of the public sector two extreme systems are defined: a fully 
planned system and a market-oriented system, with respectively high and low 
degree of public involvement. In between those two systems many intermediate 
forms may exist. Turning to consideration of entry conditions, three categories are 
proposed: needs-based systems, contract-based systems and competitive based 
systems. Looking at the structure of the local public transport in 18 countries of 
Europe he concludes that 12 countries had planned systems, one (UK) had a 
market system and the other five had types of hybrid or intermediate systems. 
Berechman (1993) characterises the production environment of public transport 
operations, defining forms of regulation as constraints to the decision parameters 
of transport operators. The parameters are divided into five categories 
(operational, investment, economic, ownership and institutional) and several sub- 
categories. According to the type and number of constraints under which the 
transport operator has to operate, four regulatory regimes are defined: Complete 
Regulation, Regulation with Tendering, Partial Regulation and Full Deregulation. 
"Complete Regulation is a situation where every constraint is imposed. Regulation 
with Tendering is a situation where the entry regulation is removed and it is 
possible to have the firms competing for the tendered contracts but the other forms 
of regulations are maintained. Partial Deregulation is a situation where we can 
have some regulatory constraints but not others. Full Deregulation is a situation 
where only some institutional parameters, like safety and administrative registration 
and licensing, are regulated. " (Berechman, 1993). 
His study covers European and North American examples and public transport 
"is regarded as all major modes of passenger transport, mainly bus and rail, which 
have exclusive rights to operate in intra-urban, metropolitan, regional and inter- 
urban markets". Table 4.3 contains the policy regimes which are ultimately 
recommended by Berechman according to the characteristics and size of the public 
transport market. 
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Table 4.3 
- Recommended transit policy regimes by transit markets 
Policy Transit Market 
Regime Large Central Small City Metropolitan Rural Inter-City 
Citya 
Public Yes No No No No 
Agency Tendering of 
Regulation Auxiliary 
ServiceSb 
Partial No Yes Yes Yes No 
Deregulation' Tendering of Social Services 
Full No No No No Yes 
Deregulation No Tendering 
Notes: a Population size exceeds 100,000-150,000 inhabitants; b Including demand-responsive, 
express and some special purpose services; c Deregulation with some central planning and 
tendering of social welfare services. 
Source: Berechman (1993). 
4.3 Organisation models 
The classification proposed here relating to the organisation of urban public 
transport systems, focuses on two features: service co-ordination and competition 
between operators. The strength of this fori-nulation Res in that the organisational. 
option/models correspond to the four options of combining the two features and to 
different arrangements in the market structure, conduct and performance. 
Table 4.4 
Organisational. options for urban public transport 
Organisation Model Co-ordination Competition Examples 
I Modal Services No No Oporto, Lisbon 
2 Authority and Operator Yes No Athens, Antwerp, 
Lyons, Madrid 
3 Authority and Multiple Operators Yes Yes London, Copenhagen, 
Gothenburg 
4 Deregulation No Yes Manchester 
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The models are, apart from some differencies (e. g. aggregation of the first two 
models giving 4 models instead of 5), similar to Wilson's (1991) categorisation. 
Table 4.4 shows options for the organisational arrangements together with some 
illustrations from metropolitan areas in Western Europe. 
Model 1. Modal Services 
In this model the public transport operator emerges from a merger of the public 
regulator with a private operator or operators working within a regulated 
environment (Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez, 1991, provide a description of the cycle 
of private and public involvement in urban bus services). The new operator, a 
publicly owned company, assumes all the responsibilities of both organisations. 
The ownership of the public transport company is controlled either by central or 
regional government or by the local authority. 
The responsibilities of management include both the establishing of policies and 
the operation of the system. Most of the activities are performed by a work force 
under contract with the operator. The services are usually provided separately by 
mode (e. g. bus, railway, tramway, trolley, metro), without, or with only minimal, 
service co-ordination or fare integration (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 
Industrial organisation for public transport provision in model I 
Public Transport 00a0 
Operator 
Mode I Mode 2 Mode 3 
Few metropolitan areas in Western Europe now have an organisational 
arrangement akin to this model but similar structures were quite common in the 
recent past. In Oporto, the organisation of urban public transport services is 
somewhat like this model. There are two public operators - Servigo dos 
Transportes Colectivos do Porto (STCP) responsible for-the buses, trolley buses 
and trams and Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses (CP), the national railway operator, 
responsible for the suburban railway - and several private bus operators for the 
4.8 
The organisation of urban public transport systems 
suburban services. The enterprises are not co-ordinated and each sets its own 
policies and operates its system independently but they do have fare agreements. 
STCP is currently concentrating its efforts on bus operations. The public 
undertakings are controlled by the central government. 
In Lisbon the public transport service is organised along modal lines. There are 
four public operators - Companhia Cards de Ferro de Lisboa (Carris) responsible 
for the buses and trams, Metropolitano de Lisboa responsible for the underground, 
Transportes Tejo (Transtejo) responsible for the river crossings and Caminhos de 
Ferro Portugueses (CP) responsible for the suburban railway - with some private 
bus operators in suburban areas. The enterprises are not co-ordinated and each 
sets its own policies and operates its system independently but they do have fare 
agreements. The public enterprises, as with Oporto, are controlled by the central 
government. 
The Portuguese law 10/90 of March 1990, permits the creation of Metropolitan 
Transport Commissions to control and co-ordinate the transport activities in the 
metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Oporto, but this has not yet been implemented. 
Model 2. Authority and Operator 
in this case two agencies with different responsibilities coexist and work 
together: 
-a policy setting authority responsible for defining the area of operation, setting 
the fare recovery ratio and the parameters for evaluation of the operator; 
- the operator responsible for the operation of services, providing vehicles, 
maintaining them and planning the operations and for labour force management. 
The responsibility for marketing strategies in some cases rests with the authority 
and in other cases rests with the operator itself. The key characteristic of this 
model is that there is no competition, so where more than one enterprise provide 
the service, they do it in areas with different characteristics or using different 
transport modes making performance comparisons meaningless. Operators work 
under licence and they can be public, semi-public or private (franchise) - see Figure 
4.3. This framework is still the most common arrangement for the provision of the 
urban public transport services in metropolitan areas in Western Europe. 
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Figure 4.3 
Industrial organisation for public transport provision in model 2 
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E6 E6 
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Mode I Mode 2 Mode 3 
Figure 4.4 
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Public Operator 
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Private Operator 
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Industrial organisation for public transport provision in Athens 
OASA OF 
ETHEL 
ILPAP 
ISAP 
Buses TroUeys Rail 
In Athens, the Urban Transport Organisation of Athens (OASA) is the authority 
responsible for the provision of public transport. This authority is dependent on 
the Anistry of Transport of Greece. OASA has control of three state owned 
companies - the Thermic Bus Company (ETHEL) responsible for the operation of 
diesel buses, the Athens-Piraeus Area Electric Buses (ILPAP) for the operation of 
electric trolley buses and Athens-Piraeus Electric Railways (ISAP) for the 
operation of the metropolitan railway (Figure 4.4). 
Since the transformation of Belgium into a federal state in 1988, the public 
transport responsibility in Antwerp lies with a regional authority. The Flemish 
government launched Vlaamse Vervoennaatschappij - De Lijn, by incorporating all 
the then existing public enterprises - Maatschappij voor het Intercommunaal 
Vervoer te Antwerpen (MIVA), Maatschappij voor het Intercommunaal Vervoer 
te Gent (MIGV) and Nationale Maatschappij van Buurtspoorwegen (NMVB). 
Since January 199 1, De Lijn has enjoyed a monopoly of organising transport 
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services in the Flemish region. This enterprise is divided into a central service and 
5 operational divisions. The Antwerp division has control of 26% of the buses and 
61% of the trams, carries 37% of the passengers and takes 37% of the receipts of 
De Ljjn. 
Consorcio Regional de Transportes Nblicos de Madrid (CT), instigated in 
1985, is an organ of the public sector concentrating all the responsibilities related 
to the regular transport of passengers in the Comunidad de Madrid. Ayuntamento 
of Madrid, the most populated municipality of Comunidad de Madrid, decided to 
take part in CT in 1985 for a period of seven years and in 1992 negotiated a new 
contract for four more years. Consorcio is dependent on Comunidad de Madrid 
and the municipalities members of Consorcio. It is funded by them and by the 
Spanish government. Since its creation several municipalities have joined the CT 
and by the end of 1992,79% of the municipalities representing 98% of the 
population of the Comunidad de Madrid were members of CT; Table 4.5 shows 
the evolution of its membership. 
Table 4.5 
Evolution of municipalities joining the Consorcio de Transportes 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total 
Municipalities 1 32 14 95 11 24 45 141 
Source: Consorcio Regional de Transportes Pdblicos de Madrid. 
Consorcio controls Metro de Madrid (MM), the bus operator - Empresa 
Municipal de Transportes (EMT), suburban private bus operators and the suburban 
railway operations of Renfe, the national railway operator (Figure 4.5). 
Consorcio assumed the functions of infrastructure planning, definition and co- 
ordination of programmes for exploiting all transport modes, introduction of a 
common fare system and creation of a coherent image for the transport system. 
The public and private operators maintain legal independence, management 
autonomy and patrimony but follow regulations set by the CT in relation to 
providing transport service. Table 4.6 shows the transport system co-ordinated by 
the Consorcio in 1992. 
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Figure 4.5 
The organisational structure of the transport system in Madrid 
Govemment Comunidad Ayuntamientos 
Consorcio 
Authority 
r= Public Operators Ej 
Private Operators 
Renfe Metro EMT Privates 
Table 4.6 
The public transport system in the Comunidad de Madrid in 1992 
Number of Network Number Number of Number of Vehicle Krn Place Km 
Companies length (km) of lines Stations Vehicles (106) (106) 
Metro 1 112.5 11 155 976 81.5 14263 
Renfe 1 277.8 8 110 559 61.4 15534 
EMT 1 1301.4 166 7054 1777 77.0 6160 
Interurban 36 2996.0 174 6264 778 72.0 4752 
Source: Consorcio, Regional de Transportes Püblicos de Madrid. 
In Lyons, the Syndicat Mixte des Transports pour le RhOne et I'Agglomdration 
Lyormaise (SYTRAL) is responsible for controlling public transport services and 
the Socidtd Lyonnaise des Transports en Commun (STCL) is a private undertaking 
responsible for the operation of all modes. SYTRAL is responsible for the 
definition of transport policy, delegating the execution of policy to STCL. 
SYTRAL is also responsible for the control of the operations and for introducing 
penalties in the case of a violation of the contract. STCL has to execute the policy 
set by SYTRAL and is responsible for the management of the resources at its 
disposal. It assumes the risks of its charging policy and reports to SYTRAL. 
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Model 3. Authority and Muldple Operators 
This model embraces situations where there is clear separation between the 
policy setting authority and the operation of the public transport system by public 
and private operators under contract to the authority (Figure 4.6). The fare system 
remains integrated across modes and among the different operators, but the 
operation of public bus services is contracted to different operators, through a 
tendering proceSS2. The one that offers the best conditions, normally the 
undertaking requiring the lowest subsidy, generally gets the contract. The services 
tendered are usually on a route or small network basis and the period tendered is 
variable. The overseeing authority is responsible for co-ordination of the system. 
The key feature of this model is the introduction of competition in access to the 
business - competition 'for the market' as opposed to competition 'in the market'. 
Figure 4.6 
Industrial organisation for public transport provision in model 3 
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Since the first tenders took place in London in 1985, this organisational system 
has become increasingly common in large metropolitan areas of Western Europe. 
In London, the London Regional Transport (LRT) controls the public transport 
system. Until 1994 there were two public enterprises - London Buses and London 
Underground. Private operators also provided part of the bus services put out to 
tender by LRT. London Buses (LBL) was divided into 10 independent companies 
covering different areas. London Underground remains an integrated company. 
2 There are two main ways of tendering. In the full-cost contract, the authority specifies the 
service and size of buses and then accepts bids for the cost of providing the service. The revenue 
collected on the buses goes to the authority and the entire fare system is under its control. The 
operators do not face any particular risks and only have to rationalise the costs of operating the 
service. In the net-subsidy contract the operator asks for the amount of money that he wants for 
operating the transport service and then also retains the fares collected. The fare system remains 
integrated for people not paying inside the buses (travel cards) and this revenue reverts to the 
transport authority. 'Mis type of contract places part of the risk on the operator. 
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By March 1993,44% of the public transport service had gone through the 
tendering process. As the public operator could also bid, London Buses entered 
into the tendering process and won well. over 50% of these contracts. London 
Buses controlled 81% of the services under LRT supervision leaving the private 
operators with 19%. 
On April lst 1994, a new organisation, London Transport Buses, took over all 
the activities related to buses. All ten subsidiaries of London Buses Ltd were sold 
off by the end of 1994. The Government has the intention of further liberalising 
the regulations governing bus services in London and the first move was the 
privatisation of the bus companies. Until further regulatory reform, all bus services 
are to go through a competitive tendering process and contracts will last 5 years. 
In Copenhagen, Hovedstadsomradets Trafikselskab (HT) was formed in 1973 
with the mission of co-ordinating and integrating public transport services in the 
region, and it was controlled by Greater Copenhagen Council until 1989. HT was 
at the same time a bus operator, having absorbed most of the transport operators, 
and also an authority that supervised the private operators. Further, since 1979, 
the Danish State Railway acted as a subcontractor to HT. 
The government abolished the Greater Copenhagen Council in 1990 and 
HovedstasomrAdets Trafikselskab is now controlled by the government through the 
Department of Traffic. It is divided into two units, one responsible for planning 
and acquiring transport provision and the other a bus operator. HT, being a public 
company, was not allowed to bid for the first 45% of the services tendered out. 
This is the first city to have a foreign private company - Linjebuss (Swedish) now 
with 25% of market share - providing bus services. 
in Gothenburg, the Traffic Authority - Trafikkontoret - was formed in January 
1991. Trafikkontoret is responsible for all types of traffic and administers the total 
traffic budget. The department responsible for public transport, Stadstrafiken 
(Public Transport Authority), is responsible for network planning, service 
standards, finance, fares policy, information and marketing, administers the public 
transport budget and acts as a purchaser-operator. In January 1993, the operation 
of 30% of the bus services (4.37 million vehicle kilometres) was placed under 
tendered contracts. The city owned operator, Gbteborgs SpArvdgar AB, won 55% 
of those offered and Linjebuss, the private company operating in Copenhagen, won 
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the remaining 45%. The authority decided not to tender more services until 
G6teborgs Spkwagar AB is allowed to compete for services in other localities. 
For this to happen the law will have to change because Gdteborgs Sphrvagar AB, 
as a city owned enterprise, can only bid for a service in the area of the municipality 
that owns the undertaking, in this case Gothenburg. Meanwhile the authority 
negotiated a price at market level for the remaining 70% of the bus services not yet 
tendered. 
Goteborgs SpArvAgar AB had a 2-3 years period to reduce costs before the first 
tender took place while the amount that Stadstrafiken paid to GOteborgs SpArvagar 
AB per kilometre operated decreased each year. During that time the enterprise 
reduced its work force from approximately 3000 personnel in 1989 to 2250 in 
1992. 
Model 4. Deregulation 
Here, public bus services are provided on a commercial basis by private 
enterprises. The market is relatively competitive (or imperfectly contestable) and 
the intervention of the public authorities is restricted to setting safety standards, 
environmental controls and other institutional regulations (Figure 4.7). 
FIgure 4.7 
Industrial organisation for public transport provision in model 4 
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There are no organisational arrangements which strictly conforms to this type in 
the metropolitan areas of Western European. The nearest are the ones currently 
found in metropolitan areas in Britain outside of London (White, 1991, and Pickup 
et aL, 1991). Public bus transport is deregulated in the sense described above and 
operated by private companies but there remains the possibility of subsidising 
social, but unprofitable, services. 
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Table 4.7 
Annualised vehicle mileage for the top 23 bus operators in Manchester 
(000, S) 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GM Buses* 51,174 55,813 56,909 54,061 52,010 51,752 
Bee Line 6,459 9,992 6,930 10,099 6,352 4,731 
North Western 738 1,371 1,742 3,096 5,527 3,874 
Ribble 1,946 3,861 5,217 3,809 3,677 3,486 
Shearings 375 1,130 1,255 1,557 1,931 1,804 
Rossendale 446 483 544 857 1,104 1,548 
Citibus 406 616 1,077 1,080 1,298 1,446 
A Mayne & Son 626 823 968 834 989 1,197 
Blue Bus 227 720 
Walls 253 416 596 722 874 717 
Bluebird 234 495 706 
Finglands 59 154 213 454 509 599 
Midway 164 339 561 
J. P. Executive 60 138 257 297 506 547 
C-Line 183 430 529 
Stuarts 99 200 320 378 357 483 
Stotts 235 477 390 394 467 
Irwell Valley 286 243 381 543 453 
Pacer 444 
Pennine Blue 243 414 
Heatons 394 
R. Bullock 383 
Dennis's 171 249 362 
Annualised Mileage 65,704 79,417 82,922 82,038 80,089 82,726 
* Following division into two companies (size could inhibit competition), GM Buses North and 
GM Buses South were acquired by employee buyouts in March 1994. 
Source: Greater Manchester Transportation Unit's Bus Registration Database (GMPTE). 
In Manchester, with the deregulation of the bus services in 1986 following the 
passing of the 1985 Transport Act, the provision of bus services is to a great extent 
carried out on a commercial basis. The Greater Manchester Passenger Transport 
Executive (GMPTE) may also be interested or obliged by law (e. g. transport to 
schools) in providing some bus transport services not commercially attractive to 
private operators. In those cases the authority can tender out the operation of the 
services. The usual types of service that are tendered out are early morning and 
late evening services during the week, Sunday services, low-density all-day routes 
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and transport to schools. Figure 4.8 is a representation of the arrangement in 
Manchester. 3 
Table 4.8 
Annualised vehicle mileage for the top 23 bus operators in Manchester split 
between commercial and subsidised services in 1992. 
Conventional Minibus % of 
(000's) Commercial Subsidised Commercial Subsidised Total Total 
GM Buses 42,518 3,920 3,536 1,778 51,752 62.6 
Bee Line 1,933 693 1,427 678 4,731 5.7 
North Western 2,252 1,206 278 138 3,874 4.7 
Ribble 2,446 175 687 178 3,486 4.2 
Shearings 1,424 380 0 0 1,804 2.2 
Rossendale 768 454 182 144 1,548 1.9 
Citibus 1,370 76 0 0 1,446 1.7 
A Mayne & Son 1,039 158 0 0 1,197 1.4 
Blue Bus 694 26 0 0 720 0.9 
Walls 607 78 0 32 717 0.9 
Bluebird 198 135 67 306 706 0.9 
Finglands 582 7 10 0 599 0.7 
Midway 276 285 0 0 561 0.7 
J. P. Executive 0 0 319 228 547 0.7 
C-Line 443 86 0 0 529 0.6 
Stuarts 394 88 0 1 483 0.6 
Stotts 338 129 0 0 467 0.6 
Irwell Valley 8 47 339 59 453 0.5 
Pacer 117 12 123 192 444 0.5 
Pennine Blue 412 2 0 0 414 0.5 
Heatons 116 0 186 92 394 0.5 
R. Bullock 319 61 2 1 383 0.5 
Dennis's 281 22 4 55 362 0.4 
Other 3,055 1,023 323 708 5,110 6.1 
Annual Mileage 61,590 9,063 7,483 4,590 82,726 100 
Source: Greater Manchester Transportation Unit's Bus Registration Database (GMPTE). 
3 Chile is the only country where the bus operation is totally deregulated. In Santiago the 
deregulation of the operations was implemented in three steps. The first step took place in 1979 
with the relaxation of most of the restrictions on access to the business. The second step occurred 
in 1983 with the relaxation of the pricing mechanism. The last step was in 1989 when the 
government ended its control over the network and the fleet dimension [Darbdra (1993)]. 
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Figure 4.8 
Industrial organisation for bus provision in Manchester 
M GMPTE 
Private Operator 
Table 4.7 shows the vehicle mileage for the 23 top bus operators between 1987 
and 1992. We can see that the market structure, in spite of a relatively high degree 
of concentration, has produced numerous operators with the role of the largest bus 
operator, which was still publicly owned during the period, having decreased in 
importance since deregulation. There are around 70 operators in Greater 
Manchester. GMPTE tendered out about 15% of the mileage operated in 1992. 
Table 4.8 provides data for vehicle mileage split between commercial and 
subsidised services by each bus operator for that year. 
4.4 Industrial organisation 
The 'Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm' (see Scherer and Ross, 1990) can 
be used to characterise the urban public transport industry. This paradigm was 
initially developed in the context of manufacturing industry but it can equally well 
be applied, with the necessary adaptations, to industries in the service sector. 
Bearing this in mind, the contents of Tables 4.9,4.10 and 4.11 are 
characterisations of the market structure, market conduct and market performance 
in each of our organisation models. 
Market Structure 
Number of sellers represents the number of distinct public transport companies 
identified by the passengers. Where there is no fare integration or service co- 
ordination between the operators (as in models 1 and 4) the number of sellers is the 
same as the number of operators. In the first model, this usually corresponds to 
one operator for each transport mode. In the fourth model, this coffesponds to 
several bus operators and the number of operators usually increases with the size 
of the urban area. In markets with a unified fare system and service co-ordination 
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among operators, even though there may be more than one operator, the general 
public has no perception of this, apart from some obvious physical differences in 
the way the service is provided. 
Table 4.9 
Market structure of urban public transport system in each model 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Number of sellers one by mode one one variable 
Number of buyers many many one/many many 
Product differentiation little little little yes 
Barriers to entry yes yes some no 
Functional Integration yes no no yes 
Vertical Integration yes yes variable variable 
Dedicated Activity Yes yes/no no no 
Number of buyers represents the number of transport customers identified by 
the operators. To the authority, every passenger is considered a customer and the 
authority is often interested in maximising their number. To the operator the 
customers are the passengers that contribute to satisfying their management 
function. In the models 1 and 4, operators are often interested in maximising: the 
number of passengers given the operational constraints confronting them. In the 
second model, the motivation for carrying customers depends on the incentives 
embraced in the contract between the authority and the operator. In the third 
model, the interest of the operator depends on the type of contract it has with the 
transport authority. In the full-cost contract, the authority pays for all the services 
run by the operator which then has little interest in how many people it carries. In 
contrast, in the net-subsidy contract the operator gets the money collected inside 
the vehicle which means that it is generally interested in transporting as many 
people as possible. 
Product differentiation represents the ability of the supplier to induce in the 
customer the feeling that the products are different. In the first three models, the 
ability to differentiate is limited to cases of quality differentiation and price 
discrimination. The last model provides opportunities to restructure markets 
through product innovation and differentiation. 
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Barriers to entry represent regulations and incumbent behaviour that make it 
difficult or impossible for new enterprises to enter the market. In the first model, 
the service is a public monopoly and new entrants are not allowed in. In the 
second model, the service is still a monopoly but not necessarily a public one. In 
the case of private company under a franchising contract, because it is difficult to 
guarantee bidding parity at the moment of contract renewal, the incumbent has 
great advantages - the incumbents "realise non-trivial advantages in informational 
and informal organisational respects during the contract execution" [Williamson, 
1986,2741.4 In the third model, there is no competition in the market but in the 
cost of producing the service - competition for the market. Technically efficient 
companies can enter the market but the global approach does not favour the 
innovative ones. In the last model, the market is supposed to be relatively 
competitive or contestable. In the British case, however, there are a number of 
barriers to contestability: a need to signal entry and exit intentions, the working of 
tendering for socially necessary services and the intervention of the Office of Fair 
Trading (Hibbs, 1989b). Managers try to protect their enterprises from the forces 
of competition and use every tool available to avoid more competition and protect 
their core activities. Barriers are created usually by filling all possible gaps in the 
network5 or through reputation gained by aggressive response to entrants 
(McGuiness et aL, 1994). 
Functional integration is the relationship between policy and operational 
activities in the provision of services. In the first and last models the policy and 
operation activities are intemalised in the enterprises. . In the models 2 and 3 these 
two functions do not co-exist in the same organisation. There is one authority that 
sets the policies and one or several operators providing the service. 
Vertical integration is the degree of integration in operational activities. The 
f1rst two models refer to the kind of enterprises that internalise most of the 
4 This could be the reason why in Lyons, in spite of European consultation, in December 1992, 
the incumbent operator won the renewal of the franchising contract for 6 more years. 
5 "The company received f. 600000 a year in subsidy for its rural operations, but with over 100 
small private operators in Devon we recognised that about a quarter of our business would be at 
risk if we were to continue to rely on the subsidy. We, therefore, consulted with the trade unions 
and concluded that it was possible by increased productivity and, in some cases, cutting wages, to 
bridge this f: 600000 gap and continue to operate in the rural areas without financial support" 
[Blundred, 19911. 
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activities without almost any service being bought in the market. In the two last 
models the enterprises have to rationalise costs and so tend to perform those 
activities wherever they can find them at a cheaper price, sometimes in the market, 
sometimes intemally. 
Dedicated activity concerns the involvement of the enterprise in more than one 
market. In the first model, enterprises are usually only involved in the public 
transport business in one urban area. The same is true in the second model if the 
undertaking is publicly owned but, otherwise, private enterprises may operate in 
more then one urban area (see Meyere, 1987, and Andersen, 1993, for a 
description of the French case). In the last two models, the enterprises are 
normally involved in providing public transport services in several urban areas, 
sometimes even in different countries. Some enterprises become involved in other 
kinds of businesses such as taxis, the leisure industry, vehicle maintenance and 
engineering. Diversification by the undertaking suggest that in these models the 
companies could be very vulnerable if they relied on only one local market. 
Market Conduct 
Table 4.10 
Market conduct of the urban public transport system in each model 
Model 24 
Management largest possible largest possible largest possible short run 
strategy network network network marginal cost 
recovery 
Pricing goals satisfying goals satisfying cost satisfying cost profit 
recovery ratio recovery ratio 
Pricing cross- cross- cross- pricing down 
policies subsidisation subsidisation subsidisation to marginal 
cost 
Pricing second-degree second-degree second-degree second-degree 
procedures and third- and third- and third- and third- 
degree degree degree degree 
discrimination discrimination discrimination discrimination 
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Management strategy represents the central focus of management decisions. In 
the first three models the objective is generally to maximise some physical criteria 
such as the number of passengers carried or route kilometres served and the 
strategy is to move the production function outwards. In the last model the market 
is much more important and so the objective is to realise a "positive profit" 
[Alchian, 19501. Transport services exist only on profitable routes in this last 
framework and management strategy in this case is often limited to recovering 
short run marginal costs. 
Pricing goals are the objectives to be achieved with the pricing system. In the 
first model the objectives can be very different and may include macroeconomics 
ones - e. g. prices may be kept artificially low in order to control cost push inflation. 
In the second and third models the authority usually has a cost-recovery ratio 
target. In the last model the objective is to price so as to maximise profit. 
Pricing policies concern the relationship between production and the pricing 
mechanism. The pricing policy is related to management strategy. In the first three 
models the strategy is to have the largest possible network and this is possible by 
cross-subsidising unprofitable routes with the revenue from profitable ones and 
also with subsidies from the authorities. In the last model the policy is to raise as 
much profit as possible. 
Pricing procedures are the tactics used in pricing products. Second-degree 
price discrimination (quantity discounts) procedures are usually implemented 
through the use of single ride tickets and monthly passes which offer discounts to 
frequent users. Third-degree price discrimination procedures (consumer 
discrimination) are usually implemented by selecting people according to their 
characteristics such as age or occupation. In some cases, such as Zurich, there is 
also quality price discrimination, especially in the case of railway operations where 
it is more common to introduce differences in the quality of service (for an example 
of an extensive application of price discrimination see ZUrcher Verkhersverbund, 
1993). 6 
6A manager of an enterprise in a deregulated market said "Our job is to survive. We have moved 
from'ourjob is to get on the road'to'ouriob is to survive [Bryman et aL, 19931. 
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Market Performance 
Table 4.11 
Market performance of the urban public transport system in each model 
Model 124 
Productive, allocative and allocative and 
allocative scale efficiency scale efficiency 
and dynamic 
efficiency 
allocative and product choice 
technical and technical and 
efficiency dynamic 
efficiency and 
economies of 
scope 
Progress slow slow/fast slow/fast fast 
Productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency is the way performance is 
perceived in each of the organisational models. In the first two models, the 
traditional arguments that public monopolies are essential to avoid consumer 
exploitation by private monopoly utilities are the ones that prevail. Markets are 
seen to be of monopolistic nature because of economies of scale together with the 
lack of a stable 'core'. In the third model, these arguments are still valid but there is 
the perception that the technical efficiency is more important than the scale 
efficiency. In particular the degree of X-inefficiencies (Button and Weyman-Jones, 
1993) in the first two models is seen as potentially large. There is, in effect, a 
principal agent problem. So, in this model, an authority controls and co-ordinates 
public transport provision but private enterprises operate the services. The last 
model questions the assumption that the market is a natural monopoly and, even if 
this is the case, the market can still be workably competitive or contestable. This is 
important because competition in the market produces dynamic efficiency and a 
broader spectrum of product choice. Each firm has to be a cost minimiser, and so 
technically efficient, to stay in the market. It is important to note that scale 
efficiency is usually attainable in the last two models because the enterprises 
involved can work in several urban areas and their operations are not confined to 
only one geographical location. 
Progress is the introduction of new technical solutions to the provision of public 
transport services. The first model corresponds to very traditional ways of 
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organising the transport services, so progress is very slow both on the management 
side and on the technical side. There is a limited incentive to innovate because of 
the lack of potential competition from new actors with improved technology. The 
second set of two models are more conducive to developing new management 
processes and to introducing technical improvements. The last model is the only 
one where the industry is market driven and so progress, especially if related to 
low cost solutions and low level of risks, can be very swift (e. g. the increase in the 
number of minibuses in Britain). The only limitation is the possible lack of 
investment funds if prices are lower down to short run marginal cost. 
4.5 Organisational systems in Western European cities 
In the western world, most governments are aware that current problems in public 
transport can not be solved by the current organisational structures. In several 
cities the organisation of transport systems has recently changed. Table 4.12, for 
example, shows urban public transport organisation models in several cities in 
Western Europe and the date of implementation of the new organisational 
arrangement. 
In some cases, attributing a specific organisational model to a particular 
metropolitan area is debatable because more than one model could apply. This is 
the case, for example, in the cities where model 3 was chosen. In all the cases 
cited, there remain a number of services not tendered but, operated under licence, 
as is the case under model 2. 
In some cases, the date is also difficult to establish because it takes time to 
introduce change. The date established for model 2 was the date when the 
authority took charge of the system and for number 3 it was the date of the first 
tendering. After passing of legislation allowing the introduction of tendering 
contracts, there has been a period of transition enabling the public enterprises to 
rationalise their services and to prepare to compete with private competitors during 
the tendering process. These enterprises, when the services are put out to tender, 
became more competitive and, in the cases where they were allowed to bid as in 
London and Gothenburg, they won the majority of the contracts. At the end of the 
transition period from model 2 to 3, the organisation of the market is still as in 
model 2 but public enterprises would seem to be attempting to improve the 
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technical efficiency which is consistent with an enterprise in a market of the model 
3 type. 7 
Table 4.12 
Transport organisation models in Western European cities 
city Country 1234 Year 
Antwerp Belgium x 1991 
Athens Greece x 1993 
Barcelona Spain x 1980 
Brussels Belgium x 1991 
Cologne Germany x 1987 
Copenhagen Denmark x 1991 
Gothenburg Sweden x 1993 
Hamburg Germany x 1996 
Helsinki* Finland x 1995 
Lisbon Portugal x 1978 
London England x 1985 
Lyons France x 1983 
Madrid Spain x 1985 
Manchester England x 1986 
Munich Germany x 1972 
Oporto Portugal x 1975 
Oslo** Norway x 
Stockholm Sweden x 1993 
Vienna Austria x 1984 
Zurich Switzerland x 1990 
Major changes have occurred and the first tendering is expected in 1995. 
** Efficiency improvement have been reported but the model is still the same 
7 This is a situation which is similar to that of British Gas in the UK. Important gains of 
productivity were achieved probably because of the regulatory reforms introduced some years 
before the effective privatisation (Price and Weyman-Jones, 1993). 
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5.1 Introduction 
We have seen in the last chapter that many cities have recently undergone major 
reorganisations of their public transport system or are about to undertake changes 
in the near future. In this chapter we briefly introduce and discuss two questions: 
why and how have cities been reorganising their public transport systems? 
First, the reasons for this trend towards reorganisation are only briefly 
considered because they are common to all sectors of the economy and its analysis 
goes beyond the scope of this work. This trend stems from a new economic 
climate favouring greater private involvement in the provision of public services. 
Some aspects that are particularly relevant to the urban public transport are then 
presented. 
Second, we present a structure of classifying how the processes of 
reorganisation were carried out. The success in reorganising urban public 
transport systems fies not only in the organisational arrangement adopted but also 
in the implementation of the process of change. Political acceptability of the 
changes as well as the public's perception of their suitability are influenced by the 
forms of implementing the reorganisations. 
Finally, the chapter ends with an integration of the answers to the two questions 
dealt within this chapter using classification models presented in the last chapter, 
applied to the framework of transport operations in Western European cities. 
Organisational change strategies 
5.2 Reasons to reorganise 
There is a general trend to reduce economic regulation in Europe, the United 
States as well as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and many South American 
countries. The "prevailing wisdom is now that intervention failures are often 
potentially more damaging than market imperfections" [Button, 1993,251]. 
Traditionally, public intervention through regulation was seen as serving the public 
interest by correcting for possible market failures (e. g. natural monopoly or 
predatory behaviour) but this only provides a solution if one assumes that perfectly 
informed social welfare maximisers are either managing the regulation or running 
the regulated firms. This is often far from being the case. 
Swann (1988) advances three main reasons which are contributing to this 
climate of change towards favouring deregulation: (i) the undermining of the public 
interest theory, (ii) the potentialities of competition and the market (iii) and the 
influence of consumer and environmental groups. 
The undermining of the public interest theory to a large extent resulted from 
the studies focusing on the behaviour of regulated firms. First studies questioned 
the value of the arguments in favour of regulation on the grounds that regulation 
led to distortion of input choices and creation of inefficiencies. Subsequent studies 
revealed the sources of inefficiencies, attributing them to the behaviour of well 
organised groups. These groups usually constitute a minority of people, easily 
identifiable, that can have the sympathy of a high proportion of the population, 
which would only gain a small benefit from the regulatory change. It would 
require major changes in regulations to show large enough benefits to change their 
sympathy. 
The potentialities of competition and the market were put forward by some 
Chicago researchers (e. g. Friedman, Demsetz and Coase). Later, the development 
of the theory of the contestable markets (e. g. Baumol) also highlighted the virtue 
of potential competition even in monopolistic markets. 
Consumer and environmental groups have been very active and often successful 
in their demands. Consumer movements successfully campaigned for more social 
regulation (e. g. consumer protection) and at the same time opposed pieces of 
legislation enabling restrictions and distortions in competition. Environmental 
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pressure groups have also been successful in pressing for the abolition of 
regulations that facilitate the creation of more environmental problems. Pressure to 
internalise the externalities such as the effect of pollution in the price of energy and 
also to change the declining unit costs in the tariff system is changing the rate 
structure of the price of energy. 
The extent to which the first two reasons complement each other was important 
in the movement towards deregulation. Not only was the prevailing theory at the 
time strongly attacked but a new set of theories putting forward the advantages of 
competition and market forces was proposed. 
The change in the climate of ideas towards implementing policies supporting 
deregulation have been developed through research undertaken by disinterested 
economists which demonstrated the effects of regulation in the economic sectors. 
These studies generally produced accurate predictions (Winston, 1993) which put 
the case for extending these kinds of policies to new sectors of activity. 
The economic ideology of Thatcher and Reagan which promoted the private 
sector in the belief that it would increase efficiency and distribute economic power 
and in that sense strengthen the democratic system by increasing the number of 
owners, played an important role in the implementation of deregulation and 
privatisation. 
The need for new sources of funds to invest in the transport infrastructures also 
made the governments seek out funds in the markets so engaging the private sector 
in infrastructure investment. The best known case is probably the Channel Tunnel 
linking France and England by railway. 
The urban public transport system was one of the last transport activities to feel 
the effects of this new economic climate. However, the trend for reorganising 
urban public transport systems in large metropolitan areas within Western Europe, 
even in cities where the organisation system seemed to produce satisfactory 
operational results (e. g. Hamburg and London), is now well in place. 
"The public regulation, financial support and often ownership of transit is 
usually rationalised on the basis of three major sets of reasons: economic grounds, 
primarily of efficiency and equity; political realities, including the power of interest 
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groups; and what is called the social role of transiL"[Berechman, 1993]. These 
reasons are linked to ones that justify a more active role for the private sector: 
reduced public budgets, ideology and revitalisation of the industry that had become 
constricted by regulation. 
Andersen (1992) pointed out the need for reductions in public budgets as the 
main factor behind the discussions on privatisation and deregulation in most 
Western European countries. The ideology was also a major factor in some other 
countries. Ideological forces were manifested in different forms: a belief in 
competition and a belief in private ownership (people, managers and employees). 
Banister et aL (1992) also pointed out the need to revitalise the industry that had 
become constricted by regulation. 
Berechman (1993) advances two categories of conditions, not necessarily 
independent of each other, needed in order to initiate an organisational reform in 
public transport: economic crisis and political change. Table 5.1 contains a scheme 
of the main conditions and their main forms. 
Table 5.1 
Conditions to initiate an organisational reform 
Conditions 
Economic crisis - Competing technologies 
- Subsidy crisis - General economic crisis 
- Fiscal crisis 
- Conspicuous levels of inefficiency 
Political change - Institutional change 
- Political awareness and acceptance 
- Credibility of public sector policies 
Economic crisis caused by either the introduction of alternative, competing 
technologies or a subsidy crisis. Fare revenues and subsidies are the two main 
sources of income of public transport operators and a drastic reduction of either of 
these sources will lead to an economic crisis. 
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The introduction of alternative competing technologies, leading to reductions in 
patronage and a decrease in income, will affect the revenue and eventually the 
survival of the transport service. 
A subsidy crisis can be induced by a general economic crisis, a fiscal crisis or 
conspicuous levels of inefficiency. 
A general economic crisis is usually manifested by a decrease in the rate of 
GNP growth (or, on occasions of GDP per se), an increase in the rate of 
unemployment and an increase in inflation changing the perception of the general 
public towards favouring the efficiency measures more than equity. 
The economic crisis in the UK during the early 1980s followed along similar 
lines and required reduction in the levels of subsidisation of the urban public 
transport operations. 
A fiscal crisis corresponds to a scarcity of funds to publicly owned and 
controlled enterprises as a result of deficits in the budget which puts pressure on 
public expenditure and engenders a case for the sale of public assets to finance the 
deficits. 
Andersen (1992) advances the fiscal crisis the Scandinavian countries were 
experiencing as the main reason for regulatory changes in the urban public 
transport markets in the 1990s. The sale of public assets and fiscal restraint helped 
in reducing the public deficits. 
Conspicuous levels of inefficiency often correspond to the escalating costs of 
transport operations and stem from the lack of disciplinary powers which generally 
accompany the market. These inefficiencies are easier to identify when the same 
type of service is provided by private operators at lower costs and without 
subsidies making the demand for further deregulation more credible. 
Political change in the public transport system can be explained by the 
political-economic theories of deregulation and can take three forms: 
Institutional changes which result in fundamental changes in the perceived role 
of the agencies involved in public transport regulation, co-ordination or provision. 
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German cities have transport authorities which are associations of the transport 
operators. In 1997, these transport authorities are to be replaced by associations 
of local and regional political authorities. With this new institutional framework, 
policies will be separated from operations and the new transport authorities will be 
able to buy in services. This corresponds to a major institutional change in the 
perception of the attributes of a transport authority even if the public owned 
operators remain the main or sole transport suppliers of the service. 
Political awareness and acceptance - Politicians have to be aware of public 
concerns and when they feel that the political gains in tenns of public support will 
be greater than the losses created by the opposition of the interest groups to 
undertaking a regulatory reform they often take the inherent risks. 
The reorganisation undertaken in Athens in 1992 meant the government faced 
strong opposition from the trade unions. There were long disruptions to public 
transport bus provision with a strike lasting over two months by the bus drivers. 
Credibility of public sector policies - In some cases before starting extensive 
regulatory reforms the government liberalises the transport operations in limited 
areas and evaluates the results of such pieces of legislation. Afterwards the 
government has to set policies based on the results of the field trials and do not 
infringe its commitments. Many decisions in the private sector are often long term 
and only the stability of government policies can assure the involvement of the 
private sector, especially in regarding long term, irreversible investments. 
In 1986, the deregulation of the public bus operations in Britain were preceded 
by several field trials. More recently the privatisation of GM Buses in Manchester 
in March 1994, the division of London Buses into ten companies and subsequent 
privatisation at the end of 1994 and the reaffirmation of the commitment to 
deregulate the bus operations in London is in line with policies set out by the 
government, which resulted from the 1980 British Trail Area experiment. The 
private sector now has a strong involvement in the urban passenger transport 
provision in the UK. 
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5.3 The process of change 
The success in reorganising urban public transport systems Hes not only in the 
choice of the organisational system adopted but also in the implementation of the 
process of change. 
The public transport industry is experiencing radical changes in Western 
European cities and the implementation of those changes tries to take into account 
their political acceptability and the public's perception of the wisdom of the 
changes. Disruptions to the service are difficult for the general public to accept 
and can bring about long lasting effects on the industry. 
Examples from Britain, where declines in patronage are attributed partly to the 
instability of services offered (Banister et aL, 1992), and Athens, which 
experienced two 2-3 months strikes in less than one and a half year producing 
major disruptions to the transport service represent evidence of what should be 
avoided. The case of Athens shows how the choice, in August 1992, of an 
apparently efficient and effective organisational. model, the same as was adopted in 
London and Copenhagen (authority and multiple operators), was made intractable 
by an inadequate implementation process. A change of Government led to the 
return of the bus operator to public ownership in December 1993, a decision based 
on ideological considerations which led also to major disruptions to the service 
(Matsoukis, 1996). 
The following structure explaining the processes of change is the one proposed 
by Van Matre McLaughlin and Wilson (1987) which identify types of behaviours 
that occurred during the various US transport reorganisations in recent years. 
Changes can occur either within the existing agencies/operators structure or 
have to be supported by a new organisation for the provision of public transport 
services. The first type of change can occur within the current legal framework 
facto change) but the second type of change has to be supported by a new one 
j. u&r change). 
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5.3.1 Internal change 
The efficiency of internal solutions is often questionable, especially in the medium 
and long term. The changes appear as a reaction to the status quo and an attempt 
to improve the structure of the transport organisation within the current legal 
framework by a better allocation of available resources. They are often a reaction 
to an anticipated end to the existing agency and in order to postpone it as much as 
possible, or simply to guarantee its future existence. It is hoped that the incumbent 
suppliers will either increase quality or reduce costs. Normally there are important 
gains in technical efficiency or/and in the quality of the service during these 
periods. 
Three kinds of internal changes can be identified: 
- Increasing Efficiency: controlling costs and increasing productivity; 
This type of change is most common when a new regulatory framework, 
allowing competition for the market, is expected, has already been approved or is 
awaiting implementation - usually a change from model 2 to model 3 in the 
organisation of the public transport market. The incumbent enterprise has to be 
technically efficient to survive in the future environment in which competitiveness 
depends exclusively on the costs of providing services. All other tasks, such as the 
definition of services or of the quality of the service, are to be taken from the 
enterprise and given to the authority leaving the enterprise to concentrate on the 
areas where it has to be competitive to survive. 
This is not strictly an internal change but the important point to stress is that 
significant gains in efficiency were attained before fundamental changes in the 
organisational structure were undertaken. ' 
Examples: Gothenburg and Stockholm 
Goteborgs SpArvAgar AB was given two years for rationalisation before the 
introduction of competition and as a result its costs were cut by about 20%. In 
This is a situation which is similar to that of British Gas in the UK. Important gains in 
productivity were achieved probably because of the regulatory reforms introduced some years 
before the effective privatisation (Price and Weyman-Jones, 1993). 
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Stockholm the bus operator also enjoyed two years to prepare for regulatory 
changes and following its rationalisation costs were cut by about 15%. 
- Improving effectiveness: a better and more diversified service plus better 
control of costs as well as an increase in efficiency; 
This type of change is common when the transport operator starts to feel some 
pressure (e. g. economic or public concern) but the necessary laws to change the 
institutional framework that govern the market have not yet been approved or, 
having been approved, the date for implementation has not yet been fLxed. The 
operator, therefore, still has the freedom to set its own policies and can allocate 
more resources to planning tasks and trying to satisfy the general public while 
postponing as much as possible any reorganisation of the system. This behaviour is 
a consequence of financial pressure and of pubUc concern. 
Example: Oporto 
Since the late 1980s Serviqo de Transportes Colectivos do Porto (STCP) has 
been allocating more resources to planning and also marketing, trying to provide a 
wider range of services which are better tuned to market needs. However, STCP 
felt the pressures from the government to control costs and from the municipality 
of Oporto to control political issues, which delayed the embarking on an extensive 
market research. So far the creation of Metropolitan Transport Commission, made 
possible after legislation approved in 1990, has been delayed. 
- Refocusing in areas of traditional strength. 
This corresponds to the situation where the operator leaves part of the market 
where it is not efficient to private enterprise or the case when it withdraws from 
the operation of a transport mode to concentrate in markets of traditional strength. 
Example: Oporto 
Since the late 1980s STCP is focusing on bus operations and withdrawing 
slowly from tram operations and trolleybuses. The tramway system is very old and 
the operational costs are very high. The cost of modernisation of the tramway 
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system is greater than what the operator can invest and the troneybuses also 
require a very expensive investment programme. 
However, the need to improve the transportation system with the construction 
of a light railway or metro network meant that all the municipalities members of 
the Metropolitan Area of Oporto had to combine their efforts and start to tackle 
their problems on a regional or metropolitan basis. The only alternative to finding 
financial resources in the private sector or to asking for government funding was to 
appear with a broad and consensual project, with a powerful effect across the 
whole metropolitan area. 
5.3.2 External change 
The new organisational models emerge from outside the existing agencies and 
correspond to a profound change in the form of co-ordinating and operating urban 
public transport services. A new legal framework has to support changes in the 
role of existing agencies, create new agencies, change the duties of the existing 
ones or simply abolish them. The external change is most common in the case of 
the creation of transport authorities which separate the responsibility for policy 
making from the operation of the service. 
This degree of co-operation in the process of changing the duties of the 
agencies depends on feelings about the changes, but in any case it has to come 
about by the passing of new laws. 
Within this category three kinds of behaviour were identified: 
- Co-operative behaviour; 
The policy-making functions are taken away from the operating agency, but the 
reorganisation plan has the active participation of the operating agency as well as 
the municipality. 
Example: Zurich 
The Zurich Verkhersverbund (ZVV) came into operation in May 1990 
following the results of a referendum undertaken in March 1988. 
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- Expansion of area of operation; 
This model includes cases where there are changes in the size of the 
geographical area of intervention or operation. This change is most common when 
the service is not yet co-ordinated and there is the feeling that the area of operation 
does not accomplish this goal (e. g. Antwerp) and also in the cases where there is 
already a policy setting authority but the approach is still based on fund allocating 
agencies (e. g. Paris). 
Example: Antwerp 
Belgium was transformed into a federal state in 1988 (3 regions: Flemish, 
Walloon and Brussels) and since then the public transport responsibility in Antwerp 
lies with a regional authority. De Lijn, created in 1991, took over the former urban 
and regional public transport operators to ensure better services and connections, 
higher labour and rolling stock productivity and to avoid losses from the previous 
duplication of services and lack of co-ordination. The service area size of the 
previous company operating in Antwerp was very small when contrasted to the 
movements of the population of the suburbs and the difficulties of making 
connections. 
- Take-over. 
A new policy setting authority is established over the existing public transport 
operator against the latter's will. This kind of change, normally taken by the 
central government, emerges in situations of existing conflicts and dissatisfaction 
with the urban transport agents. Sometimes the take-over does not actually 
materialise but a strong pressure to change the policies of the agents is pursued 
(e. g. as an ultimatum put by the government for the privatisation of GM Buses in 
Manchester in 1993). 
Example: London 
The Greater London Council was abolished and its power divided between 
several organisations by the Local Government Act of 1985 and the London 
Regional Transport Act 1984, and was against the will of the existing agency. The 
5.11 
Organisational change strategies 
Greater London Council had been in continuos conflict and tension with the 
conservative government for some time. 
5.4 Organisational reforms in Western Europe 
Table 5.2 provides examples of the experience in Western European urban areas of 
the reorganisation of public transport systems, models of organisation, year of 
reorganisation, reasons to reorganise, forms of implementation and the most 
important measures undertaken. The new organisational models adopted favour 
the introduction of competition in the operation of urban public transport systems. 
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f erformance Evaluation Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
We have seen from the last two chapters that in recent years many Western 
European urban public transport systems have undergone major reorganisation and 
structural change. The main concern here is to evaluate urban public transport 
service performance and so evaluate the impact of these recent reorganisations 
undertaken in Western Europe. Given the time horizons we are concerned with, 
this will inevitably only allow short term changes to be assessed. Nevertheless, 
these are likely to provide some insights into long term effects as well as giving 
some information regarding efficiency factors in the transition process. 
Because an urban public transport operation is generally managed as a public 
service, in spite of the presence of a traded output, profitability is not normally 
used as the only measure of performance. Other approaches using univariate 
performance indicators, such as ratios of efficiency, effectiveness and quality of 
service give intuitive information, but it is not clear whether a change in value of 
any individual univariate ratio affects the overall performance of a transport 
operator or not (Henscher and DeMellow, 1991). Further, given the dimension of 
the data sets, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) methods cannot easily be applied. 
in this chapter a different approach to evaluating the performance is explored - the 
Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix (EEM). 
The chapter starts with a general characterisation of the main functions of an 
urban public transport system in order to clarify concepts of performance in this 
context. This is followed by a brief discussion of the concepts behind some ratios 
of performance and a review of the literature on applications using frontier 
methodologies, the preferred approach, in the public transport field. 
Performance Evaluation Methodology 
Since EEM is constructed using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) values the 
explanation of EEM is preceded by a presentation of the main theoretical concepts 
behind DEA. The main difference between the two approaches is that DEA 
considers only one measure of performance and EEM considers two, supporting 
the view that "public transport agencies cannot focus on a single objective 
function" [Fielding et al., 1985]. 
The chapter includes some applications of different methods of performance 
evaluation employing two different data sets, discussion of the results and a 
summary of the main conclusions derived. The data sets are taken from a selection 
of European urban transport networks for 1984 and urban bus operations in 
Emilia-Romagna (Italy) between 1986 and 1993. 
The aim of the chapter is to develop the justification for this methodology and 
to explain and show its potential. 
6.2 Urban public transport services 
The operation of public transport in any urban area is affected by a diversity of 
factors. There are many interrelations between public transport operations and 
other aspects of any urban transport system such as road construction and 
maintenance, traffic lights, traffic priorities, parking priorities and bus dedicated 
lanes. Governments' policies also influence the performance of the service. The 
need for governments' involvement is often economic - e. g. to avoid imperfect 
competition because of the monopolistic nature of markets - but also because 
public transport is a public service and public authorities decide to set standards 
other than those stemming from market forces. The outcome of all these 
interrelations influences the attractiveness of urban public transport to potential 
users and the perfon-nance of operators. 
Evaluation of the performance of any urban public transport system involves 
consideration of two main functions: production of the service and utilisation of 
the system. Those functions are performed by different agents: the producers of 
the service are the operators and the users are a subset of the potential passengers. 
Figure 6.1 offers a representation of the interrelation between those functions with 
indicators showing inputs and outputs of activities. 
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FIgure 6.1 
Inputs and outputs of an urban public transport system 
Staff Seat Km 
Vehicles Vehicle Km Passenger Km 
I 
Energy Vehicle Hour 
I 
Passengers 
I 
Potential 
The production of the transport service is a process of transforming a range of 
inputs including staff, vehicles, energy, into outputs such as distance covered by 
the fleet, distance covered by each seat in the fleet or hours of vehicle operation. 
In some ways the process of production is similar to many manufacturing 
companies but, unlike most of them, to be successful it is not enough to have a 
productive efficient unit. Because the service cannot be either stored or provided. 
under client order the service produced has to match instant client needs. The 
intimate presence of the clients during the process of production can cause 
disturbance (e. g. through congestion) and decreases the efficiency of the operator 
but, since customers are the reason for the existence of services and the purpose 
behind a supplier's operations, these difficulties have to be handled. 
The transport service is used by a subset of potential customers over the entire 
system - the passengers. The inputs to the utilisation function are staff, vehicles, 
energy, while the outputs are the number of passengers or the distance covered by 
the passengers. For potential passengers to become actual passengers the vehicle 
must be available when they want to use it, in the place they want to use it, going 
to the destination where they want to go, arriving when they want to be there, at a 
price they are willing to pay. This depends very much on matching the services 
offered to customers needs. 
To evaluate the performance of public transport operators both aspects - 
production and utilisation of the service - need to be taken into consideration. The 
performance of the operator - efficiency - is a measure of the physical economy of 
the process of transformation of resource inputs into produced outputs in the 
provision of services. The performance of the system - effectiveness - is a measure 
of the performance of the consumption of the resource inputs. 
6.3 
Performance Evaluation Methodology 
The purpose of creating transport authorities and the like in many metropolitan 
areas has precisely been to balance those two, often conflicting, objectives 
(efficiency and effectiveness). Efficient production is better attained without 
congestion which corresponds to periods of low demand. Large number of 
passengers and congested transport network cause disruptions in production. 
Effective production is better attained with high demand and this corresponds to 
congested periods. 
6.3 MeChods of performance evaluation 
Urban public transport operations are generally managed as public services; 
profitability, the usual economic measure of performance evaluation in private 
firms, is not normally used as the sole measure of performance. The performance 
of urban public transport systems can be evaluated in several ways ranging from 
the most simple, but still widely used, partial ratios of performance to more 
complex models defining cost or production frontiers. 
Two types of ratios of productivity are normally used: labour productivity and 
capital productivity. Labour productivity ratios can be calculated in a number of 
ways using information on distance covered by the fleet, distance covered by each 
seat installed in the fleet or time of fleet operation and number of workers or 
labour working hours. The capital productivity ratio can be calculated employing 
information on distance covered by the fleet, distance covered by each seat 
installed in the fleet or time of fleet operation and number of vehicles. 
Comparisons of the productivity of labour versus capital can be calculated with 
information on number of workers or labour working hours and number of 
vehicles. 
Several types of ratios of effectiveness are normally used. The ratio of labour 
effectiveness can be calculated with information on number of passengers or 
distance covered by the passengers and number of workers or labour working 
hours. The ratio of production effectiveness can be calculated with information on 
number of passengers or distance covered by the passengers and distance covered 
by the fleet, distance covered by each seat installed in the fleet or time of operation 
of the fleet. The ratio of capital effectiveness in the short term can be calculated 
with information on number of passengers or distance covered by the passengers 
and number of vehicles whilst the ratio of capital effectiveness in the long term can 
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be calculated, for the cases of a dedicated network, with information on number of 
passengers or distance covered by the passengers and network route length. 
Fielding et A (1985) highlighted the importance of multi-objective forms of 
evaluating urban public transport systems by isolating the single most important 
univariate indicators representing several performance concepts. One problem 
with the use of ratios is that there are no benchmarks for comparison. It is 
impossible to say if a determined ratio is good or bad or what is the value which 
should be attained for a particular ratio. The approach using univariate 
performance indicators like ratios of efficiency and effectiveness gives intuitive 
information, but it is not clear whether a change in the value of any individual 
univariate ratio affects the overall performance of a transport operator or not 
(Henscher and DeMellow, 1991). They can also be a source of erroneous 
interpretations of performance. 
More complex forms of performance evaluation have more recently been in 
terms of economic production or cost frontiers. Initially we have raw data 
collected from direct observations. There are two broad ways of defming a 
production frontier from such a set of resource inputs used to produce a given 
level of outputs: parametric and non-parametric approaches. With the parametric 
approach the functional form of the production function is chosen, a distribution to 
the inefficiency terms is assumed and the function is adjusted to fit the data. In the 
non-parametric approach a frontier is derived which is the envelope of all the units 
and no functional form is assumed. Table 6.1 provides a listing of recent work 
using parametric cost and production frontier methodologies in the evaluation of 
urban or regional public transport services and the main findings in terms of 
efficiency considerations. Table 6.2 contains a description of works using non- 
parametric methodologies of performance evaluation. 
With the exception of Chu et A (1992), the problem with all these works using 
parametric or non-parametric techniques is that they consider only one output 
measure. The Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix methodology adopted here is similar 
in terms of concepts to the one proposed in Chu et al. (1992) although 
Boussofiane's (1991) detailed formulation is followed. 
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6.4 Data Envelopment Analysis 
6.4.1 Introduction 
DEA was developed by Charnes et A (1978) following from initial work on 
efficiency measurement carried out by Farrell (1957). Chames et al. (1978) solved 
the problem of evaluating efficiency where there are multiple input and multiple 
output producers. Banker et A (1984) then related the efficiency evaluations 
obtained from observed data with the axiomatic formulations of Shephard's work 
(1970) and this enabled the consideration of variable returns to scale. This ties in 
with ideas of modem production theory. 
DEA provides a relative measure of performance and is increasingly being used 
in evaluating the performance of public service industries such as schools, hospitals 
and prisons (Ganley and Cubbin, 1992, provide a summary of much of the work to 
date). 
6.4.2 Technical Efficiency 
Farrell (1957) presented the first empirical treatment of the production function in 
terms of a management concept of a frontier of production. Figure 6.2, used by 
Farrell (1957) to explain the concept of efficiency, represents a firm employing two 
inputs to produce a single output under constant returns to scale. 
The line SS' is an isoquant representing the various combinations of factor 
inputs x, and x2 needed in the production of one unit of output for a technically 
efficient firm. The slope of line AA'represents the relative factor prices and Q', the 
point of tangency between SS' and AA, represents an overall efficient producer - 
i. e. it is technically efficient and hence is using the most economic combination of 
the factor inputs. 
Point P represents a fum which has both technical and allocative inefficiency. 
Point Q on the one unit output isoquant represents a fmn using the same ratio of 
factors as P but only using part of each factor, given by the ratio of distances 
OQIOP, to produce the same unit of output. Therefore OQJOP represents the 
technical efficiency value for the fmn lying in point P. Though the firm 
represented by the point Q is technically efficient it is allocatively inefficient 
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because the firm represented by the point Q' incurs only part of the costs as 
represented by the ratio of the distances ORIOQ. Hence a fmn lying on point Q is 
technically efficient because it lies on the unit isoquant but is allocatively inefficient 
and the allocative efficiency value is ORIOQ. 
Figure 6.2 
FarreR efficiency measures 
X2 
Therefore the overall efficiency of a firm is the composition of allocative 
efficiency and technical efficiency and in the case of the firm represented by the 
point P is: 
[overall efficiency]=[aflocative efficiencylx[technical efficiency] 
[OR1OPI=[OR1OQ]x[OQJOP] 
This concept of efficiency was subsequently generalised to, among other things, 
the case of multiple resource inputs and multiple output producers (Charnes et A, 
1978) and to different returns to scale (Banker et A, 1984). These developments 
gave a boost to the utilisation of this concept because it provided the basis upon 
which it could be applied to more flexible and realistic applications. 
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6.4.3 Multi-product producers 
DEA is a non-parametric approach and the efficiency measures are functions of 
distance to an empirical production frontier. There is no need to assume a 
functional form for the production function because the frontier is the observed 
best practice of the data set available. Assuming a specific functional form 
involves a strong a priori assumption about the underlying production technology 
but the revealed technology is likely to be a closer estimate of the true, unknown 
technology underlying the data (Ganley and Cubbin, 1992). 
DEA allows also one scalar overview of performance obtained with the inputs 
and outputs of each organisation by calculating weights through the comparison of 
the performance of the organisations. This calculation is based on the standard 
Pareto, efficiency concept. 
DEA has recently been widely applied to evaluate the performance of public 
sector undertakings, but can also be applied to private sector suppliers. In the 
public sector, where the outputs are non-traded services, instead of defining 
shadow prices, with all the inherent problems involved, DEA offers a non- 
subjective weight formation. According to Lewin and Morey (1981), "the 
procedure (DEA) is most appropriate for performing evaluations where 
administrators are not free to redirect resources to their programs because they are 
more 'profitable', but where their mission is to maximise the outputs to be obtained 
from the resources and non controllable factors assigned to them. " 
DEA offers also a method for identifying accurate targets. The identification of 
targets is generally important in improving efficiency of any undertaking. With 
DEA it is possible to calculate which and how much of each resource are being 
used in excess. 
The input-minimisation version of DEA programming is used in this study. It 
assumes managers wish to minimise the inputs required for any given level of 
output. ibis need not be the case with all urban public transport operators but as 
outputs are in general more prone to stochastic influences (Ganley and Cubbin, 
1992), and reporting problems than inputs, the input-minimisation version is 
adopted here. 
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In this context, Charnes et al. (1978) propose the following model: 
UrYrO 
max h,, = -11: -' M F- vi xi o i=l 
subject to 
UrYri 
< 
m E vi xii 
i=l 
U,,, vj >0rS 
where 
y, j output r of uniti 
x4 input i of unitj 
m: number of inputs 
s number of outputs 
n number of units 
i=l 
(6.1) 
The fractional programming problem can be converted into a linear 
programming problem. 'Ibis is done by imposing a unity value on the denominator 
of the objective ho and adding this as a constraint to maximise, the new objective 
hý. The linear programme can then be written as: 
max ho UrYrO (6.2) 
r=l 
subject to 
Smjn 7- Ur Yij Vi Xii <0 
r=l 
m Ivixio 
i=l 
U,,, vj >0r=Isi=Im 
The efficiency values are calculated by solving the dual programme and the 
formulation becomes: 
min ZO 
subject to 
Yj > YO r 
j=l 
(6.3) 
6.13 
Performance Evaluation Methodology 
n 
7- xiixi :5 zoxio i=1... ni 
j=l 
Xj > 0; zo unconstrained. 
6.4.4 Non-constant returns to scale 
Banker et A (1984) related the efficiency evaluations obtained from observed data 
to the axiomatic formulations of Shephard's work (1970) and, hence, enabled the 
consideration of different returns to scale and provided a basis to relate these ideas 
to modem economic production theory. 
Let x in R+n be the observed input vector of a producer, y in RM the respective 
observed output vector and z in R"+', the netput vector, a combination of those 
two vectors given by z=(y, -x). Let Z be the production possibilities set of an 
industry constructed with the observed z's, let V(y)=Jx in R, ": (y, -x) is in Z) be the 
input requirement set which gives all input bundles producing at least y and let 
P(x)=fy in R+: (y, -x) is in Z) be the output possibility set which gives all output 
bundles produced with x. 
The existence of different returns to scale depends on the properties of Z, which 
will be associated with the following assumptions: 
Convexity: If z'is in Z and z" is in Z then tz+(I-t)z" is in Z for all 0: ý t: 5 1. Z is 
a convex set; 
Monotonicity: If z'is in Z and z"<z', then z" is in Z, 
Scaling down: If z is in Z then tz is in Z, for all 0: 5 t: 5 1; 
Re-scaling: If z is in Z then tz is in Z, for all t ý: 0. 
The axiom sets are obtained from the combination of these assumptions. 
Axiom 1: convexity and monotonicity: 
The production possibilities set Z is convex and monotonic. Monotonicity 
means that inefficiency in the forin of more inputs, less outputs or both is possible 
because the netput set includes non-boundary production. Also without this 
assumption the boundary of the input requirement set would bend inwards. The 
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marginal rate of substitution between inputs is never positive nor can be increasing. 
This axiom set corresponds to the case of variable returns to scale (VRS). 
Axiom 2: convexity, monotonicity and scaling down: 
This axiom set contains the same assumptions as axiom 1 but allows netputs to 
be scaled down. The axiom set corresponds to the case of non-increasing returns 
to scale (NIRS) 
Axiom 3: convexity, monotonicity and re-scaling: 
This axiom set contains the same assumptions of axiom I but allows any netput 
re-scaling. The netputs can be scaled down and scaled up. This axiom Set 
corresponds to the case of constant returns to scale (CRS). 
Table 6.3 
Linear programming efficiency measurement 
X# the input i in unitj 
Yd output r in unitj 
xi weights attached to operator j's inputs and outputs 
ZO efficiency measure 
M number of inputs 
S number of outputs 
n number of units 
Xio input of the operator whose efficiency is being measured 
YiO output of the operator whose efficiency is being measured 
objective min zo CRS MRS VRS 
subject to nxxx I ydl%j ý! Y, O rS j=l 
nxxx 
I xi x :5 zoxio iM j j 
j=l 
nx 
IX =1 
j. 1 
nx X < I 
J. j=l 
xJ0xxx 
zo unconstrained xxx 
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The formulation of the dual programme presented in equation 6.3 corresponds 
to the case of constant returns to scale but by adding constraints to the weights 
attached to the inputs and outputs it is possible to generalise the solutions to cases 
of variable and non-increasing returns to scale. Table 6.3 offers the formulations 
of the dual programme in the three cases. 
Figure 6.3 represents a two-dimensional section of the production possibility set 
Z corresponding to its intersection with the plane determined by X=XY, and Y=yY,. 
'ne production frontier is defined for the three situations contemplated - constant 
returns to scale (CRS), non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) and variable returns 
to scale (VRS) and the representation is used to explain the calculation of the 
efficiency measures in the three cases. 
Points B=(x. X, y,, Yo) to I=(x., Yo, yYO) represent observed producers and the 
production frontier is the observed best practice frontier in the data set. The 
definition of this frontier depends on the axiom sets. 
Figure 6.3 
Technical and scale efficiency (VRS, MRS, CRS) 
y Yo 
M 
L 
i 
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Axiom set 1 corresponds to the case of variable returns to scale and the 
production frontier is defined by the line ABCDEF. Axiom set 2 corresponds to 
the case of non-increasing returns to scale because scaling down is possible and the 
production frontier is defined by the line ODEF. Axiom set 3 corresponds to the 
case of constant returns to scale because any re-scaling is possible and the 
production frontier is defined by the straight line passing in the origin 0 and points 
C=(xcXw ycY, ) and D=(xDX,,, yc YO). 
Table 6.4 
Technical efficiency measures 
Point CRS MRS VRS 
G JK1JG JK1JG JBIJG 
H LCILH LCILH LCILH 
I MNIMI MEW MEW 
The efficiency measures are ratios of distances. The distances to the frontier 
can be measured in different directions but, in our case, 'the horizontal distances 
were taken which corresponds to the problem of input minimisation for a given 
level of output. Table 6.4 offers the form of calculation of the pure technical 
efficiency values for the three cases of returns to scale contemplated. 
Table 6.5 offers the method of obtaining the scale efficiency measures for the 
same cases. The productive efficiency value is the product of overall technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency and is equal to the technical efficiency value with 
constant returns to scale as shown in the relevant column in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.5 
Scale efficiency measures 
Point CRS MRS VRS 
G I JK1JB 
H I I 
I I MNIME MNIME 
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Under Axiom set 1, the production frontier is represented by the line ABCDEF 
in Figure 6.3. Operators lying in this line are technically efficient. Operators lying 
between points C and D are technically and scale efficient. 
Operator B=(x. X, yY, ) is technically efficient because it is on the frontier but it 
is scale inefficient; the scale efficiency value is KJIBJ. Point G=(x G'YOI yGYO) is 
technically inefficient and scale inefficient; the productive efficiency value is: 
[JKIJGI=[JBIJG]x[JKIJBI 
[Productive efficiencyl=[Technical efficiency]x[Scale efficiency] 
Producers lying in the space bounded by the x-axis, line ABC and a horizontal 
line passing through C have increasing returns to scale and the technical efficiency 
values are related: TEcRs=TENRs<TEvRs. Producers lying in the space bounded by 
the horizontal lines passing through C and D and the line CD have constant returns 
to scale and TEcRs=TENRs=TEvRs. Producers lying in the space bounded by the 
horizontal line passing in D and the line DEF have decreasing returns to scale and 
TEcRs<TEN, Rs=TEVRS- 
6.5 Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix 
The EEM is a methodology proposed to evaluate the performance and resource 
allocation of a public transport operator. Boussofiane et al. (1991) suggest a 
similar methodology in the cases where profits are a good measure of performance 
evaluation and Chu et A (1992) also use a methodology with many similarities. A 
EEM is constructed with DEA values measuring the relative efficiency of the 
operations and the relative effectiveness of the transport system. The same 
concept of technical efficiency explored by Farrell (1957) is applied to measure 
effectiveness. 
The measure of the relative performance of any operator is defined as the 
'efficiency-EEM'and the measure of relative performance of-a transport system is 
the 'effectiveness-EEM'. The inputs used to calculate the relative efficiency-EEM 
value are those employed by the transport operator in the production of the service 
(e. g. staff, vehicles, petrol) and operating environmental conditions (e. g. network 
route length). Output is defined in terms of the distance covered by the fleet or the 
duration of its operation (see Figure 6.4). The inputs used to calculate the relative 
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effectiveness-EEM value are also the inputs of the transport operator but the 
outputs measure the utilisation of the service - i. e. number of passengers or 
distance covered by the passengers. 
The relative efficiency-EEM value, therefore, provides information on the 
relative productivity of the operator in a particular year while the relative 
effectiveness-EEM value provides information concerning the relative patronage of 
the transport system in a particular year. 
Figure 6.4 
Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix 
Effectiveness 
Figure 6.4 is a representation of the EEM. The relative efficiency-EEM value is 
plotted on the x-axis and effectiveness-EEM value is plotted on the y-axis. Points 
lying in quadrant I correspond to years of relative efficient and effective operations. 
Because DEA gives relative measures of performance those points represent above 
average values in both efficiency-EEM and effectiveness-EEM values. Points lying 
in quadrant II correspond to years in which the operations were effective but the 
production was inefficient meaning the operator could either have produced more 
output with the resources available or could have produced the same output level 
using fewer inputs. Points lying in quadrant III correspond to inefficient and 
ineffective operations meaning not only that the operator could have been more 
productive but also that either the level of utilisation could have been higher with 
the resources available or the same level of utilisation could have been obtained 
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with less inputs. Points lying in quadrant IV correspond to efficient producers but 
low levels of utilisation of the service produced. 
A successful undertaking may be managed efficiently or enjoy favourable 
environmental conditions and conversely an unsuccessful undertaking may be 
poorly managed or face unfavourable extemal'conditions. The EEM provides a 
tool which helps to distinguish between those different situations. The position of 
the operator in the matrix highlights the directions of the action needed to enhance 
the performance of the system. The evaluation of performance in an urban public 
transport service cannot normally be reduced simply to profitability or to a single 
measure of productivity given the nature of the service. 
The borders can be defined in different ways. The borders cannot be imposed a 
priori because DEA values give comparative efficiency measures and, hence, the 
definition of borders has to be related to the data set at hand. The value of the 
borders are defined by parameters of central tendency in the data set. The obvious 
ones are the efficiency- and effectiveness-EEM average values and the medians. 
Another option is to define according to average values and standard errors, 
creating thick borders corresponding to zones of indifference between quadrants. 
As a general rule, when evaluating the performance of one operator over a period 
of time the borders should be defined by the average values. This is because there 
should be no great differences in the efficiency measures. However, when 
evaluating several operators over the same period, effectively pooling information, 
the borders should be defined by the medians since the results are more likely to be 
one sided. 
6.6 Comparative Studies 
6.6.1 Introduction 
in this section we explore the potential and limitations of Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Matrix in the evaluation of performance of urban public transport systems. Some 
aspects will also be discussed in the next chapter but an extensive examination of 
the technique is undertaken at this stage. 
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A comparative study is carried out applying DEA and EEM to a cross-section 
data set presented in Gathon (1989) (see Table A. 2.1 in Appendix A. 2) and an 
extensive discussion of EEM is undertaken with the data set used by Fabbri (1995) 
with panel-data (see Table A. 2.2 in Appendix A. 2). 
6.6.1 European urban transport companies 
Gathon (1989) ranked the urban public transport operators in several European 
cities according to their technical efficiency. The study consists of a cross- 
sectional analysis using data from 60 European urban transport companies for 
1984. Two inputs - labour, measured in terms of number of workers and capital, 
measured in number of seats in the fleet - and one output - production of seat- 
kilometres - were employed. Two techniques were applied, one based on Greene 
(1980) which is a statistical estimation of a deterministic production frontier based 
on the displacement method of least squares (DLS) and the other based on Deprins 
et al. (1984) which is a non-parametric method called free disposal hull (FDH). 
The results obtained in both applications are not directly comparable because of the 
low discretionary power of FDH but, in general, the networks reported as 
inefficient in the non-parametric application were also inefficient when applying the 
DLS technique-' 
Table 6.6 
input and output variables in DLS, FDH and DEA applications 
Vaiiable 
Int)ut 
XSTA Number of staff 
XSEA Number of seats 
Output 
YSKM Distance covered by the seats 
Our DEA application is as similar as possible to FDH and DLS applications 
because one of our aims is to compare the results obtained with the various 
I The exception is Vienna ranked as very efficient with DLS but not so in the frontier with FDH. 
in this case the FDH application seems more reliable because Munich has a DLS efficiency level 
of 0.798 (ranked 19) and has less of each input and more output than Vienna which has a 
superior DLS efficiency level - 0.889 (ranked 9). 
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methodologies. DEA is applied in the case of variable returns to scale and with the 
same inputs and outputs used in the other two applications as shown in Table 6.6. 
Free Disposal Hull and Data Envelopment Analysis 
With FDH2 an operator is considered inefficient if there is another operator 
using the same or less of each input and obtaining at least the same of each output. 
This characteristic of the method provides a robust platform of comparison but is 
very restrictive in its criteria for comparison. Those elements not involved in the 
process of comparison are left on the production frontier. 
Table 6.7 contains the FDH results presented by Gathon (1989) for inefficient 
networks, DEA values for the same networks (DEA1) and for the respective 
leading networks (DEA2) and the ratio of the two DEA values. 
Table 6.7 
FDH inefficient enterprises in DEA application 
FDH Leading etwotk DEAI Rank DEA2 Rank 
Vienna 0.862 Munich Vienna 0.496 38 Munich 0.636 15 
Brussels 0.876 Rotterdam Brussels 0.371 59 Rotterdam 0.533 29 
Augsburg 0.894 Wiesbaden Augsburg 0.504 33 Wiesbaden 0.585 19 
Grenoble 0.949 Wiesbaden Grenoble 0.455 46 Wiesbaden 0.585 19 
Le Havre 0.920 Arnhem Le Havre 0.710 10 Arnhem 0.864 9 
Nancy 0.958 Dijon Nancy 0.531 30 Dijon 0.643 13 
Bologna 0.650 Essen Bologna 0.348 60 Essen 0.550 28 
Florence 0.984 Basle Florence 0.419 54 Basle 0.584 21 
Bordeaux 0.977 Basle Bordeaux 0.432 50 Basle 0.584 21 
Naples 0.903 Rotterdam Naples 0.412 55 Rotterdam 0.533 29 
Turin 0.667 Munich Turin 0.420 53 Munich 0.636 15 
Bergen 0.855 Trondheim Bergen 0.496 37 Trondheim 0.588 18 
Malmo 0.822 Aarhus Malmo 0.519 31 Aarhus 0.681 11 
Blackpool 0.917 Trondheim Blackpool 0.503 34 Trondheim 0.588 18 
Liverpool 0.710 Munich 
--+ 
Liverpool 0.452 47 Munich 0.636 15 
Average 
____ 
0.863 0.471 
The results of FDH and DEA efficiency values are very different because the 
average FDH efficiency level for the inefficient networks is 86.3% (standard error 
For an explanation of basic methodology see Tulkens (1993) 
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2.8%) and the average DEA efficiency level for the same networks is 47.1 % (s. e. 
2.2%). 
FDH does not give a complete method for disfinguishing/hierarchising the 
various urban transport operators with many of them remaining on the frontier (45 
out of 60). Some networks not in the frontier with FDH are quite efficient 
according to the DEA estimation as, for example, is the case of Le Havre and 
clearly there are many networks in the FDH frontier less efficient than this one. 
FDH is, therefore, a robust and understandable method of efficiency evaluation for 
operators not on the frontier in relation to their leading networks. The problem is 
that it might lead to some misunderstanding because it leaves many elements on the 
frontier which are inefficient, because there is not an element of comparison. 
Displacement method of least squares and Data Envelopment Analysis 
The DLS consists in estimating an average production function using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) to fit the best curve and define the frontier by shifting the 
curve up according to the largest positive residual found from the OLS results. 
Gathon, in his work on buses, applied the following function to define the 
production process: 
Y=f (K, L) 
in which Y represents the output with K and L the capital and the labour inputs. 
Output is measured as the number of seat-kilometres produced in 1984, K is the 
number of seats installed in the vehicle fleet and L is the total number of 
employees. 
ne analytical fonn of the production function was translog: 
109yý--CCO +CCK log K+ CC L log L+ 
I 
CcKK (log K)2 +I cc u (log 
L) 2+ CEIM log Klog L 22 
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Table 6.8 
DLS and DEA (VRS) efficiency values 
DLS Rank DEA Rank Leading Networks 
Hamburg 0.981 3 1.000 1 Hamburg 1.000 
Manchester 0.678 48 0.432 51 Maastricht 0.587 Hamburg 0.413 
Munich 0.798 19 0.636 15 Maastricht 0.591 Hamburg 0.409 
Vienna 0.889 9 0.496 38 Maastricht 0.650 Hamburg 0.350 
Madrid 0.840 14 0.490 42 Maastricht 0.704 Hamburg 0.296 
Liverpool 0.694 42 0.452 47 Maastricht 0.714 Hamburg 0.286 
Turin 0.636 55 0.420 53 Maastricht 0.732 Hamburg 0.268 
Rotterdam 0.758 27 0.533 29 Maastricht 0.759 Hamburg 0.241 
Naples 0.765 55 0.412 55 Maastricht 0.794 Hamburg 0.216 
Brussels 0.616 57 0.371 59 Maastricht 0.791 Hamburg 0.209 
Leeds 0.862 11 0.477 44 Maastricht 0.823 Hamburg 0.177 
Lyons 0.582 58 0.404 58 Maastricht 0.825 Hamburg 0.175 
Zurich 0.725 34 0.496 39 Maastricht 0.837 Hamburg 0.163 
Amsterdam 0.815 17 0.463 45 Maastricht 0.845 Hamburg 0.155 
Barcelona 0.706 39 0.406 57 Maastricht 0.870 Hamburg 0.130 
Marseilles 0.669 51 0.408 56 Maastricht 0.883 Hamburg 0.117 
Bonn 0.771 23 0.489 43 Maastricht 0.884 Hamburg 0.116 
Essen 0.946 6 0.550 28 Maastricht 0.886 Hamburg 0.114 
Haarlem 0.960 4 0.557 24 Maastricht 0.894 Hamburg 0.106 
Edinburgh 0.834 15 0.493 40 Maastricht 0.912 Hamburg 0.088 
Basic 0.810 18 0.584 21 Vervicrs 0.516 Winterhur 0.395 Hamburg 0.090 
Florence 0.677 49 0.419 54 Maastricht 0.914 Hamburg 0.086 
Bordeaux 0.690 44 0.432 50 Maastricht 0.915 Hamburg 0.085 
Bologna 0.579 60 0.348 60 Maastricht 0.931 Hamburg 0.069 
The Hague 0.686 45 0.420 52 Maastricht 0.939 Hamburg 0.061 
Salerno 0.817 16 0.491 41 Maastricht 0.945 Hamburg 0.055 
Liege 0.708 37 0.433 49 Maastricht 0.950 Hamburg 0.050 
Antwerp 0.707 38 0.438 48 Maastricht 0.957 Hamburg 0.043 
Aachen 0.918 7 0.562 23 Maastricht 0.958 Hamburg 0.042 
Wiesbaden 0.990 2 0.585 19 Maastricht 0.958 Hamburg 0.042 
Grenoble 0.697 41 0.455 46 Verviers 0.604 Maastricht 0.353 Hamburg 0.043 
Aarhus 1.000 1 0.681 11 Maastricht 0.962 Hamburg 0.038 
Augsburg 0.733 31 0.504 33 Verviers 0.892 Winterhur 0.066 Hamburg 0.042 
Malmo 0.767 24 0.519 31 Maastricht 0.971 Hamburg 0.029 
Braunschweig 0.690 43 0.500 36 Verviers 0.845 Winterhur 0.122 Hamburg 0.033 
Utrecht 0.882 10 0.637 14 Maastricht 0.973 Hamburg 0.027 
Dijon 0.781 21 0.643 13 Winterhur 0.517 Verviers 0.457 Hamburg 0.026 
Nancy 0.623 56 0.531 30 Verviers 0.526 Winterhur 0.449 Hamburg 0.025 
Kingston 0.739 30 0.501 35 Maastricht 0.977 Hamburg 0.023 
Gent 0.845 12 0.557 25 Maastricht 0.978 Hamburg 0.022 
Bielefeld 0.727 33 0.513 32 Verviers 0.843 Maastricht 0.132 Hamburg 0.025 
Trondheim 0.789 20 0.588 18 Maastricht 0.987 Hamburg 0.013 
Caen 0.720 36 0.575 22 Verviers 0.891 Winterhur 0.092 Hamburg 0.017 
Blackpool 0.580 59 0.503 34 Maastricht 0.989 Hamburg 0.011 
Bergen 0.645 54 0.496 37 Maastricht 0.991 Hamburg 0,009 
Bergamo 0.750 29 0.585 20 Verviers 0.582 Maastricht 0.406 Hamburg 0.012 
Salzburg 0.727 32 0.556 26 Maastricht 0.813 Vmiers 0.178 Hamburg 0.009 
Innsbruck 0.673 50 0.553 27 Maastricht 0.993 Hamburg 0.007 
Parma 0.705 40 0.600 17 Verviers 0.893 Winterhur 0.094 Hamburg 0.013 
Rimini 0.845 13 0.678 12 Maastricht 0.994 Hamburg 0.006 
Arnhem 0.724 35 0.864 9 Maastricht 0.994 Hamburg 0.006 
Le Havre 0.682 46 0.710 10 Maastricht 0.996 Hamburg 0.004 
Winterhur 0.776 22 1.000 1 Winterhur 1.000 Hamburg 0.000 
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Table 6.8 
DLS and DEA (VRS) efficiency values 
DLS Rank DEA Rank Leading Networks 
Charleroi 0.645 53 0.621 16 Maastricht 0.999 Hamburg 0.001 
Maastricht 0.960 5 1.000 1 Maastricht 1.000 Hamburg 0.000 
St-GaHcn 0.891 8 0.925 7 Verviers 0.867 Wintcrhur 0.128 Hamburg 0.005 
Neuchatel 0.758 26 0.916 8 Maastricht 0.435 Brighton 0.419 Verviers 0.146 
Biel 0.757 28 0.962 6 Vervicrs 0.923 Winterhur 0.076 Hamburg 0.001 
Brighton 0.681 47 1.000 1 Brighton 1.000 Maastricht 0.000 Verviers O. OW 
Verviers 0.663 52 1.000 1 Verviers 1.000 Hamburg 0.000 Maastricht 0.000 
Table 6.8 shows the efficiency values presented by Gathon (1989) using DLS, 
the results of DEA application with the leading networks and the ranking of the 
operators using the various methods of performance evaluation. 
The average DEA efficiency value is found to be 58.1% (s. e. 2.3%) and the 
average DLS efficiency value is 75.9% (s. e. 1.4%) which is a difference of 17.8%. 
The ranking of the enterprises under the various techniques is also quite different 
and Table 6.9 shows the magnitude of those differences. Only 23 (38.3%) 
networks are within a5 places ranking difference using the two techniques and 18 
networks are more than 20 places ranking difference. 
Table 6.9 
Operators ranking differences with DLS and DEA 
Places of ranking Number of 
difference operators 
0-5 23 
5-10 9 
11-15 3 
16-20 7 
>20 18 
The efficient operators found from the DEA application, the ones on the 
production frontier, are very small ones (Verviers, Winterhur, Maastricht and 
l3righton) and the largest one (Hamburg) - see Table 6.8 again. The average DEA 
efficiency value of the top half operators (ordered by decreasing seat-kilometres) is 
49.0% and the average DEA efficiency value of the bottom half operators is 
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67.2%. This could lead to the conclusion that performance is influenced by the 
scale of the operators with large operators generally being less economically 
efficient than the small ones. 
Since DEA is a method producing relative efficiency values, a very efficient 
operator can strongly affect the performance values of other operators. In this 
case, Table 6.6 reveals that Hamburg is a leading network. The efficiency values 
were therefore recalculated without Hamburg's network in order to investigate its 
influence in the results obtained in DEA application. The results are quite different 
but a similar problem remains, now Munich takes Hamburg's place as a leading 
network. Only after removing the three largest operators from the data set were 
the results not strongly influenced by a particular operator. Table 6.10 contains a 
summary of the results presented in Table A. 2.3 (Appendix A. 2) and shows that 
after taking out the eight largest operators the results are more stable. 
Table 6.10 
Average DEA efficiencY values taking out the largest operators 
Number of DEA 
operators Average s. e. 
60 58.1 2.3 
59 74.3 1.8 
58 73.9 1.7 
57 81.7 1.7 
56 81.6 1.7 
55 81.3 1.7 
54 81.2 1.7 
53 80.8 1.7 
52 83.4 1.9 
51 83.1 1.9 
50 82.8 1.9 
40 80.8 2.0 
DEA efficiency values are calculated by considering distances of actual 
performance from the observed production frontier. Normally the frontier takes a 
convex form but Gathon arrived at an'S'shaped curve with part of the curve being 
convex and part concave. Hence in this case, DEA techniques are not suitable for 
evaluating efficiency. 
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The shape of Gathon's curve reflects the nature of public transport operators - 
involving a very wide range of dimensions and diversified transport modes often 
with very different productivity levels. Among the seventeen largest undertakings 
examined, ten have a subway system and six of them extensive tramway networks. 
There are two different situations - the small networks mainly use buses but the 
largest ones operate several modes of transport. Since metro is generally more 
efficient, it is not surprising the shape of the production function exhibits a kink in 
the zone where the networks become larger and metro operations begin to become 
important elements of the system. 
The definition of a DEA production frontier is strongly influenced by the 
efficient elements and, in this case, the results are deeply affected by the networks 
with extensive underground systems. Cities in which the output is largely supplied 
by subway - Hamburg (53 million seat kilometres produced representing 47.0% of 
total output) and Munich (33 million seat kilometres; produced representing 41.2% 
of total output) - are the ones that have the strongest influence on the results. 
After extracting these cities, Rotterdam exhibits a strong influence and here the 
output by subway represents 35.9% of the total. This is why after removing the 8 
largest networks (Rotterdam is the eighth) the remaining data set becomes more 
homogeneous and the results more stable. 
Ibis comparison highlights the problem of input and output definition. The 
networks are different and the inputs and the output ideally need to be considered 
according to transport mode. This could have been done with DEA but not with 
the DLS method. 
Data Envelopment Analysis and EfficiencylEffectiveness matrix 
Given the problems already discussed, comparison of the EEM and DEA 
methods is conducted without the 8 largest networks of the data set. The data set 
still includes some networks with subway operations but those operations are not 
important in the total output of the operators and the results should not be much 
affected by their inclusion. 
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It is now possible to consider multi-output producers. The inputs considered 
employing DEA (see Table 6.11) are the number of staff (XSTA) and the number 
of seats in the fleet (XSEA) while the outputs are the number of seats times the 
kilometres covered in one year (YSKM), the distance covered by the fleet 
(YVKM) and number of passengers (YPAS). The EEM-Efficiency value is 
calculated with the same inputs (XSTA and XSEA) but with the number of seats 
times the kilometres covered in one year (YSKM) and with the distance covered by 
the fleet (YVKM) as outputs. The EEM-Effectiveness value is calculated with the 
same inputs (XSTA and XSEA) and with the number of passengers (YPAS) as 
output. 
Table 6.11 
Input and Output variables in DEA and EEM applications 
Variable DEA Effi. -EEM Effe. -EEM 
InDut 
XSTANumber of staff xxx 
XSEANumber of seats xxx 
Output 
YPASNumber of Passengers xx 
YVKMDistance covered by the fleet xx 
YSKMDistance covered by the seats xx 
Table 6.12 gives DEA and EEM performance values - the average DEA value is 
85.7%, Efficiency-EEM 83.9% and Effectiveness-EEM 45.0%. The DEA values 
are at least equal to the higher of the EEM values because they have all the inputs 
and outputs considered in the other two ratios and they are calculated using the 
minimum distance to the frontier. The values given in the DEA appHcation could 
lead to abnormally high values of performance which do not reflect the complete 
nature of operations. This fact can be seen if we consider the values of the first 5 
networks in the table: Naples, Brussels, Leeds, Lyons and Zurich, these are on the 
DEA frontier because they are on the frontier when considering the production 
outputs (Efficiency-EEM) although the situations are diverse in terms of 
effectiveness of the networks. 
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Table 6.12 
DEA and EEM values 
undeaWngs DEA Effl. -EEM Effe. -EEM 
Naples 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Brussels 1.000 1.000 0.369 
Leeds 1.000 1.000 0.446 
Lyons 1.000 1.000 0.630 
Zurich 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Amsterdam 0.992 0.928 0.806 
Barcelona 0.891 0.775 0.648 
Marseilles 0.770 0.752 0.373 
Bonn 0.944 0.944 0.083 
Essen 1.000 1.000 0.165 
Haarlem 1.000 1.000 0.101 
Edinburgh 0.982 0.860 0.548 
Basle 1.000 1.000 0.453 
Florence 0.895 0.766 0.741 
Bordeaux 0.798 0.798 0.095 
Bologna 0.717 0.583 0.616 
The Hague 0.757 0.687 0.372 
Salerno 0.815 0.815 0.143 
liege 0.743 0.743 0.138 
Antwerp 0.695 0.693 0.153 
Aachen 0.896 0.896 0.194 
Wiesbaden 0.981 0.981 0.207 
Grenoble 0.729 0.729 0.167 
Aarhus 1.000 1.000 0.254 
Augsburg 0.766 0.766 0.198 
Malmo 0.751 0.748 0.224 
Braunschweig 0.843 0.841 0.225 
Utrecht 0.895 0.895 0.278 
Dijon 0.896 0.896 0.320 
Nancy 0.732 0.732 0.270 
Kingston 0.725 0.716 0.242 
Gent 0.811 0.811 0.270 
Bielefeld 0.701 0.701 0.261 
Trondheim 0.779 0.779 0.339 
Caen 0.733 0.733 0.355 
Blackpool 0.620 0.620 0.313 
Bergen 0.637 0.631 0.323 
Bergamo 0.721 0.696 0.381 
Salzburg 0.740 0.676 0.382 
Innsbruck 0.724 0.659 0.395 
Parma 0.743 0.705 0.408 
Rimini 0.823 0.809 0.491 
Arnhem 1.000 0.987 0.627 
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Table 6.12 
DEA and EEM values 
undertakings DEA Effl. -EEM Effe. -EEM 
Le Havre 0.800 0.786 0.542 
Winterhur 1.000 1.000 0.931 
Charleroi 0.641 0.641 0.518 
Maastricht 1.000 1.000 0.872 
St-Gallen 1.000 0.984 0.784 
Neuchatel 0.916 0.916 0.854 
Biel 0.964 0.964 0.914 
Brighton 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Verviers 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Mean 0.857 0.839 0.450 
SE 0.017 0.019 0.038 
Median 0.867 0.813 0.372 
Range 0.380 0.417 0.917 
Figure 6.5 
Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix (Mean) 
Effectiveness 
I Quadrant H 
0.450 
Barcelona 
Bologna 
Rimini 
Le Havre 
Charleroi 
Marseilles, Bordeaux, The Hague, 
Salerno, Liege, Antwerp, Grenoble, 
Augsburg, Malmo, Nancy, Kingston, 
Gent, Bielefeld, Trondheim, Caen, 
Blackpool, Bergen, Bergamo, 
Salzburg, Innsbruck, Parma 
m 
Quadrant I 
Naples, Lyons, Zurich, 
Amsterdam, Edinburgh, Basle, 
Arnhem, Winterhur, Maastricht, 
St-Gallen, Neuchatel, Biel, 
Brighton, Verviers 
Brussels, Leeds, Bonn, Essen, 
Haarlem, Florence, Aachen, 
Wiesbaden, Aarhus, 
Braunschweig, Utrecht, Dijon 
0.839 
IV 
Efficiency 
Figure 6.5 provides an EEM representation with the borders defined by the 
mean values and Figure 6.6 provides an EEM representation with the borders 
defted by the median value. The networks in italic in both Figures are those that 
are affected by the forni of border definition and changed quadrants. 
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hwe 6.6 
Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix (Median) 
Effectiveness 
I Quadrant H 
0.372 
Barcelona, Marseilles, Bologna, 
Bergamo, Salzburg, Innsbruck, 
Parma, Rimini, Le Havre, 
Charleroi 
Bordeaux, The Hague, Salerno, 
Liege, Antwerp, Grenoble, 
Augsburg, Malmo, Nancy, 
Kingston, Gent, Bielefeld, 
Trondheim, Caen, Blackpool, 
Bergen 
in 
Quadrant I 
Naples, Leeds, Lyons, Zurich, 
Amsterdam, Edinburgh, Basle, 
Arnhem, Winterhur, Maastricht, 
St-Gallen, Neuchatel, Biel, 
Brighton, Verviers 
Brussels, Bonn, Essen, Haarlem, 
Florence, Aachen, Wiesbaden, 
Aarhus, Braunschweig, Utrecht, 
Dijon 
0.813 
IV 
Efficiency 
Figure 6.7 
Number of networks in quadrants with borders defined with mean and median 
LMe I 
5 14 
21 12 
Medianý 
10 15 
16 11 
Six urban public transport networks changed quadrants with the definition of 
the borders -5 changing from quadrant III to quadrant 11 and one changing from 
quadrant IV to quadrant 1. Figure 6.7 shows the number of networks lying in each 
quadrant for both definitions of the borders. 
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6.6.3 Emilia-Romagna Operators (1986/1993) 
The data set 
Table 6.13 
Characteristics of public transport operators in Emilia-Romagna 
(1986) 
Staff Vehicles Vehicle Km Seat km Passengers 
ACAP-Piacenza 171 58 2,348,138 230,643,831 13,616,682 
TEP-Parma 385 113 4,572,794 477,877,207 25,633,416 
ACT-Regio-Emilia 222 82 3,582,656 366,086,276 23,660,996 
ATMC-Modena 300 114 3,725,404 371,200,562 19,582,022 
ATC-Bologna 1,699 445 16,486,308 1,755,791,802 140,206,960 
ACFF-Feffara 207 75 2,421,095 243,755,845 11,092,543 
ATR-Forli 116 55 2,483,155 232,603,901 7,215,354 
ATM-Ravenna 134 38 2,930,106 283,526,310 5,719,593 
TRAM-Rimini 384 108 5,522,069 523,697,140 20,892,359 
Total 3618 1088 44,071,725 3,967,007,803 267,619,925 
(1993) 
ACAP-Piacenza 180 57 2,638,875 255,322,730 8,365,000 
TEP-Parina 382 155 5,644,980 603,976,441 29,436,000 
ACT-Regio-Emilia 236 92 3,980,517 406,142,533 14,417,000 
ATMC-Modena 280 124 4,477,291 449,028,959 10,189,000 
ATC-Bologna 1,371 460 17,079,265 1,842,592,792 105,379,000 
ACFT-Feffara 164 85 2,399,661 232,682,423 9,069,000 
ATR-Forli 166 82 3,011,032 269,267,045 4,395,000 
ATM-Ravenna 142 49 2,761,856 248,116,125 3,762,000 
TRAM-Rimini 340 121 5,319,777 536,462,140 16,621,000 
Total 3261 1225 47,313,254 4,843,591,188 201,633,000 
(Mean value of variables during the sample period) 
ACAP-Piacenza 166 56 2,506,458 248,169,233 11,537,180 
TEP-Parma 405 136 5,287,797 564,529,241 28,224,920 
ACT-Regio-Emilia 228 91 3,862,270 391,407,494 19,814,902 
ATMC-Mcdena 303 124 4,124,404 420,212,984 15,925,077 
ATC-Bologna 1,639 447 17,183,174 1,832,964,441 124,144,820 
ACFT-Feffara 181 79 2,448,117 245,139,837 10,136,957 
ATR-Forli 141 67 2,705,232 245,426,527 5,133,641 
ATM-Ravenna 147 43 2,812,149 266,239,440 4,765,849 
TRAM-Rimini 368 111 5,534,034 555,735,354 18,338,874 
Total 3578 1154 46,463,635 4,769,824,551 238,022,220 
The data set consists of a panel data with information on the characteristics of 9 
urban bus operators in the region of Emilia-Romagna (Italy) and covers a period of 
8 years, starting in 1986 and ending in 1993. This gives a total of 72 observations. 
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Table A. 2.2 in Appendix A. 2 contains a complete fist of the variables and Table 
6.13 shows the data related to 1986 and 1993 together with the average values of 
the variables over the time period. 
The number of workers employed in urban public transport in Emilia-Romagna 
fell from 3,618 in 1986 to 3,261 in 1993. The number of vehicles increased from 
1,088 in 1986 to 1,225 in 1993. There was a slight increase in the distance 
covered by the fleet but the important trends are seen in an increase of about 20% 
in the seat-km produced and a reduction of more than 25% in the number of 
passengers carried. The average age of the fleet increased from 10.7 years in 1986 
to 12.8 years by 1993. 
Efficiency and effectiveness indices 
The inputs and outputs used in the calculation of efficiency and effectiveness 
values are shown in Table 6.14. The inputs for both, efficiency and effectiveness, 
indices are the number of staff (XSTA) and the number of seats installed in the 
fleet (XSEA) while the outputs are the distance covered by the vehicle fleet 
(YVKM) and the production of seat-kilometres (YSKM) for efficiency indices, and 
the number of passengers (YPAS) for effectiveness indices. 
Table 6.14 
Input and output variables in efficiency and effectiveness values 
Vaiiable Efficiency Effectiveness 
Input 
XSTA Number of staff xx 
XSEA Number of seats xx 
Output 
YPAS Number of passengers x 
YVKM Distance covered by the fleet x 
YSKM Distance covered by the seats x 
Table 6.15 contains the main characteristics of the efficiency values and Table 
6.16 the main characteristics of the effectiveness values. Both indices were 
calculated on the basis of variable returns to scale. Both indices are ordered by 
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decreasing average performance values over the time period. The complete list of 
results is shown in Tables A. 2.4 and A. 2.5 in Appendix A. 2. 
Table 6.15 
Efficiency values for operators of Emilia-Romagna (VRS) 
VRS Efficiency 1986 1993 Dif. (%) Range Average 
5ATC 0.932 1.000 +6.8 0.932-1.000 0.984 
9TRAM 0.944 0.980 +3.6 0.944-1.000 0.982 
8ATM 1.000 0.899 -10.1 0.899-1.000 0.967 
3ACT 0.874 0.946 +7.2 0.874-1.000 0.933 
7ATR 1.000 0.844 -15.6 0.844-1.000 0.931 
2TEP 0.748 1.000 +25.2 0.748-1.000 0.868 
1ACAP 1.000 0.776 -22.4 0.765-1.000 0.853 
4ATMC 0.661 0.926 +26.5 0.639-0.926 0.782 
6ACFF 0.722 0.707 -1.5 0.637-0.727 0.693 
Average 0.876 0.898 0.888 
Table 6.16 
Effectiveness values for operators of Emilia-Romagna (VRS) 
VRS Effectiveness 1986 1993 Dif. (%) Range Average 
8ATM 1.000 0.899 -10.1 0.855-1.000 0.943 
IACAP 0.992 0.786 -20.6 0.786-1.000 0.936 
5ATC 1.000 0.917 -8.3 0.716-1.000 0.926 
7ATR 1.000 0.806 -19.4 0.741-1.000 0.906 
3ACT 1.000 0.666 -33.4 0.666-1.000 0.860 
6ACFF 0.698 0.770 +7.2 0.696-0.838 0.743 
2TEP 0.780 0.773 -0.7 0.640-0.780 0.738 
9TRAM 0.696 0.537 -15.9 0.537-0.747 0.626 
4ATMC 0.645 0.473 -17.2 0.423-0.682 0.562 
Average 0.868 0.736 0.805 
Table 6.15 shows that the average yearly efficiency value for all operators 
increased by 2.2% during the period: from 87.6% in 1986 to 89.8% in 1993. 
There is no general pattern for the change of the efficiency value during the time 
period with ATC, TRAM, ACT, TEP and ATMC increasing efficiency but ATM, 
ATR, ACAP and ACFT decreasing their efficiency. The most dramatic changes 
occurred in ATMC (+26.5%), TEP (+25.2%) and ACAP (-22.4%). 
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Table 6.16 shows that the average yearly effectiveness value decreased from 
86.8% in 1986 to 73.6% in 1993. The average value during the period was 80.5%. 
There is a clear trend for decreasing effectiveness during the period and only one 
operator, ACFr-Ferrara (+7.2%), is more effective in 1993 than it was in 1986. 
The most dramatic declines occurred in ATC-Bologna (-33.4%), ACAP-Piacenza 
(-20.6%) and ATR-Forli (49.4%). 
EfficiencylEffectiveness Matrix 
The Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix is constructed from the combination of the 
values of efficiency and effectiveness assuming variable returns to scale (VRS). 
Figure 6.8 shows the EEM for 9 Emilia-Romagna operators over the eight years. 
The EEM reveals that there is a time trend in which the operators move towards 
quadrant IV, indicating increased efficiency and decreased effectiveness. 
Figure 6.8 
Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix - borders defined by mean 
Effective ess 
Quadrant H 
ACAP 89,90,91,92 
ACT 86 
ACFT92 
ATR 90,93 
0.805 
ACAP93 
TEP 86,87,8 8,89,90 
ACT 91 
ATMC 86,87,88,89,90,91,92 
ACFT 86,87,88,89,90,91,93 
ATR 91 
Quadrant M 
Quadrant I 
ACAP 86,87,88 
ACT 87,88,89,90,92 
ATC 86,87,88,89,90,92,93 
ATR 86,87,88,89,92 
ATM 86,87,88,89,90,91,92, 
93 
TEP 91,92,93 
ACT 93 
ATMC 93 
ATC 91 
TRAM 86,87,88,89,90,91,92, 
93 
0.888 
IV 
Efflciency 
Figure 6.9 represents the EEM constructed from the average performance 
values during the time period and Figure 6.10 represents the EEM based on the 
data reported only to 1993. 
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Figure 6.9 
Average Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix 
Effectiveness 
I Quadrant H 
ACAP-Piacenza 
0.805 
TEP-Parma 
ATMC-Modena 
ACF17-Feffara 
drant IH 
QuadrantI 
ATC-Bologna 
ATM-Ravenna 
ATR-Forli 
ACT-Re2io-Emflia 
TRAM-Rimini 
Quadrant IV 
0.888 
Efficiency 
Figure 6.10 
Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix for 1993 
Effective? zess 
Quadrant II Quadrant I 
ACAP-Piacenza ATC-Bologna 
ACFr-Ferrara ATM-Ravenna 
0.736 ATR-Forli TEP-Parma 
ACT-Regio-Emilia 
TRAM-Rimini 
ATMC-Modena 
uadrantIV 
0.898 
Efficiency 
The three operators in quadrant III in Figure 6.9 with below average efficiency 
and effectiveness values during the period are in different quadrants in an EEM 
using the 1993 data, as shown in Figure 6.10: TEP is in quadrant 1, ATMC in 
quadrant IV and ACFT in quadrant 11. These operators increased one of the 
performance measures to bring about such shifts. 
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Size-efficiency and size-effectiveness relation 
In order to extract more information the overall efficiency values and the scale 
efficiency values were calculated. Table 6.17 and Table 6.18 show the main 
characteristics of those values and Tables A. 2.6, A. 2.7, A. 2.8 and A. 2.9 in 
Appendix A. 2 contain the complete list of results. 
Table 6.17 
Efficiency and effectiveness values with constant returns to scale (CRS) 
CRS Efficiency Effectiveness 
1986 1993 Average 1986 1993 Average 
I ACAP 0.637 0.670 0.710 0.804 0.624 0.747 
2 TEP 0.587 0.747 0.659 0.953 0.936 0.964 
3 ACT 0.779 0.813 0.814 1.000 0.860 0.949 
4 ATMC 0.585 0.758 0.657 0.950 0.722 0.860 
5 ATC 0.527 0.635 0.566 1.000 0.846 0.966 
6 ACFT 0.557 0.671 0.643 0.731 0.674 0.711 
7 ATR 0.979 0.830 0.880 0.584 0.308 0.384 
8 ATM 1.000 0.889 0.910 0.489 0.291 0.388 
9 TRAM 0.662 0.746 0.731 0.900 0.879 0.876 
9 Average 0.702 0.751 0.730 0.823 0.682 0.760 
Table 6.18 
Scale performance of operators of Emilia-Romagna 
s Efflciency Effectiveness 
1986 1993 Average 1986 1993 Average 
I ACAP 0.637 0.864 0.839 0.804 0.624 0.747 
2 TEP 0.784 0.747 0.762 0.953 0.936 0.964 
3 ACT 0.892 0.860 0.872 1.000 0.860 0.949 
4 ATMC 0.885 0.819 0.844 0.950 0.722 0.860 
5 ATC 0.566 0.635 0.575 1.000 0.846 0.966 
6 ACFT 0.771 0.948 0.928 0.731 0.674 0.711 
7 ATR 0.979 0.982 0.947 0.584 0.308 0.384 
8 ATM 1.000 0.990 0.941 0.489 0.291 0.388 
9 TRAM 0.702 0.761 0.744 0.900 0.879 0.876 
Average 0.802 0.845 0.828 0.823 0.682 0.760 
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The average scale efficiency value increased from 80.2% in 1986 to 84.5% in 
1993 with an average value of 82.8%. The average scale effectiveness value 
decreased from 82.3% in 1986 to 68.2% in 1993 with an average value of 76.0%. 
The largest operator (ATC) has a high scale effectiveness value but a low scale 
efficiency value and the reverse happens with the small operators (ATR and ATM). 
These results, especially scale and overall technical performance values, suggest 
that the size of the operators affects efficiency and effectiveness values. The scale- 
efficiency and overall productive efficiency appear to be inversely related to 
operators' size and scale-effectiveness and overall productive effectiveness to be 
related directly to operators size. 
A more formal discussion of the possible relation between performance and size 
of operations can be undertaken using Spearman rank correlation and regression 
analysis. The number of workers and number of vehicles are used as indicators of 
the size of the different operators. The total number of workers decreased from 
3,618 in 1986 to 3,261 in 1993 and the total number of vehicles increased from 
1,088 in 1986 to 1,225 in 1993 which suggest that these measures offer different 
perspectives of size. 
Table 6.19 
Speannan rank correlation analysis of efficiency 
Staff Vehicles 
SE -0.81 ja -0.730a 
CRS -0.697a -0.642- 
VRS -0.076b -0.113b 
a Significant at 5% and 1% level. 
bNot significant at 5% and 1% level 
Table 6.19 shows the main results of Spearman rank correlation analysis of the 
relationships between the three measures of efficiency and the number of workers 
and vehicles. They show that there is a significant negative correlation between 
both scale and overall productive efficiency and the size of the operator. This 
means that the hypothesis of the existence of an inverse relation between size and 
efficiency cannot be rejected. The other hypothesis tested is the case of pure 
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technical efficiency and size can be rejected because the correlation is not 
significant at the 95% confidence level. 
The logarithms of the three measures of efficiency were regressed against the 
number of workers and vehicles respectively and the results, shown in Table 6.20, 
confirm the conclusions revealed using Spearman's rank correlation analysis. The 
regression analysis also suggest a possible positive relation between pure technical 
efficiency and the size of operators with the coefficients significant at the 95% level 
but not at 99% level. However, this relation is not confirmed by Spearman's rank 
correlation test which yields a negative coefficient. 
Table 6.20 
Regression analysis of efficiency 
Independent variables 
Staff Vehicles F value 
Log SE -0.000306 198.05- 
-0.001163 174.21a 
Log CRS -0.000221 41.20- 
-0.000869 43.47, 
Log VRS O. WO085 6.27b 
0.000293 4.9 lb 
a Significant at 5% and 1% level. 
11 Significant at 5%, but not at 1% level 
Similar analysis was carried out using the effectiveness values and the results are 
shown in Table 6.21. The results of the Spearman rank correlation show a positive 
and significant correlation between both scale and overall technical effectiveness 
and the number of workers and vehicles and a negative and significant correlation 
between pure technical effectiveness and the number of workers and vehicles. 
The results of the regression analysis, shown in Table 6.22, confirm the results 
obtained from Spearman's rank correlation analysis in terms of scale and overall 
technical effectiveness but not for pure technical effectiveness. In this last case 
signs are different. The hypothesis tested for the case of pure technical 
effectiveness and size can be rejected but the other two cannot be rejected. 
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Table 6.21 
Spearman rank correlation analysis of effectiveness 
Staff Vehicles 
SE 0.808 0.770 
CRS 0.550 0.485 
VRS -0.454 -0.482 
Note: All values are significant at 5% and I%. 
Table 6.22 
Regression analysis of effectiveness 
Independent variables 
Staff Vehicles F value 
Log SE 0.000341 13.92a 
0.001391 15.91, - 
Log CRS 0.000403 21.18- 
0.001526 20.15- 
Log VRS 0.000062 1.28b 
0.000136 0.41b 
a Significant at 5% and 1% level. 
b Not significant at 5% and I% level 
These results suggest that, in general, bus operations in Emilia-Romagna are 
characterised by diseconomies of scale-efficiency and economies of scale- 
effectiveness indicating that large operators in general are more effective but less 
efficient. This might reflect the fact that the larger operators are operating in more 
populous areas where there is greater demand for public transport but productivity 
is adversely affected by traffic congestion problems. 
Increasing and decreasing returns to scale 
The potentially conflicting trends in the ratios of size/scale-efficiency and 
size/scale-effectiveness highlight the dilemma in the choice which has to be made 
regarding optimal scale in transport operations. High scale efficiency and scale 
effectiveness values seem to be attained at different levels of operations. High 
scale efficiency values are attained for small operators and high scale effectiveness 
values for the large ones. In order to investigate the extent in which these results 
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can be generalised, the increasing and decreasing returns to scale efficiency and 
effectiveness are calculated; see Tables 6.23 and 6.24. 
Table 6.23 
Increasing, constant and decreasing efficiency returns to scale 
ACAP TEP ACT ATMC ATC ACFr ATR ATM TRAM 
1986 Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Inc. Dec. Con. Dec. 
1987 Inc. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Inc. Inc. Dec. Dec. 
1988 Inc. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Inc. Inc. Con. Dec. 
1989 Inc. Dec. Dec. Dec. Inc. Inc. Inc. Dec. 
1990 Inc. Dec. Dec. Dec. Inc. Inc. Inc. Dec. 
1991 Inc. Dec. Dec. Dec. Inc. Inc. Inc. Dec. 
1992 Inc. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Inc. Dec. Inc. Dec. 
1993 Inc. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Inc. Dec. Inc. Dec. 
Note: * unclear 
Table 6.24 
Increasing, constant and decreasing effectiveness returns to scale 
ACAP TEP ACT ATMC ATC ACFF ATR ATM TRAM 
1986 Inc. Inc. Con. Inc. Con. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
1987 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Con. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
1988 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Con. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
1989 Inc. Dec. Inc. Inc. Con. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
1990 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Dec. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
1991 Inc. Dec. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
1992 Inc. Dec. Inc. Inc. Dec. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
1993 Inc. Dec. Inc. Inc. Dec. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
The results show that, in general, small operators have increasing returns to 
scale efficiency and large ones have decreasing returns. Most operators have 
increasing returns to scale effectiveness but more recently the two largest ones 
(TEP and ATC) show decreasing returns to scale effectiveness. 
The values of efficiency and effectiveness, increasing and decreasing returns to 
scale combined provide information useful in choosing the scale of operations. 
Small operators (ACAP, ACFT and ATM) show increasing efficiency and 
6.41 
Performance Evaluation Methodology 
effectiveness returns to scale while the largest ones (ATC and TEP) reveal the 
reverse; decreasing efficiency and effectiveness returns to scale. Between, there 
are a number of operators (ACT, ATMC, ATR and TRAM) that show decreasing 
returns to efficiency but increasing returns to effectiveness. The results of the 
calculations for this range of operators highlights the problem of choosing the 
appropriate scale of operations when scale parameters show different types of 
returns to scale. 
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Organisational form and performance, 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to testing the hypothesis that the reorganisation of the 
urban public transport systems affects the performance of the operators. The 
hypothesis is explored using data from the London Underground and the Metro de 
Madrid. Four reasons led to the choice of these operators. 
Firstly, they operate in cities that went through the process of reorganisation 
some time ago enabling a tractable post-evaluation of performance. 
Secondly, they operate in cities that reorganised in different forms: Madrid 
organised its system along model 2 lines (see chapter 4) with the creation of a 
transport authority which corresponding to a change from model 1; London had 
the system organised along model 2 lines and introduced tendering for some bus 
operations which corresponds to a change to model 3. 
Thirdly, London Underground and Metro de Madrid do not share the network 
with any other mode of transport which makes the evaluation less dependent of 
external factors such as congestion in the road network or the introduction of 
schemes of bus priorities. 
Fourthly, and important from a practical point of view, it was possible to get 
data related to the operation covering a period before and after the reorganisation. 
I The article 'Public Transport Efficiency and Effectiveness: Metro de Madrid', forthcoming in 
Button K., P. Nijkamp and H. Priemus (eds) European Transport Networks: Concept, Analysis 
and Policies, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, is based on material covered in this chapter. 
Organisational form and performance 
The methodology used here to evaluate the performance of public transport 
operators is the EEM but ratios of performance and a traditional application of 
DEA are also included. 
7.2 Madrid 
7.2.1 The structure of the public transport system 
Consorcio - The Consorcio Regional de Transportes Pdblicos de Madrid (CRT) - 
the Public Transport Authority - was given its constitution by Law 5/1985 (June 
1985) as an organ of the public sector concentrating all competencies related to the 
regular transport of passengers in the Comunidad Aut6noma de Madrid. 
Ayuntamento de Madrid has around 3.1 million inhabitants of a total of 4.7 n-dMon 
in the ComunidadAut6noma de Madrid which controls 179 municipalities. 
Before the creation of CRT, the different public transport operators were 
managed independently. The services of Metro de Madrid (MM) - the 
underground operator - and Empresa Municipal de Transportes (EMT) - the bus 
operator - were not co-ordinated and there were no fare agreements between 
transport operators. The model of organisation was along model 1 lines set out in 
chapter 4- Modal Services. 
CRT was created with the objective of co-ordinating the different public 
transport modes and the articulation of the operators that constitute the public 
transport system in the metropolitan area. The new model of organisation follows 
the lines of model 2 -Authority and Operator. 
CRT assumed four main tasks: 
- Planning infrastructures for the transport of passengers; 
- Defining programs of service production and co-ordination for all modes; 
- Creating a common fare system across all urban public transport operators, 
irrespective of public or privately ownership, with the introduction of tickets valid 
for all operators; 
- Creating a global marketing image for the transport system, the CRT being the 
entity responsible for interfacing with clients. 
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Public and private operators maintained legal independence, management 
autonomy and patrimony but are controlled by regulations set by the CRT in terms 
of transport services. Figure 7.1 shows the structure of organisation in Madrid 
after the creation of CRT. 
Figure 7.1 
Organisational structure of the transport system in Madrid 
Govemment ComunidadAyuntamientos 
' RT 
)'olifical Authorities 
Public Operators 
Private Operators 
Renfe Metro EMT Privates 
The Ayuntamento de Madrid decided to join CRT in July 1985 for seven years. 
The period of the contract finished in 1992 and a new contract was negotiated for 
four more years, until November 1996. Several municipalities have joined the 
CRT since its creation, and by the end of 1992,79% of municipalities representing 
98% of the population of the Comunidad Aut4noma de Madrid were members of 
CRT. Table 7.1 shows the evolution of membership in CRT. In 1993 another 9 
municipalities joined CRT. 
Table 7.1 
Municipalities joining the Consorcio Regional de Transportes 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total 
Municipalities 1 32 14 95 11 24 45 141 
Source: Consorcio Regional de Transportes P'dblicos de Madrid. 
Table 7.2 provides details of the transport system co-ordinated by the 
Consorcio in 1992. CRT co-ordinates the output of Metro de Madrid, Empresa 
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Municipal de, Transportes, the local production of the national railway operator 
Renfe and the interurban bus services provided by the private operators. 
Table 7.2 
The public transport system in the ComunidadAut6noma de Madrid in 1992 
Number of Network Number Number of Number of Vehicle Km Place Km 
Companies length (lun) of lines Stations Vehicles (106) (106) 
1ým 1 112.5 11 155 976 81.5 14,263 
Renfe 1 277.8 8 110 559 61.4 15,534 
EMT 1 1,301.4 166 7,054 1,777 77.0 6,160 
Interurban 36 2,996.0 174 6,264 778 72.0 4,752 
Source: Consoreio Regional de Transportes Pöblicos de Madrid. 
Metro de Madrid - Compaffia Metropolitano de Madrid was constituted in 1917, 
as a private company and on 31st October 1919 the first metro line was opened to 
the public. The state intervened in the enterprise in June 1978 and subsequently 
expropriated because Metro de Madrid was in a difficult financial situation. The 
central government transferred the assets to the local and regional authorities. in 
the end of December 1986 Ayuntamento de Madrid and Comunidad Aut6noma de 
Madrid transferred the assets to the ownership of CRT. 
The CRT has the responsibility of network and service planning, and fare policy 
and the MM has to organise production in order to accomplish the targets agreed 
in the contracts established with CRT. 
The offer has been defined in terms of quantity, quality and cost. The objectives 
are a better management with rationalisation and cost reduction, to increase the 
capacity and quantity of offer and to improve the image of the enterprise, 
consolidate the financial structure, control the money spent and the capital and get 
new passengers. 
Empresa Municipal de Transportes - EMT is the bus operator. It was constituted 
in May 1971 and has the responsibility of producing the service of public transport. 
Ayuntamento de Madrid owns EMT. 
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7.2.2 The hypothesis 
Introduction 
The aim of this sub-chapter is to test the hypothesis that the reorganisation of 
the urban public transport system undertaken in Madrid with the creation of a 
unified transport authority - Consorcio Regional de Transportes - affected the 
performance of the underground operator - Metro de Madrid. The reorganisation 
corresponded to a change from a structure of organisation along model 1 lines - 
Modal Services - to a structure along model 2 lines - Authority and Operator. The 
performance of Metro de Madrid is analysed using three methodologies: ratios of 
perfonnance, data envelopment analysis and efficiency/effectiveness matrix. Ratios 
of performance are also presented for EMT, to investigate if the evolution of 
performance of this operator followed lines similar to Metro de Madrid. 
Table 7.3 
Characteristics of Metro de Madrid (1981-1992) 
Year Passengers Vehicle Km VeMcles Staff Energy (KW) Network (Km) 
1981 353,629,000 80,553,300 780 5,562 234,900,147 91.2 
1982 349,412,000 82,214,600 818 5,944 244,180,949 97.6 
1983 346,912,000 84,819,600 906 6,427 262,096,780 106.4 
1984 331,646,000 80,496,600 910 6,483 256,747,670 106.4 
1985 320,879,971 76,262,296 928 6,353 271,248,400 106.4 
1986 329,039,960 80,696,730 976 6,300 281,960,131 110.5 
1987 340,363,881 83,385,781 980 6,429 300,394,364 112.6 
1988 364,780,212 82,402,389 984 6,434 303,557,615 112.6 
1989 394,776,168 80,385,375 962 6,296 302,796,670 112.6 
1990 415,505,432 81,068,225 946 6,108 306,957,431 112.6 
1991 400,841,508 80,016,880 914 5,977 309,507,269 112.6 
1992 413,080,320 81,462,102 976 5,830 313,944,201 112.6 
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Figure 7.2 
Number of passengers in EMT and MM (1981-1992) 
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The data set shown in Table 7.3 refers to Metro de Madrid operations between 
1981 and 1992. This data was compiled from the 1990,1991 and 1992 Annual 
Report of Metro de Madrid and other publications obtained from CRT. 
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Figure 7.3 
Output of EMT and MM (1981-1992) 
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Figure 7.2 shows the evolution of the number of passengers for EMT, MM and 
for both operators combined, between 1981 and 1992. The number of passengers 
decreased between 1981 and 1986 for both operators. In 1986, MM reversed the 
downward trend and EMT reversed the adverse trend in 1987. The combined 
operators have experienced an increase in the number of passengers since 1987. 
EMT had a relatively low number of passengers in 1990 and 1992 because of two 
strikes by its employees. 
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Figure 7.3 shows the evolution of the output for EMT, MM and both operators 
combined, between 1981 and 1992. The output of EMT has generally decreased 
since 1981. The output of MM had some variations over the years but it seems to 
be more stable in the last few years. From the combination of the outputs of the 
two operators we can see a trend for a decrease in the output over the 12 year 
period. However, one has to be cautious because EMT suffered two strikes, one 
in 1990 and the other in 1992. These strikes caused major disruptions in the 
provision of services. 
Figure 7.4 shows the number of staff employed by Metro de Madrid. The 
number of workers increased sharply until 1983. Between 1983 and 1988 the 
number of workers stabilised and started to fell after 1988. 
Figure 7.4 
Number of workers of Metro de Madrid (1981-1992) 
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Ratios of performance 
Labour productivity measured in Vehicle Km/Staff and capital productivity 
measured in Vehicle KmNehicle for MM are presented in Figures 7.5 and 7.6. 
The trend in both ratios changed in 1986. Labour productivity was decreasing 
until then and this reversed. The capital productivity trend also changed from a 
sharp, decreasing one to be roughly constant, slightly above 80,000 kilometers per 
vehicle. 
7.8 
ý C9 cn 1-tt tn %0 r- 00 aN 0 -14 N 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0*1 C\ C\ ON 0\ CA M ON C\ C\ CN (ON C\ M CN 
Year 
Organisational form and performance 
Figure 7.5 Figure 7.6 
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Figure 7.7 
Labour effectiveness in MM 
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Figure 7.8 
Short term capital effectiveness in MM 
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Ratios of effectiveness are presented in Figures 7.7,7.8 and 7.9. The ratios of 
labour effectiveness seen in Figure 7.7 and short tenn capital effectiveness in 
Figure 7.8 reveal U-shaped curves with the lowest values attained in 1985 and 
1986 respectively. 
The ratios of production effectiveness shown in Figure 7.9 for the cases of MM 
and EMT show a slightly decreasing trend until 1987 and 1986 respectively. After 
that the ratios began increasing. The ratio of production effectiveness for MM 
increased until 1990 and maintained the same value in the following couple of 
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years while EMT has been increasing, after reaching its lowest value in 1986, with 
a slight decrease in 1992. 
FIgure 7.9 
Production effectiveness in MM and EMT 
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Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Year 
The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method is applied to the operation of 
Metro de Madrid between 1981 to 1992. 
Table 7.4 shows the variables used in the evaluation of performance in this 
appUcation. 
Table 7.4 
Input and output variables 
Input variables Output variables 
XSTA Number of workers YPAS Number of passengers 
XVEH Number of vehicles YVKM Distance covered by the fleet 
XENE Energy 
XROU Network route length 
The inputs considered in the DEA exercise are the average number of staff 
(XSTA), the number of vehicles (XVEH), the energy (XENE) and the network 
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route length (XROU) and the outputs are the distance covered by the fleet 
(YVKM) and the number of passengers (YPAS), all the data being for one year. 
Table 7.5 contains the DEA values related to the operations of Metro de 
Madrid during the period of application and Figure 7.10 graphs those values. DEA 
values were calculated using constant returns to scale (CRS) because, given the 
short period of time in question, the consideration of variable returns to scale 
(VRS) would have put every year of operation on the frontier. As we are in the 
presence of a single operator which can chose the best scale of operation it seems 
more reasonable to evaluate the performance including this choice and not only 
considering the pure technical performance. 
Table 7.5 
DEA with CRS values for Metro de Madrid (1981-1992) 
Year DEA 
1981 1.000 
1982 0.982 
1983 0.944 
1984 0.914 
1985 0.829 
1986 0.884 
1987 0.896 
1988 0.886 
1989 0.935 
1990 1.000 
1991 0.995 
1992 1.000 
Average 0.939 
The operations of Metro de Madrid show a decreasing trend in its efficiency 
over the period 1981 to 1985. The efficiency value decreased from 100% to 83% 
during that period. In 1986 this situation changed, and in the following couple of 
years the efficiency value maintained approximately in the same level - around 
89%. In 1989 the efficiency increased again and in 1990 it reached the value of 
100% which it has maintained ever since. 
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FIgure 7.10 
Relative efficiency DEA value for Metro de Madrid 1981-1992 
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DEA offers a method of computing sources of technical inefficiency. Taking 
into consideration that the application is to a unit over a period of time, the 
formulation to compute was the following: 
S+M- 
min ZO - P- Sr + 7, Si. 
n 
I Yj j- Sr+ = YrO rS j=l 
nM I xij j+ Si = ZO Xio 
j=l 
? -j, Sr+, Si ý: 0; zo unconstrained. 
where 
yý output r in yearj 
xý the input i in yearj 
m: number of inputs 
s: number of outputs 
7.12 
1-4 ell Cf) ;9 tr) 
ýo r- 00 cs 0 -4 N 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Cý 47S CN 
ON C', Cý Cý CN ON ON ON CN CN CN CN 
-4 1ý " -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 1-4 -4 
Year 
Organisational fonn and perfonnance 
P, :a small positive number 
n: number of years 
Table 7.6 contains the results of the calculations. For six of the nine inefficient 
years the positive "slacks" in the number of passengers show that this variable is 
too low for these years in relation to the reference set. The other two main 
sources of slack resource are the capital related ones: number of vehicles and 
network route length. Since DEA is a relative measure of efficiency the reference 
years represent the years of comparison in the calculation of the efficiency values 
and "slacks". 
Table 7.6 
Slacks of DEA values in Metro de Madrid (1980-1992) 
YPAS YVKM XVEH XSTA XROU XENE Reference years 
1982 11,510,107 7 159 2.7 1981 
1983 25,446,058 34 209 4.4 1981 
1984 21,734,087 53 369 6.1 1981 
1985 13,911,521 31 1.8 2,438,427 1981 
1986 25,218,698 82 6.4 14,055,351 1981 
1987 25,699,711 70 6.4 25,862,229 1981 
1988 64 5.4 24,498,942 1981: 1992 
1989 1,914,702 1981: 1990: 1992 
1991 4.1 15,733,291 1981: 1990: 1992 
Note: * The values were calculated with e= 10,7 which might lead to biased results (< 0.1%). 
EfficiencylEffectiveness Matrix 
This sub-chapter contains an application of the EEM method to the operation of 
Metro de Madrid between 1981 to 1992. The inputs and outputs used in the 
calculation of EEM-efficiency and EEM-effectiveness values are shown in Table 
7.7. 
The inputs considered to calculate the relative efficiency-EEM value are the 
average number of staff (XSTA), the number of vehicles (XVEH), the energy 
(XENE) and the network route length (XROU) and the output is the distance 
covered by the fleet (YVKM). The relative effectiveness-EEM value was 
computed with the same inputs (staff, vehicles, energy, network route length) but 
7.13 
Organisational form and performance 
the output was the number of passengers (YPAS) carried. A better measure for 
the output would have been the distance covered by the passengers (passengers 
kilometres) but this data was not available. The inputs for the effectiveness-EEM 
could have been YVKM and XROU, which are the output of the production 
function and the environmental constraint, instead of XVEH, XSTA, XENE and 
XROU. The measure of effectiveness adopted in this application better reflects the 
system in question while the latter would reflect the partial transformation. 
Table 7.7 
Inputs and outputs of EEM-efficiency and EEM-effectiveness values 
Efficiency Effectiveness 
- 
Inouts 
XVEH xx 
XSTA xx 
XENE xx 
XROU xx 
Outputs 
YPAS x 
YVKM x 
Table 7.8 
Efficiency indices 
Year CRS VRS MRS SE SR 
1981 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1982 0.982 1.000 1.000 0.982 Dec. 
1983 0.944 1.000 1.000 0.944 Dec. 
1984 0.914 0.915 0.914 0.999 Inc. 
1985 0.829 0.875 0.829 0.947 Inc. 
1986 0.884 0.887 0.887 0.997 Dec. 
1987 0.896 0.954 0.954 0.938 Dec. 
1988 0.884 0.923 0.923 0.958 Dec. 
1989 0.882 0.883 0.882 0.998 Inc. 
1990 0.916 0.928 0.928 0.988 Dec. 
1991 0.924 0.931 0.924 0.993 Inc. 
1992 0.965 0.986 0.986 0.979 Dec. 
Average 0.918 0.940 0.936 0.977 
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Tables 7.8 and 7.9 give the values of EEM-Efficiency and EEM-Effectiveness 
indices calculated with constant (CRS), variable (VRS) and non-increasing returns 
to scale (NIRS). The tables also include the values'of scale efficiency (SE) and the 
type of returns to scale (SR) experienced by the operator in each year. 
Table 7.9 
Effectiveness indices 
Year CRS VRS MRS SE SR 
1981 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1982 0.951 0.980 0.951 0.970 Inc. 
1983 0.879 0.922 0.879 0.954 Inc. 
1984 0.858 1.000 0.858 0.858 Inc. 
1985 0.791 1.000 0.791 0.791 Inc. 
1986 0.802 1.000 0.802 0.802 Inc. 
1987 0.798 1.000 0.798 0.798 Inc. 
1988 0.855 0.974 0.862 0.877 Inc. 
1989 0.935 0.937 0.937 0.997 Dec. 
1990 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1991 0.995 1.000 0.995 0.995 Inc. 
1992 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
Average 0.905 0.984 0.906 0.920 
Figure 7.11a shows the Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix (EEM) for Metro de 
Madrid between 1981 and 1992. The representation shows the relative efficiency 
value plotted against the relative effectiveness value assuming constant returns to 
scale. Several interesting aspects arise from this representation. 
Between 1981 and 1985 the relative efficiency and effectiveness values 
decreased which in the figure is represented by points moving towards the origin. 
The nearest point to the origin is related to 1985 operations. In 1986 the relative 
efficiency when compared with 1985 improved but the relative effectiveness 
remained unchanged. Between 1986 and 1990 the effectiveness improved but the 
level of efficiency remained, with minor changes, similar to the 1986 value. This is 
represented in the figure by a vertical shift. From 1990 to 1992 relative efficiency 
increased and relative effectiveness of the system remained constant which is 
represented by a horizontal movement. The results show that, in relative terms, 
1981 was an efficient and effective year while 1990 and 1992 very effective years, 
but less efficient. 
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Figure 7.11a 
The efficiency/effectiveness matrix of Metro de Madrid (CRS) 
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Figure 7.11b 
The efficiency/effectiveness matrix of Metro de Madrid (CRS) (1981-1992) 
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Figure 7.1 lb shows the EEM results in terms of shift from quadrant to 
quadrant. The years of relative high efficiency and effectiveness are the two first 
and the two last years of the data set. Operations in the period from 1984 to 1988 
were relatively inefficient and ineffective and these years are lying in quadrant III in 
the representation. 
OrganisationlPerformance 
All three measures of performance provide the same type of evolution, namely a 
trend break in 1985. This can be explained by several facts. 
Between 1981 and 1985 the number of passengers decreased which combined 
with network expansions, acquisition of new vehicles and more staff meant a 
significant decrease in the effectiveness of the service. These effects put together 
with a reduction in the output produced show a decrease in the efficiency of the 
operator. All three methodologies of evaluating performance show a decreasing 
trend in performance until 1985. This can be seen in the Figures 7.5 to 7.11. 
The creation of Consorcio Regional de Transportes Publicos de Madrid, a 
public transport authority, might have influenced the introduction of some 
discipline in the management of MM and this organisational change follows as a 
results for the degradation of the conditions experienced until 1985. Ayuntamento 
de Madrid decided to take part in the CRT in August 1985 and in the end of 1986 
transferred its assets to the CRT. The following years correspond to the 
introduction of the travel card system and a general increase in the number of 
passengers stimulated by cheaper transport prices resulting from intense utilisation 
of travel cards and, probably also, better co-ordination with other transport modes. 
This corresponded to a general increase in the effectiveness of the enterprise until 
1990 as can be seen in Figures 7.7,7.8,7.9 and 7.11 a. However, efficiency 
improvements were not experienced during those years as shown in Figures 7.5, 
7.6 and 7.11. The improvements in performance shown in Figure 7.10 have to be 
seen in the context of gains in effectiveness. 
From 1990 on, there is a general increase in the relative efficiency of the 
enterprise. The reason for this was a new contract established between the CRT 
and the operators putting more cost discipline on their operation and setting targets 
to be achieved annually (CRT, 1990). The effectiveness remained at 1990 level 
which can be explained by strikes and ticket prices. The strikes occurred mainly in 
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the EMT but had consequences on the levels of utilisation of the MM and the price 
of travel cards from 1992 was adjusted to reflect inflation and might also have 
affected the effectiveness value in the last year. Efficiency evaluation with the 
ratios of perfon-nance is shown in the Figures 7.5 and 7.6, and shows that labour 
productivity has been increasing but capital productivity has been stable. Figures 
7.7,7.8 and 7.9 indicate that ratios of effectiveness have been approximately 
constant since 1990. Figure 7.11 shows an increase in efficiency and a stable value 
for effectiveness. Figure 7.10 shows performance increases in this last year but 
again with little infonnation about the causes. 
In summary, the evaluation of perfonnance between 1981 and 1992, using three 
different methodologies, shows trend changes after the creation of CRT. This 
suggests that the reorganisation of the public transport system in Madrid and the 
creation of a transport authority - Consorcio Regional de Transportes Pdblicos de 
Madrid- affected the operation of Metro de Madrid. 
In this particular case the ratios of performance provide a good picture of the 
impacts of CRT on the operation of MM and EMT because all the ratios of 
performance change from downward to upward trends which poses no difficult 
problems in their interpretation. However, this might not be the case with other 
reorganisations or with other operators. 
From the comparison of the results of DEA and EEM approaches we can 
conclude that some experiences of MM between 1981 and 1992 are reflected, in 
broad terms, in the performance results obtained. However, the 
Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix gives more information because it offers a way of 
distinguishing efficiency and effectiveness effects - productivity and level of 
utilisation of the service - which in terms of public transport policy and 
management is important to understand the real issues to address. 
The changing trends in efficiency and effectiveness values seen with the creation 
of CRT might be explained by the introduction of the travel card, investments, new 
discipline in the operation, all measures that tend to be possible or easier to 
implement with the new organisational framework. In this sense the organisational 
structure is of primary importance. Not can only the organisation affect market 
behaviour but it can facilitate the implementation of co-ordination measures which 
affect the performance of operators. 
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7.3 London 
7.3.1 The structure of the public transport system 
Since 1984, London has experienced some important innovations in the 
management of operations. The organisation of transport, previously controlled by 
the Greater London Council, passed to the Department of Transport and in 1985 
the first bus tendered services were introduced in the network. There were also 
major changes not only in the operation of buses but also in the underground. 
London public transport system is co-ordinated by London Regional Transport 
(LRT). Until 1994 there were two public operators - London Buses (LBL) and 
London Underground (LU) - and several private operators providing part of the 
bus services put out to tender by LRT. 
London Buses was divided into 10 companies covering different parts of 
London. London Underground remains a centralised company but also 
experienced innovation in its management. 
By March 1993,44% of bus transport service had gone through the tendering 
process. As the public operator could also bid, London Buses entered into the 
tendering process and won well over 50% of these contracts. The situation was 
that London Buses controlled 81% of the services and the private operators 19%. 
More recently, in the first big award after the cessation of London Buses' block 
grant, the incumbent companies could only retain 6 out of 24 of the lines tendered 
out. 
In the competitive tendering process, LRT specifies the service and size of 
buses and then accepts bids for the cost of provision. More recently LRT 
introduced the net-subsidy contract which puts part of the risk on the operator. 
Fare integration remains valid for people not paying inside the buses and this 
revenue goes to LRT but revenue collected in the buses goes to the operators. 
On April Ist 1994, a new organisation, London Transport Buses, took over aH 
the activities related to buses. All ten subsidiaries of London Buses Ltd (LBL) 
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were sold by the end of 1994. The Government has the intention of deregulating 
bus services in London and the first move was the privatisation of the bus 
companies. Until deregulation, all bus services are to go through a competitive 
tendering process and contracts will last 5 years. 
7.3.2 The hypothesis 
Introduction 
The aim here is to test the hypothesis that the reorganisation of the urban public 
transport system undertaken in London affected the performance of the London 
Underground. The reorganisation corresponded to a change from a structure of 
organisation along model 2 lines - Authority and Operator - to a structure along 
model 3 lines - Authority and Multiple Operators (see again chapter 4). The 
performance of London Underground is analysed using the same three 
methodologies as applied to Metro de Madrid: ratios of performance, data 
envelopment analysis and efficiency/effectiveness matrix. Ratios of performance 
will also be presented for London Buses, to investigate if the evolution of 
performance of this operator foRowed similar lines to London Underground. In 
fact if there were complete information on the private operators, the bus operations 
would give a more interesting example because there is no tendering in the London 
Underground, which is one of the features of the model of organisation. 
The set 
The data set, shown in Table 7.10 refers to London Underground operations 
between 1970 and 1992/93. The data was compiled from the 92/93 Annual Report 
of London Transport and from several issues of Transport Statistics for Great 
Britain published by HMSO. 
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Table 7.10 
Characteristics of London Underground (1970-1992/93) 
Year Train Km Passengers Number of Number of Network 
(millions) (millions) vehicles workers length (Km) 
1970 48.0 672 4,432 22,121 383 
1971 49.0 654 4,350 22,231 388 
1972 49.0 655 4,357 21,941 383 
1973 47.0 644 4,379 21,024 383 
1974 43.0 636 4,318 23,674 383 
1975 47.0 601 4,409 24,944 381 
1976 48.0 546 4,519 25,076 383 
1977 48.0 545 4,323 25,038 383 
1978 47.0 569 4,223 25,251 383 
1979 46.0 594 4,228 25,821 388 
1980 47.0 559 4,353 23,594 388 
1981 49.0 541 4,210 23,900 388 
1982 46.7 498 4,070 23,700 388 
1983 46.7 563 3,870 23,900 388 
1984/85 47.3 672 3,920 22,300 388 
1985186 47.8 732 3,875 21,598 394 
1986/87 49.2 769 3,877 20,612 394 
1987/88 51.2 798 3,905 18,992 394 
1988/89 51.7 815 3,950 19,645 394 
1989/90 51.2 765 3,908 22,179 394 
1990/91 53.6 775 4,146 22,087 394 
1991/92 53.6 751 3,880 21,184 394 
1992/93 53.8 728 3,895 19,014 394 
Note: After 1983 the data relates to the period April I to March 31. 
Figure 7.12 shows the trend in Train Icilometres on London Underground 
between 1970 and 1992/93. Between 1970 and the beginning of 1980s the output 
produced was more or less stable. From 1984/85 an increasing trend emerged. 
Figure 7.13 shows the number of passengers during the period for the same 
operator. The trend in the number of passengers can be divided into three periods: 
between 1970 and 1982 the number of passengers decreased, between 1982 and 
1988/89 it increased and it decreased again afterwards. 
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Fig. 7.12 
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Figure 7.14 is a representation of the consumption of the service produced by 
LBL and the private operators that started with the first tendering in 1985. 
Between 1970 and 1982 the number of passengers decreased, but had a slight 
increase afterwards and remained approximately at the same level from 84/85. The 
output produced by private operators increased from the introduction of the first 
tendered service in 1985. 
Figure 7.14 
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Figure 7.15 shows the output of bus operators controlled by the London 
Regional Transport. The minimum of the U-shaped curve was reached in 1986/87. 
Figure 7.15 
Bus output in London 
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Ratios of performance 
Figures 7.16 and 7.17 show ratios of effectiveness for the operations of London 
Underground between 1970 and 1992/93. Here again there are three trends, the 
same as Figure 7.13 -a decreasing trend until 1983, an increase until 1988 and 
again a decreasing trend after that. 
Figure 7.16 
Production effectiveness in LU 
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Figures 7.18,7.19 and 7.20 show ratios of performance related to bus 
operations. Here the gains in efficiency, as shown in Figures 7.18 and 7.19, are 
quite considerable but effectiveness seemed to have experience a slightly 
decreasing trend for an extended period shown in Figure 7.20. 
Figure 7.18 
Capital Productivity Ratio in LBL 
Figure 7.19 
Labour Productivity Ratio in LBL 
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Data Envelopment Analysis 
Data Envelopment Analysis method is applied to the operation of London 
Underground between 1970 and 1992/93. Table 7.11 shows the variables used in 
the evaluation of performance. 
Table 7.11 
Input and output variables 
Input variables Output variables 
XSTA Number of workers YPAS Number of passengers 
XVEH Number of vehicles YTKM Distance covered by the trains 
XROU Network route length 
The inputs considered in calculating the DEA model are the average number of 
staff (XSTA), the number of vehicles (XVEH) and the network route length 
(XROU) while the outputs are the distance covered by the train fleet (YTKM) and 
the number of passengers (YPAS). All the data is on an annual basis. Energy was 
not included because this information was not available. The estimated DEA 
values are shown in Table 7.12 and were calculated assuming constant returns to 
scale. 
Table 7.12 
London Underground DEA values (1970-1992) 
Year DEA Year DEA Year DEA 
1970 0.920 1980 0.887 1990 1.000 
1971 0.925 1981 0.925 1991 1.000 
1972 0.937 1982 0.881 1992 1.000 
1973 0.899 1983 0.881 
1974 0.833 1984 0.897 
1975 0.903 1985 0.930 
1976 0.918 1986 0.966 
1977 0.918 1987 1.000 
1978 0.899 1988 1.000 
1979 0.868 1989 0.976 
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Figure 7.21 graphs the values shown in Table 7.12. Between 1970 and 1983 
the DEA were roughly constant and started increasing in 1984/85. By 1987/88 the 
efficiency reached 100% and has maintained that value until 1992/93. 
Figure 7.21 
DEA values for London Underground (1970/1992) 
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Here we apply the EEM method to the operation of London Underground 
between 1970 to 1992. The inputs and outputs used in the calculation of EEM- 
efficiency and EEM-effectiveness values are shown in Table 7.13. 
The inputs considered to calculate the relative efficiency-EEM value are the 
average number of staff (XSTA), the number of vehicles (XVEH) and the network 
route length (XROU) and the output is the distance covered by the fleet (YVKM). 
The calculation of the relative effectiveness-EEM value was computed with the 
same inputs (staff, vehicles, network route length) but the output was the number 
of passengers (YPAS) carried. 
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Table 7.13 
Inputs and outputs of EEM-efficiency and EEM-effectiveness values 
Efficiency Effectiveness 
InDuts 
XVEH xx 
XSTA xx 
XROU xx 
Outputs 
YPAS x 
YVKM x 
Table 7.14 
EEM Efficiency indices 
Year CRS VRS MRS SE SR 
1970 0.906 1.000 0.906 0.906 Inc. 
1971 0.925 1.000 0.925 0.925 Inc. 
1972 0.925 1.000 0.925 0.925 Inc. 
1973 0.887 1.000 0.887 0.887 Inc. 
1974 0.812 1.000 0.812 0.812 Inc. 
1975 0.887 1.000 0.887 0.887 Inc. 
1976 0.906 1.000 0.906 0.906 Inc. 
1977 0.906 1.000 0.906 0.906 Inc. 
1978 0.887 1.000 0.887 0.887 Inc. 
1979 0.868 1.000 0.868 0.868 Inc. 
1980 0.887 1.000 0.887 0.887 Inc. 
1981 0.925 1.000 0.925 0.925 Inc. 
1982 0.881 1.000 0.881 0.881 Inc. 
1983 0.881 1.000 0.881 0.881 Inc. 
1984 0.893 1.000 0.893 0.893 Inc. 
1985 0.893 1.000 0.893 0.893 Inc. 
1986 0.919 1.000 0.919 0.919 Inc. 
1987 0.953 1.000 0.953 0.953 Inc. 
1988 0.961 0.997 0.961 0.964 Inc. 
1989 0.952 0.994 0.952 0.957 Inc. 
1990 0.996 0.999 0.996 0.997 Inc. 
1991 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1992 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
Average 0.915 1.000 0.915 0.916 
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Tables 7.14 and 7.15 show the values of EEM-Efficiency and EEM- 
Effectiveness indices calculated with CRS, VRS and MRS. The tables also include 
the values of scale efficiency and the type of returns to scale experienced by the 
operator in each year. 
Table 7.15 
EEM Effectiveness indices 
Year CRS VRS MRS SE SR 
1970 0.848 1.000 0.848 0.848 Inc. 
1971 0.815 0.989 0.815 0.824 Inc. 
1972 0.827 1.000 0.827 0.827 Inc. 
1973 0.813 1.000 0.813 0.813 Inc. 
1974 0.803 1.000 0.803 0.803 Inc. 
1975 0.763 1.000 0.763 0.763 Inc. 
1976 0.689 1.000 0.689 0.689 Inc. 
1977 0.688 1.000 0.688 0.688 Inc. 
1978 0.718 1.000 0.718 0.718 Inc. 
1979 0.740 0.989 0.740 0.748 Inc. 
1980 0.696 0.991 0.696 0.703 Inc. 
1981 0.674 0.994 0.674 0.678 Inc. 
1982 0.620 1.000 0.620 0.620 Inc. 
1983 0.705 1.000 0.705 0.705 Inc. 
1984 0.837 1.000 0.837 0.837 Inc. 
1985 0.916 1.000 0.916 0.916 Inc. 
1986 0.961 1.000 0.961 0.961 Inc. 
1987 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1988 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1989 0.949 0.997 0.949 0.951 Inc. 
1990 0.951 0.992 0.951 0.958 Inc. 
1991 0.938 0.999 0.938 0.939 Inc. 
1992 0.913 1.000 0.913 0.913 Inc. 
Average 0.820 0.998 0.820 0.822 
Figure 7.22a shows EEM with the values shown in Tables 7.14 and 7.15 related 
to the case of constant returns to scale. 
The efficiency measure showed considerable variability between 1970 and 1982 
but there was no clear trend - in some years it increased and in some years 
decreased. Between 1982 and 1985/86 the value is almost constant (88% - 89%) 
and then the system experienced an increase in efficiency reaching the value of 
100% in 1991/92 and maintaining it the following year. 
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From the plot of EEM values in Figure 7.22a we can see that between 1970 and 
1982 the only clear trend is a general decrease in the effectiveness of the system. 
The effectiveness decreases from about 85% to 62%. From 1983 and during the 
next four years there is a swift gain of 38% in the effectiveness value which 
attained 100% in 1987/88 and from 1988/89 a decrease of 9% by 1992/93. 
Figure 7.22a 
The efficiency/effectiveness matrix of London Underground (1970/92) 
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Figure 7.22b shows EEM in terms of shift from quadrant to quadrant. The 
years of relative high efficiency and effectiveness, with the exception of 1972, are 
the seven final years of the data set. The operations in the period from 1973 to 
1983, with the exception of 198 1, are relatively inefficient and ineffective and these 
years are lying in quadrant III. 
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Figure 7.22b 
The efficiency/effectiveness matrix of London Underground (1970/92) 
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The previous measures of performance were calculated in an inter temporal 
form. The problem with this type of measurement is that it does not discriminate 
between efficiency/effectiveness gains and technical progress. In the case of gains 
in perfonnance the production frontier is supposed to be fixed and in the case of 
technical progress there is the possibility of a shift in the frontier of production. 
The temporal dimension of the analysis led to the need to address this second 
aspect. In the present case, given our objectives, the distinction between 
performance gains derived from reduction in inefficiency levels or from technical 
progress is not important. In either case the link between organisation and 
performance would be established. Nevertheless we proceed to the investigation 
of technical progress. 
Technical progress and inefficiency are distinguished by looking at shifts from 
the efficiency frontier. The process is similar to the one followed by Tulkens and 
Wunsch (1994). Efficiency and effectiveness are calculated sequentially i. e. taking 
a small data set and adding more observations and recalculating the performance. 
An enterprise is considered inefficient in one year if there is another dominant 
year's performance before. The enterprise is considered to be making progress if 
by adding one more year of operation to the data set the performance of a year 
previously in the production frontier is now considered inefficient. The magnitude 
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of technical progress is going to be considered to be the largest decrease in 
efficiency experienced by an observation in the frontier of production. 
Table 7.16 contains the efficiency values calculated considering constant returns 
to scale for the periods 1970-1981 to 1970-1992. There were technological shifts 
in 1985,1986,1987,1991 and 1992. The magnitude of the technological shifts 
were 1.3% in 1985,3.5% in 1986,6.8 % in 1987,0.4% in 1991 and 4.7% in 1992. 
Table 7.16 
EEM-Efficiency values (CRS) 
Year Number of observations 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
19700.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.952 0.943 0.943 0.909 0.909 0.906 
1971 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.972 0.962 0.962 0.928 0.928 0.925 
1972 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.972 0.962 0.962 0.928 0.928 0.925 
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 OIL 0.932 0.923 0.923 0.900 0.890 0.887 
1974 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.853 0.845 0.845 0.815 0.815 0.812 
1975 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.932 0.923 0.923 0.890 0.890 0.887 
1976 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.952 0.943 0.943 0.909 0.909 0.906 
1977 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.952 0.943 0.943 0.909 0.909 0.906 
1978 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.932 0.923 0.923 0.890 0.890 0.887 
1979 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.912 0.904 0.904 0.871 0.871 0.868 
1980 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.932 0.923 0.923 0.890 0.890 0.887 
1981 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.972 0.962 0.962 0.928 0.928 0.925 
1982 0.986 0.974 0.969 0.967 0.957 0.926 0.917 0.917 0.887 0.885 0.881 
1983 1.000 1.000 0.987 0.962 0.926 0.921 0.921 0.921 0.885 0.881 
1984 1.000 0.994 0.973 0.938 0.929 0.929 0.924 0.896 0.893 
1985 1.000 OM2 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.893 0.893 
1986 1.000 Q 9M 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.930 0.919 
1987 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 QM 
1988 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.961 
1989 0.999 0.999 0.955 0.952 
1990 1.000 1.000 129-. ý 
1991 1.000 1.000 
1992 1.000 
Table 7.17 contains the effectiveness values. There were technological shifts of 
9.5% in 1985,4.8% in 1986 and 2.9% in 1987. 
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Table 7.17 
EEM-Effectiveness values (CRS) 
Year Number of observations 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1970 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.944 0.899 0.866 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 
1971 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.969 0.907 0.864 0.832 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 
19720.991 0.991 0.991 0.982 0.921 0.876 0.844 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827 
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Mm 0.862 0.830 0.813 0.813 0.813 0.813 0.813 
19740.971 0.971 0.971 0.949 0.894 0.851 0.820 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.803 
1975 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.849 0.808 0.779 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 
1976 0.813 0.813 0.813 0.813 0.767 0.730 0.704 0.689 0.689 0.689 0.689 0.689 
1977 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.813 0.766 0.729 0.703 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 
1978 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.851 0.800 0.761 0.734 0.718 0.718 0.718 0.718 0.718 
1979 0.927 0.927 0.927 0.878 0.824 0.784 0.756 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.740 
19800.847 0.847 0.847 0.824 0.775 0.738 0.711 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 
1981 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.800 0.751 0.714 0.688 0.674 0.674 0.674 0.674 0.674 
1982 0.807 0.807 0.739 0.691 0.658 0.634 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 
1983 0.959 0.849 0.781 0.743 0.716 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705 
1984 1.000 0.932 0.887 0.855 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 
1985 1.000 0.952 0.924 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 
1986 1.000 0.971 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961 
1987 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1988 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1989 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 
1990 0.951 0.951 0.951 
1991 0.938 0.938 
1992 0.913 
OrganisationlPerformance 
The link between reorganisation and evolution of performance shows some 
interesting aspects. In London the travel card was introduced before the 
reorganisation of the urban public transport system. This was feasible because the 
service was already co-ordinated prior to the creation of London Regional 
Transport. 
Between 1970 and 1982 the effectiveness of the transport operators declined. 
This can be seen in Figures 7.16,7.17 and 7.20. Figure 7.22a also shows a 
decrease of 38% in the effectiveness of the system during those years. The 
efficiency of the transport operators was stable. 
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From 1984, London experienced important innovations in the management of 
its transport system. The organisation of the transport system, previously 
controlled by the Greater London Council, passed to the Department of Transport 
and in 1985 the first tendered bus services were introduced in the network. Figure 
7.21 shows performance increases since 1984 and Figure 7.22a shows efficiency 
increases since 1986/87 and effectiveness increases starting in 1983. The efficiency 
value changed from 89% in 1985/86 to 100% in 1992/93 which corresponds to a 
increase of 11 %. The gains in effectiveness seem to be related to the introduction 
of the travel card in 1983, making it cheaper and easier to travel by public 
transport. Increases in effectiveness can also be seen in Figures 7.16 and 7.17 to 
be related to ratios of performance. 
From 1989/90 the system experienced a decrease in the effectiveness-EEM 
value. This value was 100% after 7 years of general increase but started 
decreasing in 1989/90 and in 4 years decreased 9%. 
The last four years clearly show the importance of the initial argument to adopt 
separate measures to evaluate performance: efficiency is improving but the 
operator is losing effectiveness. 
The evaluation of performance between 1980 and 1992/93 shows trend changes 
after the reorganisation of the public transport system. This suggests that the 
reorganisation of public transport system in London affected the performance of 
London Underground. 
7.4 Link Performance/Organisation 
The cases of Madrid and London show that the reorganisation of the structures of 
public transport provision corresponded to changes in the operation of services and 
their efficiency levels. The different structures reflect alternative forms of 
organising the markets (no co-ordination and no competition in model 1, co- 
ordination without competition in model 2, co-ordination with competition in 
model 3 and competition without co-ordination in model 4) which seem to 
influence their performance. It would be erroneous, however, to ignore other 
measures that have contributed to changes in the trends and to trend breaks (e. g. 
investment, pricing policies, management targets and subsidies) and that should be 
isolated to evaluate the full extent of the impact of market reorganisation. 
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London and Madrid provide good examples for analysis because their 
reorganisations took place in the mid 1980s. The amount of data available enables 
an evaluation of the influence that reorganisations of public transport systems 
induced in the performance of transport operators. Both examples suggest that 
reorganisations do influence the performance of transport operators. 
Equally interesting in terms of reorganisation impacts was the evolution of 
efficiency and effectiveness values. Tone and Sawada (1990), looking at bus 
operations in Japan report that "the more a company acts efficiently in income the 
less it serves the area". Lee (1989), Chu et A (1992) and Kerstens (1996) also 
suggest a possible divergence between efficiency and effectiveness. 
The results in Madrid (change from model 1 to model 2) and London (change 
from model 2 to model 3) however, show a different picture. The correlation 
between efficiency and effectiveness values is 0.705 for the 12 years of operation 
of Metro de Madrid and 0.613 for the 23 years of operation of London 
Underground. This means that, in the cases of Metro de Madrid and London 
Underground, the reorganisation led to increases in both efficiency and 
effectiveness which seem to be different from evidence presented for the cases 
where reorganisations did not take place. 
Another interesting aspect, shown in Figure 7.22a, is the evolution of efficiency 
and effectiveness in the last years of the data set for London Underground. This 
suggests that the effects of reorganisation might disappear after a certain period 
because the evolution of efficiency and effectiveness followed different trends 
during the last few years. 
The hypothesis that reorganisations of urban public transport systems influence 
the performance of transport operators is not contradicted in this study. On the 
contrary, not only the performance of the operators changed in these two cases but 
also the evolution of efficiency and effectiveness seems to have been different from 
any other cases presented in the literature. 
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The European Commission is committed to creating a Common Transport Policy. 
During the last few years effort has been devoted to abolishing barriers to 
international transport operations. Little attention, however, has been paid to local 
or urban transport. Over the last twelve years or so, however, several Western 
European cities and countries have reorganised their urban public transport 
structures and a diverse spectrum of organisational forms can now be found. 
The creation of the Single European Market in 1993, which aimed among other 
things to improve economic efficiency and enhance competition in Europe, brought 
major changes to the organisation of transport. Many institutional impediments to 
international transport have been removed. Truck operations both between 
Member States and a Member and a non-Member State have no price controls or 
quantitative restrictions for Union operators. Some countries have also liberalised 
their national operations and all quota limiting cabotage licences and price controls 
will be removed from July 1998 (Bayliss and Millington, 1995). Air transport was 
affected by the Third Package of EU air transport measures in January 1993 and 
full libeialisation, including cabotage, win be in place from April 1997. Shipping 
between Member States has generally been liberalised and controls over port entry 
and use have been removed. Railway operations are experiencing, or are about to 
experience, major changes in different countries following the publication of 
Directive 91/440/EEC concerning the accountancy separation of management of 
operation and infrastructure from the provision of railway transport services. The 
EU-Directives are being applied in different countries at different paces but 
competition in transport operations has expanded. The provision of major 
investments in transport infrastructures (e. g. the Trans-European Networks - 
TENs) is also increasingly being co-ordinated by the European Commission. 
The European Commission seems now committed to extend the Common 
Transport Policy to the local transport. In early 1996, it has published a Green 
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Paper - The Citizen's Network - Fulfilling the Potential of Public Passenger 
Transport in Europe, aimed at opening ways for the modernisation of the transport 
regulatory environment. The document mentions experiences of success in the 
organisation of public transport in urban areas and supports the introduction of 
tendering as a possible solution to improve cost discipline in the provision of 
services. The organisation of buses in Sweden and London involving tenders for 
major (area) and small (route-by-route) segments of the market, respectively, are 
referred as innovative examples of improved regulatory environments. This 
corresponds to enhancing an organisational system along the lines set out as model 
3 (see chapter 4). The concern of the EU document is to find mechanisms which 
would reduce the cost of operations, increase utilisation and improve the quality of 
local transport services. 
The reorganisation of urban public transport provision with the introduction of 
tendering systems has produced important cost reductions in bus services in 
London, Copenhagen and Gothenburg. But efficiency gains after reorganisation 
were also achieved in the underground operations in Madrid and London where the 
operators remained in public ownership and operation. Political pressure to cut 
costs led to gains in efficiency by Oslo Sporveier and by the operators of Emilia- 
Romagna region in Italy. The introduction of tendering in the bus operations led 
to cost reductions but extensive quantity of supply remained under the provision of 
public operators. Only recently the bus provision was completely privatised in 
London. 
The Citizen's Network follows a similar formulation to our models of urban 
public transport organisation (see chapter 4 and Green Paper - Annex A). The 
models correspond to the four options of combining the two main features: market 
competition and co-ordination of transport services. The different forms of 
combination induce different market structures, market conduct and market 
performance. 7he Citizen's Network favours competitive systems under the control 
and co-ordination of public authorities. 
The successful reorganisation of urban public transport systems lies not only in 
the choice of the organisational system adopted but also in the method of 
implementing the process of change. A structure of organisation with tendering 
for the provision of services could be implemented in cities already having a 
transport authority, the system being organised along the lines of model 2. In cities 
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without a transport authority, and with their organisation still along the lines of 
model 1, the creation of a transport authority co-ordinating operators (model 2) 
can lead to important gains in perfon-nance as, for example, achieved in Madrid. 
The starting point in terms of organisational structure inevitably affects the choice 
of the reorganisation to be undertaken. 
Our main concern is that aspects related to the dimension and forms of 
urbanisation of the areas were ignored in the EU-Green Paper. Berechman (1993) 
proposed different forms of organisation based on different characteristics (e. g. 
population) of the urban area and our work focuses on metropolitan areas precisely 
because we are convinced that dimensions of markets affect transport operations 
and structures of the markets. The empirical findings of most previous studies 
produced conflicting results mainly because variables reflecting the dimension of 
the urban areas were ignored (see Perry et A, 1988). If the European Commission 
is to impose a common form of organisation for passenger transport operations, 
the influence of the dimension of the urban area in the link between the 
performance of the operations and the form of organisation has to be addressed 
initially. 
The main contribution of this thesis relates to the establishment of a link 
between regulatory framework and performance of the transport operators. Two 
main functions of the transport systems have been identified: the production of the 
service and its utilisation. Those functions are performed by different agents: the 
producers of the service are the operators and the users are a subset of the 
potential passengers. In the evaluation of performance not only the technical 
efficiency of the operator is important but also the effectiveness of the transport 
system. The methodology of performance evaluation adopted in this work - 
Efficiency/Effectiveness Matrix - represents a powerful methodology to perform 
this evaluation. It has the advantage of presenting efficiency and effectiveness 
values separately and at the same time combining them in a global representation of 
the transport operators performance. 
It is tempting to propose the emerging models of organisation which favour the 
introduction of competitive systems combined with service co-ordination are best 
suited to operate the service. However, important gains in performance, both in 
terms of efficiency and effectiveness, were experienced by London Underground 
and Metro de Madrid and each city went through a different form of 
8.3 
Conclusions 
reorganisation. Both operators experienced increases in both efficiency and 
effectiveness which is different from evidence presented previously where 
reorganisations did not take place. Of course, we cannot say what would have 
happened if London and Madrid had followed the competitive tendering model - 
both efficiency and effectiveness may have increased further. 
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Table A. 1.1 
Comparative operating costs per mile for electric and other forms of traction on 
certain British municipal tramways 
(Costs are in old pence, where 240 old pence=fl. Figures in brackets refer to the average number 
of passengers per car mile where this is available) 
Derby Horse 1906 11.62 (9.45) 1907 10.84 (9.22) 1908 11.77 (8.11) 
Electric 6.00 (10.00) 6.33 (9.87) 6.35 (9.12) 
London Horse 1906 10.43 (12.20) 1907 10.12 (9.46) 1908 10.30 (9.36) 
LCC Electric 7.91 (11.66) 6.91 (11.25) 6.79 (10.91) 
Leeds Horse 1900 10.77 1901 9.52 1902 10.29 
Steam 11.86 11.05 10.41 
Electric 5.97 6.49 6.63 
Rochdale, Steam 1905 11.26 
Electric 7.92 
Leicester Horse 1903 9.68 (11.25) 1904 8.84 (10.07) 
Electric none 4.82 (9.79) 
Belfast Horse 1906 8.93 (9-05) 
Electric 4.54 (7.45) 
Source: Dickinson and Longley (1973). 
Table A. 1.2 
Operating expenses in pence per car-mile 
(Costs are in old pence, where 240 old pence=El) 
Town Electric raflway Horse Steam 
Gera 2.97 
Halle 3.51 
Marseilles 4.00 6.12 
Frankfurt 4.61 8.02 
Leeds 5.00 
Guernsey 5.79 
Birmingham 7.31 
Source: Dawson (1895b, 141) 
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Table A. 1.3 (First part) 
Electric lines in Europe already completed in 1905 
Name of Town (a) When Opened Miles of Track Number of Number of 
motor cars trailers 
Lines constructed by the Electric Construction Company, Limited, Wolverhampton 
Liverpool Overhead (be) March, 1893 13 40 
South Staffordshire January, 1893 8 16 
Total 21 56 
Lines constructed by Messrs. Mather and Platt, Manchester 
Bessbrook-Newry (b) October, 1885 3 3 
City and South London (bc) December, 1890 6.5 16 
Douglas and Laxley August, 1894 14 9 12 
Total 23.5 28 12 
Lines constructed by Messrs. Siemens Brothers and Co., London 
Port Rush (b) 1883 6 5 
Guernsey March, 1892 3 7 2 
Panama 1893 2 7 
Hobart Town September, 1893 8.5 20 
Total 19.5 39 2 
Line construted by Mr. Magnus Volk 
Brighton Beach (b) August, 1883 1 2 2 
Line constructed by Mr. Holroyd Smith 
Blackpool (f) 1884 1 
Lines constructed by the Thomson-Houston system 
Bremen May, 1892 10 25 
Remscheid July, 1893 5 7 
Hamburg March, 1894 26 36 
Erfurt June, 1894 7 29 
Gotha May, 1894 1.75 5 
Bordeaux 1893 6.5 16 
Lyons 1894 6.25 12 
Le Havre July, 1894 15 40 
Roubaix December, 1894 10 18 
Florence April, 1891 5 12 
Milan November, 1893 8 19 
Brussels May, 1894 18 35 
Liege 1893 2 5 
Leeds November, 1891 5.25 6 
Belgrade 1894 6.25 7 
Total 132 272 
Source: Dawson (1895a, 107). 
(a) Where not mentioned otherwise, overhead conductor was used. (b) Third rail conductor. (c) 
This line was run by electric locomotive. (d) Overhead conductor: slotted copper tube inside which 
collector slides. (e) Two cars per train, each car having motors wound direct on axles. (f) Conduit 
system. 
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Table A. 1.3 (Second part) 
Electric lines in Europe already completed in 1905 
Name of Town (a) When Opened Miles of Track Number of 
motor cars 
Number of 
trailers 
Electric roads equipped by Messrs. Siemens and Halske 
Budapest (town) (f) July, 1889 15 72 10 
Budapest (suburbs) October, 1893 10.5 20 
Hanover May, 1893 14.33 32 12 
Dresden July, 1893 7.5 16 16 
Genoa May, 1893 1.25 4 
Barmen (rack rail) April, 1894 2 8 
Barmen September, 1894 1.75 7 
Mulhausen (Alsace) July, 1894 3 9 7 
Lichterfelde (near Berlin) May, 1881 2.5 4 
Lemberg May, 1893 10 16 
Bucharest December, 1894 5.25 5 
Moedling (Vienna) (d) October, 1883 3.75 8 7 
Frankfurt-Offenbach (d) April, 1884 4.2 18 12 
Total 81 219 64 
Lines constructed by Compagnie de lIndustrie Electrique de Genýve 
Mont Salýve Rack Railw. (b) January, 1893 5.75 12 
Montferand, France (d) June, 1890 5 22 
Stans, Switzerland 1891 3.25 3 3 
Chavornay, Switzerland 1893 2.5 
Geneva, Switzerland 1894 3.5 
Total 20 37 3 
Lines const ructed by Maschinenfabrik-Oerlikon, Zurich 
Muffen, Switzerland (c) August, 1891 2.5 4 4 
Marseilles 1892 8 15 
Sissach-Gelterkinden, Sw'(c) May, 1891 2 1 8 
Zurich March, 1894 3 12 
Total 15.5 31 12 
Lines constructed by Elektricitifts Aktiengesellschaft (Schuckert and Co. ), Nuremberg 
Baden-Voslau July, 1894 6 9 9 
Zwickau, Saxony June, 1894 4.5 11 
Total 10.5 20 9 
Electric railways equipped by the Allgemeine Elektricitats Gesellschaft of Berlin 
Halle May, 1891 10 36 13 
Gera February, 1892 6.5 18 16 
Kiev May, 1892 8.75 32 
Breslau June, 1893 16.75 40 40 
Essen August, 1893 13.5 24 17 
Chemnitz December, 1893 13 28 20 
Christiania March, 1894 4.75 11 7 
Dortmund April, 1894 7 26 20 
Lubeck May, 1894 8.5 24 20 
Total 88.75 239 153 
Line constructed by Messrs. 0. L Kummer and Co. (Aktien-Gesellschaft Elektricitatswerke), 
Dresden 
Blasewitz, near Dresden December, 1893 6.5 10 10 
Vevey-Montreaux. (d) 1889 6.25 
Source: Dawson (1895b, 144). 
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Table A. 1.4 
Systems of electric traction on European tramways (December 31 of year) 
France Germany Great Britain All Europe 
Year Over- Other Total Over- Other Total Over- Other Total Over- Other Total 
head head head head 
1893 31 12 43 
1894 7 4 11 21 1 22 4 9 13 55 15 70 
1895 11 5 16 33 3 36 7 10 17 91 20 111 
1896 19 7 26 45 6 51 10 8 18 122 28 150 
1897 36 8 44 56 9 65 14 8 22 172 32 204 
1898 42 14 56 63 10 73 19 10 29 206 42 248 
1899 56 16 72 
1900 76 30 106 
1902 85 64 149 
Source: McKay (1976). 
Table A. 1.5 
Showing decrease of working expenses on electric roads in various cities 
(Costs are in old pence, where 240 old pence=fl) 
Halle: 1892 1893 
operating expenses per car-mile 2.90 d 2.79 d 
Gera: 1892 1893 
car-miles run 379,335 381,857 
working expenses per car-mile 2.97 d 2.80 d 
Frankfurt-Offenbach: 1884 1890 
working cost per car-mile 8.26 d 4.08 d 
Leeds, Roundhay-Road. 1892 1894 
total working cost per car-mile 6.63 d 5.5 d 
Bessbrook-Newry 1887 1891 
cost of haulape ver train-mile 4.2 d 3.94 d 
Source: Dawson (1895b, 144) 
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Table A. 2.1 
Main variables describing networks (1984) 
City Vehicle Km (millions) Passengers Seat-Km Seats in the Number of 
Subway Tram Bus/trolley (in millions) (in millions) fleet workers 
Hamburg 53 59 417 22,275 200,866 5,641 
Manchester 118 346 9,379 198,722 9,683 
Munich 33 26 21 417 9,291 133,678 4,134 
Vienna 12 46 20 527 8,008 148,332 8,543 
Madrid 95 475 6,806 128,145 6,522 
Liverpool 18 60 295 6,600 135,066 5,698 
Turin 15 35 330 6,197 136,789 5,691 
Rotterdam 14 6 19 234 5,612 97,959 3,187 
Naples 1 48 466 5,068 114,790 7,461 
Brussels 7 13 18 192 4,914 124,039 6,034 
Leeds 58 183 4,197 82,918 5,039 
Lyons 7 38 203 4,155 97,033 3,291 
Zurich 18 12 225 3,896 74,427 2,267 
Amsterdam 4 11 22 249 3,727 76,387 4,067 
Barcelona 37 226 3,164 74,772 6,641 
Marseilles 4 1 24 124 2,882 68,211 2,749 
Bonn 4 3 11 63 2,866 56,639 1,805 
Essen 8 15 79 2,808 49,443 2,071 
Haarlem 40 55 2,643 46,118 2,000 
Edinburgh 28 134 2,244 44,951 2,401 
Basel 16 4 94 2,229 42,346 1,104 
Florence 22 150 2,194 51,738 1,804 
Bordeaux 21 65 2,177 49,887 1,629 
Bologna 17 159 1,826 52,921 2,827 
The Hague 9 9 103 1,650 40,130 2,093 
Salerno 16 49 1,531 32,150 1,300 
Liege 15 58 1,405 33,862 1,130 
Antwerp 6 7 56 1,255 30,452 1,261 
Aachen 12 44 1,241 23,490 942 
Wiesbaden 11 50 1,237 22,498 742 
Grenoble 11 39 1,174 29,257 890 
Aarhus 15 50 1,148 18,164 912 
Augsburg 2 6 46 1,106 26,579 754 
Malmo 12 43 944 20,320 950 
Braunschweig 3 8 36 920 23,973 663 
Utrecht 10 33 911 16,089 808 
Dijon 7 34 857 20,346 465 
Nancy 7 28 821 23,512 552 
Kingston 10 40 814 18,736 800 
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Table A. 2.1 
Main variables describing networks (1984) 
City Vehicle Km (millions) 
Subway Tram Bus/trolley 
Passengers Seat-Km 
(in millions) (in millions) 
Seats in the Number of 
fleet workers 
Gent 2 6 30 791 16,488 635 
Bielefeld 2 4 28 738 18,883 571 
Trondheim 1 7 15 600 12,722 535 
Caen 6 18 554 14,958 420 
Blackpool 5 22 550 13,986 740 
Bergen 7 21 513 13,514 556 
Bergamo 5 33 488 12,240 402 
Salzburg 5 42 480 11,894 430 
Innsbruck 1 4 43 477 11,540 500 
Parma 5 39 464 13,015 365 
Rimini 5 23 441 8,936 344 
Arnhem 5 22 439 6,983 402 
Le Havre 5 21 403 8,057 407 
Winterhur 3 20 378 10,889 160 
Charleroi 4 12 338 8,277 352 
Maastricht 4 14 315 4,937 201 
St-Gallen 4 21 295 6,984 190 
Neuchatel 2 15 243 5,056 197 
Biel 2 13 210 5,700 163 
Brighton 1 3 9 195 4,264 170 
Verviers 2 68 166 4,770 149 
Source: Gathon (1989) (different order) 
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Table A. 2.2 
Main variables describing Emilia-Romagna networks 
Operator Year Staff Vehicles Vehicle Km Seat Ian Net-length Passengers Bus age 
A. C. A. P. 1986 171 58 2,348,138 230,643,831 219.6 13,616,682 10.00 
A. C. A. P. 1987 150 58 2,394,943 235,241,212 219.2 13,384,341 10.00 
A. C. A. P. 1988 148 57 2,405,984 236,377,375 219.6 12,858,446 10.00 
A. C. A. P. 1989 153 55 2,397,013 243,928,759 221.1 12,325,094 9.00 
A. C. A. P. 1990 170 55 2,596,994 264,515,643 236.7 11,214,438 11.00 
A. C. A. P. 1991 181 55 2,638,949 264,374,709 244.6 10,082,069 14.00 
A. C. A. P. 1992 173 56 2,630,768 254,949,606 255.7 10,451,366 12.00 
A. C. A. P. 1993 180 57 2,638,875 255,322,730 255.7 8,365,000 13.00 
T. E. P. 1986 385 113 4,572,794 477,877,207 346.1 25,633,416 10.93 
T. E. P. 1987 373 117 4,671,396 493,930,256 348.7 25,779,171 10.80 
T. E. P. 1988 407 126 4,902,756 520,081,244 362.2 25,585,739 11.13 
T. E. P. 1989 408 147 5,314,697 573,594,916 407.5 30,929,316 10.69 
T. E. P. 1990 431 141 5,613,339 603,777,204 336.7 26,310,125 11.63 
T. E. P. 1991 437 146 5,766,001 620,398,012 345.7 30,818,215 11.41 
T. E. P. 1992 412 144 5,816,414 622,598,649 347.2 31,307,374 11.38 
T. E. P. 1993 382 155 5,644,980 603,976,441 430.9 29,436,000 11.50 
A. C. T. 1986 222 82 3,582,656 366,086,276 275.1 23,660,996 10.10 
A. C. T. 1987 221 86 3,627,656 374,196,935 280.4 22,288,353 9.17 
A. C. T. 1988 225 87 3,674,712 379,889,192 263.8 21,149,360 7.01 
A. C. T. 1989 222 94 4,022,205 402,819,552 263.8 20,425,506 7.57 
A. C. T. 1990 215 95 3,992,897 397,356,297 273.6 19,248,678 8.66 
A. C. T. 1991 247 96 3,990,423 399,915,205 269.8 18,181,459 9.82 
A. C. T. 1992 233 92 4,027,091 404,853,964 271.9 19,147,862 9.42 
A. C. T. 1993 236 92 3,980,517 406,142,533 271.9 14,417,000 11.45 
A. T. M. C. 1986 300 114 3,725,404 371,200,562 390.5 19,582,022 10.80 
A. T. M. C. 1987 311 128 3,679,380 369,202,787 381.8 22,246,220 8.77 
A. T. M. C. 1988 330 123 3,868,786 408,078,289 377.9 10,220,930 10.36 
A. T. M. C. 1989 308 123 4,231,737 446,362,243 428.0 19,301,964 8.15 
A. T. M. C. 1990 305 126 4,294,946 444,254,216 469.0 17,869,667 12.11 
A. T. M. C. 1991 301 126 4,340,577 434,850,028 469.0 16,992,636 13.00 
A. T. M. C. 1992 290 125 4,377,113 438,726,790 458.5 10,998,174 15.00 
A. T. M. C. 1993 280 124 4,477,291 449,028,959 440.3 10,189,000 14.86 
A. T. C. 1986 1,699 445 16,486,308 1,755,791,802 524.7 140,206,960 10.90 
A. T. C. 1987 1,720 430 16,711,710 1,779,797,115 522.6 136,145,096 11.30 
A. T. C. 1988 1,702 430 17,115,511 1,822,801,922 538.3 135,887,390 12.30 
A. T. C. 1989 1,782 449 17,174,474 1,829,081,481 452.2 136,653,113 11.03 
A. T. C. 1990 1,634 453 17,645,720 1,879,269,180 463.0 128,098,053 11.90 
A. T. C. 1991 1,701 453 17,711,528 1,886,277,732 452.5 101,557,660 13.00 
A. T. C. 1992 1,505 453 17,540,878 1,868,103,507 537.0 109,231,288 14.00 
A. T. C. 1993 1,371 460 17,079,265 1,842,592,792 538.0 105,379,000 14.00 
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Table A. 2.2 (cont) 
Main variables describing Emilia-Romagna networks 
Operator Year Staff Vehicles Vehicle Km Seat Ian Net-length Passengers Bus age 
A. C. F. T. 1986 207 75 2,421,095 243,755,845 145.5 11,092,543 11.20 
A. C. F. T. 1987 207 75 2,415,274 247,581,687 145.5 10,977,075 9.63 
A. C. F. T. 1988 181 75 2,443,477 252,818,420 145.0 10,638,999 8.42 
A. C. F. T. 1989 179 75 Z483,637 257,669,060 177.0 10,012,598 10.00 
A. C. F. T. 1990 175 81 2,499,861 246,251,740 176.9 9,338,800 10.73 
A. C. F. T. 1991 175 81 2,469,660 242,575,493 196.0 9,157,268 10.73 
A. C. F. T. 1992 162 85 2,452,274 237,784,027 184.0 10,809,371 12.31 
A. C. F. T. 1993 164 85 2,399,661 232,682,423 165.0 9,069,000 12.31 
ATR 1986 116 55 2,483,155 232,603,901 295.0 7,215,354 12.89 
ATR 1987 130 57 2,473,522 230,037,546 340.7 6,017,092 11.64 
ATR 1988 125 56 2,489,680 239,631,700 357.2 5,881,751 11.60 
ATR 1989 133 66 2,537,436 224,909,100 357.2 5,315,939 9.00 
ATR 1990 143 71 2,726,605 230,609,338 357.2 3,848,910 9.30 
ATR 1991 158 73 2,848,636 263,323,229 496.1 3,786,072 9.90 
ATR 1992 160 77 3,071,791 273,030,358 496.1 4,609,012 11.00 
ATR 1993 166 82 3,011,032 269,267,045 495.6 4,395,000 11.30 
A. T. M. 1986 134 38 2,930,106 283,526,310 325.0 5,719,593 10.99 
A. T. M. 1987 142 39 3,003,810 288,904,905 325.0 5,499,531 11.96 
A. T. M. 1988 148 39 3,034,124 291,820,490 369.0 5,241,533 11.96 
A. T. M. 1989 165 40 2,579,293 251,416,585 369.0 4,898,031 12.70 
A. T. M 1990 151 45 2,656,397 255,840,547 481.0 4,564,837 8.91 
A. T. M. 1991 153 48 2,761,804 254,776,419 428.0 4,559,951 9.44 
A. T. M. 1992 137 48 2,769,801 255,514,142 428.0 3,881,317 iO. 44 
A. T. M. 1993 142 49 2,761,856 248,116,125 428.0 3,762,000 10.82 
T. R. A. M. 1986 384 108 5,522,069 523,697,140 269.0 20,892,359 9.36 
T. R. A. M. 1987 387 95 5,610,023 573,480,847 278.0 19,169,323 9.01 
T. R. A. M. 1988 382 108 5,621,039 551,248,136 275.0 17,650,712 8.11 
T. R. A. M. 1989 373 110 5,628,755 564,239,713 286.0 16,781,747 8.98 
T. R. A. M. 1990 366 105 5,589,785 572,333,426 293.0 19,014,893 9.86 
T. R. A. M. 1991 357 119 5,585,071 581,042,565 289.0 18,776,177 9.89 
T. R. A. M. 1992 353 122 5,395,753 543,378,864 305.0 17,804,777 10.77 
T. R. A. M. 1993 340 121 5,319,777 536,462,140 340.0 16,621,000 11.20 
A. 2.4 
Appendix A. 2 
Table A. 2.3 
DEA values for smallest 40 and 50-60 undertakings 
undertakings 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 40 _ 
Verviers 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Brighton 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Biel 0.962 1 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 
Neuchatel 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 
St-Gallen 0.9251 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 
Maastricht 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1,000 1.000 1.000 
Charleroi 0.6211 0.636 0.636 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641 
Winterhur 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Le Havre 0.710 0.769 0.769 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 
Arnhem 0.864 0.960 0.960 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 
Rimini 0.678 0.755 0.755 0.798 0.798 0.798 0.798 0.7981 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 
Parma 0.600 0.669 0.669 0.694 0.694 0.694 0.694 0.694 0.694 0.694 0.694 0.694 
Innsbruck 0.553 0.629 0.629 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 
Salzburg 0.556 0.630 0.630 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676 
Bergamo 0.585 0.664 0.664 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 
Bergen 0.496 0.575 0.575 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.617 
Blackpool 0.503 0.594 0.594 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 
Caen 0.575 0.673 0.673 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 
Trondheim 0.588 0.709 0.709 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.769 0.769 0.769 0.769 
Bielefeld 0.513 0.648 0.648 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 
Gent 0.557 0.713 0.713 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.811 
Kingston 0.501 0.645 0.645 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.715 0.715 0.715 0.715 
Nancy 0.531 0.675 0.675 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 
Dijon 0.643 0.824 0.824 0,896 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896 0,896 0.896 0.896 0.896 
Utrecht 0.637 0.838 0.838 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 
Braunschweig 0.500 0.658 0.658 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 
Malmo 0.519 0.687 0.687 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.748 0.748 0.748 0.748 
Augsburg 0.504 0.689 0.689 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766 
Aarhus 0.681 0.930 0.930 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Grenoble 0.455 0.631 0.631 0.718 0.718 0.718 0.718 0.718 0.729 0.729 0.729 0.729 
Wiesbaden 0.585 0.813 0.813 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0,981 0.981 0.981 0.981 
Aachen 0.562 0.776 0.776 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896 
Antwerp 0.438 0.605 0.605 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.693 0.693 0.693 0.693 
Liege 0.433 0.607 0.607 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.740 
Salerno 0.491 0.696 0.696 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.831 
The Hague 0.420 0.600 0.600 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.687 0.687 0.687 0.732 
Bologna 0.348 0.503 0.503 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.630 
Bordeaux 0.432 0.634 0.634 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.798 0.798 0.798 0.826 
Florence 0.419 0.616 0.616 0.727 0.727 0.727 0.727 0.727 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.803 
Basel 0.584 10.892 0.892 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table A. 2.3 (cont) 
DEA values for smallest 40 and 50-60 undertakings 
undertakings 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 40 
Edinburgh 0.493 0.725 0.725 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.860 0.860 0.860 
Haarlem 0.557 0.831 0.831 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Essen 0.550 0.823 0.823 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Bonn 0.489 0.733 0.733 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.944 0.944 0.944 
Marseilles 0.408 0.612 0.612 0.721 0.721 0.721 0.721 0.721 0.752 0.752 0.752 
Barcelona 0.406 0.613 0.613 0.725 0.725 0.725 0.725 0.725 0.771 0,771 0.771 
Amsterdam 0.463 0.705 0.705 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.924 0,924 0.924 
Zurich 0.496 0.773 0.773 0.94 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Lyons 0.404 0.618 0.618 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.980 0.9801 1.000 
Leeds 0.477 0.731 0.731 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Brussels 0.371 0.572 0.572 0.689 0.689 0.689 0.689 0.689 LOW 1.000 
Naples 0.412 0.637 0.637 0.769 0.769 0.769 0.769 0.769 1.000 
Rotterdam 0.533 0.826 0.826 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 LOGO 
Turin 0.420 0.653 0.653 0.806 10.84 10.8771 1.000 
Liverpool 0.452 0.704 0.704 0.947 1 1.000 1.000 
Madrid 0.490 0.765 0.765 0.960 1 1.000 
Vienna 0.496 0.777 0.777 1.000 
Munich 0.636 1.000 1.000 
Manchester 0.432 1.000 
Hamburg 1.000 
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Table A. 2.4 
Efficiency-EEM values for operators of Emilia-Romagna 
VRS Efficiency 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Average 
1 ACAP 1.000 0.911 0.912 0.878 0.784 0.765 0.797 0.776 0.853 
2 TEP 0.748 0.792 0.779 0.861 0.876 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.868 
3 ACT 0.874 0.903 0.906 0.990 1.000 0.887 0.958 0.946 0.933 
4 ATMC 0.661 0.639 0.683 0.821 0.846 0.819 0.861 0.926 0.782 
5 ATC 0.932 0.975 1.000 0.963 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.984 
6 ACFT 0.722 0.637 0.680 0.698 0.690 0.683 0.727 0.707 0.693 
7 ATR 1.000 1.000 0.948 1.000 0.880 0.867 0.905 0.844 0.931 
8 ATM 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.958 0.951 0.931 0.899 0.967 
9 TRAM 0.944 1.000 0.971 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.963 0.980 0.982 
6 Average 0.876 0.873 0.875 0.912 0.893 0.873 0.905 0.898 0.888 
Table A. 2.5 
Effectiveness-EEM values for operators of Emilia-Romagna 
VRS Effectiveness 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Average 
1 ACAP 0.992 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.938 0.885 0.889 0.786 0.936 
2 TEP 0.780 0.757 0.698 0.770 0.640 0.716 0.774 0.773 0.738 
3 ACT 1.000 0.961 0.908 0.898 0.889 0.743 0.817 0.666 0.860 
4 ATMC 0.645 0.682 0.423 0.622 0.595 0.582 0.472 0.473 0.562 
5 ATC 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.962 0.946 0.716 0.868 0.917 0.926 
6 ACFF 0.698 0.696 0.749 0.741 0.730 0.724 0.838 0.770 0.743 
7 ATR 1.000 0.950 0.995 0.962 0.968 0.741 0.828 0.806 0.906 
8 ATM 1.000 0.987 1.000 1.000 0.877 0.855 0.928 0.899 0.943 
-9 
TRAM 0.696 0.747 0.623 0.592 0.672 0.588 0.554 0.537 0.626 
7 Average 0.868 0.864 0.822 0.838 0.806 0.728 0.774 0.736 0.805 
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Table A. 2.6 
Efficiency values with constant returns to scale 
CRS Efficiency 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Average 
I ACAP 0.637 0.741 0.755 0.754 0.735 0.690 0.696 0.670 0.710 
2 TEP 0.587 0.626 0.604 0.664 0.662 0.671 0.714 0.747 0.659 
3 ACT 0.779 0.800 0.798 0.858 0.873 0.765 0.821 0.813 0.814 
4 ATMC 0.585 0.561 0.584 0.685 0.688 0.683 0.715 0.758 0.657 
5 ATC 0.527 0.553 0.567 0.544 0.556 0.557 0.587 0.635 0.566 
6 ACFF 0.557 0.565 0.660 0.680 0.665 0.655 0.694 0.671 0.643 
7 AIR 0.979 0.870 0.911 0.872 0.872 0.825 0.878 0.830 0.880 
8 ATM 1.000 0.995 1.000 0.840 0.805 0.826 0.925 0.889 0.910 
9 TRAM 0.662 0.807 0.684 0.715 0.739 0.769 0.728 0.746 0.731 
- 9 Average 0.702 0.724 0.729 0.735 0.733 0.716 0.751 0.751 0.730 
Table A. 2.7 
Effectiveness values with constant returns to scale 
CRS Effectiveness 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Average 
1 ACAP 0.798 0.837 0.815 0.772 0.685 0.606 0.627 0.490 0.704 
2 TEP 0.743 0.734 0.675 0.725 0.628 0.715 0.744 0.723 0.711 
3 ACT 1.000 0.946 0.882 0.863 0.840 0.691 0.771 0.573 0.821 
4 ATMC 0.612 0.671 0.291 0.588 0.550 0.530 0.356 0.341 0.492 
5 ATC 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.962 0.912 0.715 0.795 0.776 0.895 
6 ACFF 0.510 0.505 0.551 0.525 0.501 0.491 0.626 0.519 0.529 
7 ATR 0.584 0.434 0.441 0.375 0.253 0.225 0.270 0.248 0.354 
8 ATM 0.489 0.454 0.427 0.387 0.334 0.317 0.277 0.262 0.368 
-9 
TRAM 0.626 0.637 0.530 0.500 0.590 0.534 0.498 0.472 0.548 
10 Average 0.707 0.691 0.624 0.633 0.588 0.536 0.552 0.490 0.602 
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Table A. 2.8 
Scale efficiency 
-S 
Efficiency 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Average 
1 ACAP 0.637 0.813 0.828 0.858 0.938 0.902 0.874 0.864 0.839 
2 TEP 0.784 0.791 0.775 0.772 0.756 0.754 0.714 0.747 0.762 
3 ACT 0.892 0.887 0.881 0.867 0.873 0.863 0.857 0.860 0.872 
4 ATMC 0.885 0.879 0.856 0.834 0.813 0.834 0.830 0.819 0.844 
5 ATC 0.566 0.567 0.567 0.565 0.556 0.557 0.587 0.635 0.575 
6 ACFT 0.771 0.887 0.970 0.975 0.963 0.959 0.954 0.948 0.928 
7 ATR 0.979 0.870 0.961 0.872 0.991 0.951 0.970 0.982 0.947 
8 ATM 1.000 0.995 1.000 0.840 0.840 0.868 0.993 0.990 0.941 
9 TRAM 0.702 0.807 0.705 0.715 0.739 0.769 0.755 0.761 0.744 
- 13 Average 0.802 0.833 0.838 0.811 0.830 0.829 0.837 0.845 0.828 
Table A. 2.9 
Scale effectiveness 
_S 
Effectiveness 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Average 
1 ACAP 0.804 0.837 0.815 0.773 0.731 0.684 0.705 0.624 0.747 
2 TEP 0.953 0.970 0.966 0.942 0.983 0.999 0.961 0.936 0.964 
3 ACT 1.000 0.985 0.971 0.961 0.945 0.929 0.944 0.860 0.949 
4 ATMC 0.950 0.984 0.687 0.946 0.924 0.910 0.754 0.722 0.860 
5 ATC 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.964 0.999 0.916 0.846 0.966 
6 ACFT 0.731 0.726 0.737 0.709 0.686 0.678 0.747 0.674 0.711 
7 ATR 0.584 0.457 0.444 0.390 0.261 0.304 0.327 0.308 0.384 
8 ATM 0.489 0.460 0.427 0.387 0.380 0.370 0.298 0.291 0.388 
-9 
TRAM 0.900 0.853 0.851 0.845 0.877 0.907 0.898 0.879 0.876 
14 Average 0.823 0.808 0.766 0.772 0.750 0.753 0.728 0.682 0.760 
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Table A. 2.10 
Efficiency indices 
CRS VRS NUZS s Returns 
1986 A. C. A. P. 0.637 1.000 0.671 0.637 Unclear 
1987 A. C. A. P. 0.741 0.911 0.741 0.813 Inc. 
1988 A. C. A. P. 0.755 0.912 0.755 0.828 Inc. 
1989 A. C. A. P. 0.754 0.878 0.754 0.858 Inc. 
1990 A. C. A. P. 0.735 0.784 0.735 0.938 Inc. 
1991 A. C. A. P. 0.690 0.765 0.690 0.902 Inc. 
1992 A. C. A. P. 0.696 0.797 0.696 0.874 Inc. 
1993 A. C. A. P. 0.670 0.776 0.670 0.864 Inc. 
1986 T. E. P. 0.587 0.748 0.748 0.784 Dec. 
1987 T. E. P. 0.626 0.792 0.792 0.791 Dec. 
1988 T. E. P. 0.604 0.779 0.779 0.775 Dec. 
1989 T. E. P. 0.664 0.861 0.861 0.772 Dec. 
1990 T. E. P. 0.662 0.876 1.000 0.756 Unclear 
1991 T. E. P. 0.671 0.889 1.000 0.754 Unclear 
1992 T. E. P. 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.714 Dec. 
1993 T. E. P. 0.747 1.000 1.000 0.747 Dec. 
1986 A. C. T. 0.779 0.874 0.874 0.892 Dec. 
1987 A. C. T. 0.800 0.903 0.903 0.887 Dec. 
1988 A. C. T. 0.798 0.906 0.906 0.881 Dec. 
1989 A. C. T. 0.858 0.990 0.993 0.867 Dec. 
1990 A. C. T. 0.873 1.000 1.000 0.873 Dec. 
1991 A. C. T. 0.765 0.887 0.885 0.863 Dec. 
1992 A. C. T. 0.821 0.958 0.954 0.857 Dec. 
1993 A. C. T. 0.813 0.946 0.946 0.860 Dec. 
1986 A. T. M. C. 0.585 0.661 0.661 0.885 Dec. 
1987 A. T. M. C. 0.561 0.639 0.639 0.879 Dec. 
1988 A. T. M. C. 0.594 0.683 0.683 0.856 Dec. 
1989 A. T. M. C. 0.685 0.821 0.885 0.834 Unclear 
1990 A. T. M. C. 0.688 0.846 0.846 0.813 Dec. 
1991 A. T. M. C. 0.683 0.819 0.817 0.834 Dec. 
1992 A. T. M. C. 0.715 0.861 0.858 0.830 Dec. 
1993 A. T. M. C. 0.758 0.926 0.921 0.819 Dec. 
1986 A. T. C. 0.527 0.932 0.932 0.566 Dec. 
1987 A. T. C. 0.553 0.975 0975 0.567 Dec. 
1988 A. T. C. 0.567 1.000 1.000 0.567 Dec. 
1989 A. T. C. 0.544 0.963 0.963 0.565 Dec. 
1990 A. T. C. 0.556 0.999 0999 0.556 Dec. 
1991 A. T. C. 0.557 1.000 1.000 0.557 Dec. 
1992 A. T. C. 0.587 1.000 1.000 0.587 Dec. 
1993 A. T. C. 0.635 1.000 1.000 0.635 Dec. 
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Table A. 2.10 (cont) 
Efficiency indices 
CRS VRS MRS s Retums 
1986 A. C. F. T. 0.557 0.722 0.633 0.771 Inc. 
1987 A. C. F. T. 0.565 0.637 0.565 0.887 Inc. 
1988 A. C. F. T. 0.660 0.680 0.660 0.970 Inc. 
1989 A. C. F. T. 0.680 0.698 0.680 0.975 Inc. 
1990 A. C. F. T. 0.665 0.690 0.665 0.963 Inc. 
1991 A. C. F. T. 0.655 0.683 0.655 0.959 Inc. 
1992 A. C. F. T. 0.694 0.727 0.694 0.954 Inc. 
1993 A. C. F. T. 0.671 0.707 0.671 0.948 Inc. 
1986 ATR 0.979 1.000 1.000 0.979 Dec. 
1987 ATR 0.870 1.000 0.870 0.870 Inc. 
1988 ATR 0.911 0.948 0.914 0.961 Inc. 
1989 ATR 0.872 1.000 0.872 0.872 Inc. 
1990 ATR 0.872 0.880 0.872 0.991 Inc. 
1991 ATR 0.825 0.867 0.825 0.951 Inc. 
1992 ATR 0.878 0.905 0.905 0.970 Dec. 
1993 ATR 0.830 0.844 0.844 0.982 Dec. 
1986 A. T. M. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1987 A. T. M. 0.995 1.000 1.000 0.995 Dec. 
1988 A. T. M. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1989 A. T. M. 0.840 1.000 0.840 0.840 Inc. 
1990 A. T. M 0.805 0.958 0.808 0.840 Inc. 
1991 A. T. M. 0.826 0.951 0.826 0.868 Inc. 
1992 A. T. M. 0.925 0.931 0.925 0.993 Inc. 
1993 A. T. M. 0.889 0.899 0.889 0.990 Inc. 
1986 T. R. A. M. 0.662 0.944 0.944 0.702 Dec. 
1987 T. R. A. M. 0.807 1.000 1.000 0.807 Dec. 
1988 T. R. A. M. 0.684 0.971 0.971 0.705 Dec. 
1989 T. R. A. M. 0.715 1.000 0.987 0.715 Dec. 
1990 T. R. A. M. 0.739 1.000 1.000 0.739 Dec. 
1991 T. R. A. M. 0.769 1.000 1.000 0.769 Dec. 
1992 T. R. A. M. 0.728 0.963 0.963 0.755 Dec. 
1993 TRAM. 0.746 0.980 0.980 0.761 Dec. 
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Table A. 2.11 
Effectiveness indices 
CRS VRS MRS s Retums 
1986 A. C. A. P. 0.798 0.992 0.798 0.804 Inc. 
1987 A. C. A. P. 0.837 1.000 0.837 0.837 Inc. 
1988 A. C. A. P. 0.815 1.000 0.815 0.815 Inc. 
1989 A. C. A. P. 0.772 0.999 0.772 0.773 Inc. 
1990 A. C. A. P. 0.685 0.938 0.685 0.731 Inc. 
1991 A. C. A. P. 0.606 0.885 0.606 0.684 Inc. 
1992 A. C. A. P. 0.627 0.889 0.627 0.705 Inc. 
1993 A. C. A. P. 0.490 0.786 0.490 0.624 Inc. 
1986 T. E. P. 0.743 0.780 0.743 0.953 Inc. 
1987 T. E. P. 0.734 0.757 0.734 0.970 Inc. 
1988 T. E. P. 0.675 0.698 0.675 0.966 Inc. 
1989 T. E. P. 0.725 0.770 0.770 0.942 Dec. 
1990 T. E. P. 0.628 0.640 0.628 0.983 Inc. 
1991 T. E. P. 0.715 0.716 0.716 0.999 Dec. 
1992 T. E. P. 0.744 0.774 0.774 0.961 Dec. 
1993 T. E. P. 0.723 0.773 0.773 0.936 Dec. 
1986 A. C. T. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1987 A. C. T. 0.946 0.961 0.946 0.985 Inc. 
1988 A. C. T. 0.882 0.908 0.882 0.971 Inc. 
1989 A. C. T. 0.863 0.898 0.863 0.961 Inc. 
1990 A. C. T. 0.840 0.889 0.840 0.945 Inc. 
1991 A. C. T. 0.691 0.743 0.691 0.929 Inc. 
1992 A. C. T. 0.771 0.817 0.771 0.944 Inc. 
1993 A. C. T. 0.573 0.666 0.573 0.860 Inc. 
1986 A. T. M. C. 0.612 0.645 0.612 0.950 Inc. 
1987 A. T. M. C. 0.671 0.682 0.671 0.984 Inc. 
1988 A. T. M. C. 0.291 0.423 0.291 0.687 Inc. 
1989 A. T. M. C. 0.588 0.622 0.588 0.946 Inc. 
1990 A. T. M. C. 0.550 0.595 0.550 0.924 Inc. 
1991 A. T. M. C. 0.530 0.582 0.530 0.910 Inc. 
1992 A. T. M. C. 0.356 0.472 0.356 0.754 Inc. 
1993 A. T. M. C. 0.341 0.473 0.341 0.722 Inc. 
1986 A. T. C. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1987 A. T. C. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Con. 
1988 A. T. C. 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 Con. 
1989 A. T. C. 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.000 Con. 
1990 A. T. C. 0.912 0.946 0.946 0.964 Dec. 
1991 A. T. C. 0.715 0.716 0.715 0.999 Inc. 
1992 A. T. C. 0.795 0.868 0.868 0.916 Dec. 
1993 A. T. C. 0.776 0.917 0.917 0.846 Dec. 
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Table A. 2.11 (conQ 
Effectiveness indices 
CRS VRS MRS s Returns 
1986 A. C. F. T. 0.510 0.698 0.510 0.731 Inc. 
1987 A. C. F. T. 0.505 0.696 0.505 0.726 Inc. 
1988 A. C. F. T. 0.551 0.749 0.551 0.737 Inc. 
1989 A. C. F. T. 0.525 0.741 0.525 0.709 Inc. 
1990 A. C. F. T. 0.501 0.730 0.501 0.686 Inc. 
1991 A. C. F. T. 0.491 0.724 0.491 0.678 Inc. 
1992 A. C. F. T. 0.626 0.838 0.626 0.747 Inc. 
1993 A. C. F. T. 0.519 0.770 0.519 0.674 Inc. 
1986 ATR 0.584 1.000 0.584 0.584 Inc. 
1987 ATR 0.434 0.950 0.434 0.457 Inc. 
1988 AIR 0.441 0.995 0.441 0.444 Inc. 
1989 ATR 0.375 0.962 0.375 0.390 Inc. 
1990 ATR 0.253 0.968 0.253 0.261 Inc. 
1991 ATR 0.225 0.741 0.225 0.304 Inc. 
1992 AIR 0.270 0.828 0.270 0.327 Inc. 
1993 ATR 0.248 0.806 0.248 0.308 Inc. 
1986 A. T. M. 0.489 1.000 0.489 0.489 Inc. 
1987 A. T. M. 0.454 0.987 0.454 0.460 Inc. 
1988 A. T. M. 0.427 1.000 0.427 0.427 Inc. 
1989 A. T. M. 0.387 1.000 0.387 0.387 Inc. 
1990 A. T. M 0.334 0.877 0.334 0.380 Inc. 
1991 A. T. M. 0.317 0.855 0.317 0.370 Inc. 
1992 A. T. M. 0.277 0.928 0.277 0.298 Inc. 
1993 A. T. M. 0.262 0.899 0.262 0.291 Inc. 
1986 TR. A. M. 0.626 0.696 0.626 0.900 Inc. 
1987 T. R. A. M. 0.637 0.747 0.637 0.853 Inc. 
1988 T. R. A. M. 0.530 0.623 0.530 0.851 Inc. 
1989 T. R. A. M. 0.500 0.592 0.500 0.845 Inc. 
1990 T. R. A. M. 0.590 0.672 0.590 0.877 Inc. 
1991 T. R. A. M. 0.534 0.588 0.534 0.907 Inc. 
1992 T. R. A. M. 0.498 0.554 0.498 0.898 Inc. 
1993 T. R. A. M. 0.472 0.537 0.472 0.879 Inc. 
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